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3ABSTRACT
This study seeks to investigate the empirical basis for the hypothesis, arising from the
economics literature, that public enterprises are inherently less efficient than private
enterprises, with reference to British ports which provide a comprehensive
"laboratory" of mixed—ownership enterprises.
The relative productive efficiency of public ports vis—a—vis private ports is
evaluated in terms of efficiency frontiers of the industry at a fairly high degree of
rigour. By applying the techniques of efficiency measurement the various ways that a
British port producer might depart from overall productive efficiency were
systematically explored. These include: production on the interior of the production
possibilities set; production in the congested region of the boundary of the production
possibilities set; and deviation from the scale that arises from the long—run
competitive equilibrium. As well as static productive performance, productive
performance relative to dynamic production frontiers is also the subject of
investigation.
Both mathematical programming techniques and econometric techniques are
employed. To fulfil the tasks in the empirical analysis, the econometric approach has
been enhanced in two ways. First, a less restrictive structure of production technology
is specified in estimating efficiency frontiers in order to define parametric measures in
a more meaningful way. Second, Solow's (1957) measure of productivity growth is
reconsidered in a context of stochastic frontier functions, which enables us to
translate efficiency gains over time into a movement towards frontiers and a
movement of the frontiers.
As far as British ports are concerned we found no evidence for believing the
inefficiency associated with public ownership to be unavoidable. The results cast
serious doubt on the transformation in productive performance brought about by the
port privatisation programme.
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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Some standard mathematical notations used in the text are explained as follows:
-: A:—B A Is defined by B;
€ a e A a Is an element of A;
c AB Alsasubsetoffl;
If X and Y
	 R(m), then X 1
	Yj
 for all 1-1,2,...
X Y if and only if Xj
	Yj;
R(m)	 Euclidean space of dimension m;
R(m)+:— (x: xER(m), x 0)+. ICY;)
11.11	 IIXII:— (E(Xj)2)1'2, Euclidean norm of X R(m);
X -H-a', X tends to +a'
Abbreviations are explained where they are first introduced in a section and redefined
when they appear in other sections.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Patterns of Port Ownership in the UK
There are well over 300 ports and harbours in the United Kingdom ranging in size
and complexity from small river wharves and fishing harbours to more than 100
commercially significant port authorities, as illustrated in Fig 1.1-1. A striking
feature of British ports is the diversity in the forms of ownership.
Port ownership in this thesis is defmed in terms of who provides port facilities
and services. A port basically functions as a meeting point for various transport
modes such as maritime shipping, inland navigation, highway and railway transport,
pipeline and aeroplane. A bundle of different facilities and services have to be
provided in order to fulfil the basic function of a port. Broadly these can be
categorised into three groups: 1) the infrastructure (land, water area, docks, locks,
breakwaters, channels, navigational aids, etc.); 2) the superstructure (quay cranes,
gantries, forklifts, warehouses, sheds, etc.) and 3) the services (cargo loading and
unloading, storage, pilotage, towage, etc.). Since any parties, such as national
government, local government, independent public entities and private operators,
may be involved in providing port facilities and services, port ownership is not
simply a dichotomy between private and public ownership as in many other
industries. The allocation of the provision rights and hence the property rights for
the infrastructure, the superstructure and services among various parties gives rise
to different patterns of port ownership as shown in Fig 1.1-2.
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Fig 1.1-1 Port Ownership in the UK
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in which the domain of the port authority is restricted to the provision of the
infrastructure, while investment in the superstructure and port operation are the
responsibility of licensed private companies. Thus we see that the frontier of public
authorities rolls back gradually from Fig 1.1-2 (a) to (c). When the provision of
all the facilities and services is left to the private sector as shown in Fig 1.1-2 (d)
we have the case of a private port.
Since a public port authority usually owns the property rights to the
infrastructure, its role in port activities is more than just a normal operator along
with others. As well as being directly involved in port operations, a port authority
is typically responsible for port planning, promotion and regulation of matters such
as pollution, safety of life and property within the physical boundary of the port.
A port authority is also potentially entitled to take advantage of its position to
monitor and control the conduct of licensed private operators when necessary. In so
doing a port authority is acting as a regulatory agency, designed to address
undesirable features of market forces and to promote the interests of port
customers and producers as a whole.
Therefore port ownership is better characterised in terms of the status and the
jurisdiction of the port authority. In the status dimension port ownership represents
the degree of devolution from the case of centralised administration to the case of
comprehensive privatisation. In the jurisdiction dimension port ownership represents
the extent of public control from the case of a pure public-sector port to the case
of a pure private-sector port. Indeed port ownership can be viewed as a range of
public policy instruments extending from laissez faire to government control.
Nearly all the types of port ownership can be found in the UK. Best-known
are its trust ports, which constituted the most important form of port ownership in
the UK before the second stage of pnvatisation in late 1980s and early 1990s. Also
in the UK there are a number of private ports - a form of port ownership rarely
found in the rest of the world. Private ports have now become the most important
type of port ownership following the privatisation of some major trust ports (we
16
shall return to this in the next section). In addition there are a small number of
municipal ports and even one national port. Fig 1.1-3 shows the relative
importance of the different forms of ownership in terms of traffic in 1990.
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Fig 1.1-3 Relative Importance of Port Ownership in the UK 1990
Note: This is estimated on the basis of traffic data in Port Statistic.s 1990 published by Ministry
of Traiisport and British Ports Federation. After privatising two municipal ports (Bristol and Boston)
in 1991 and a number of trust ports (Clyde, Forth, Medway, Tees & Hartlepool and Tilbury) 70%
of the cargo handling capacity of Britain's ports belongs to the private sector.
Trust ports have the characteristics of an autonomous port, but they are more
independent than autonomous ports in France and Italy. Trust ports are set up by
individual acts of Parliament or statutory orders, and owned and administered by
self—governing bodies. The Secretary of State for Transport appoints most board
members, including the chief executive of the port and also representatives from
interested groups e.g. 'port users'. The remit of trust ports is typically, to provide
a service for the import and export of goods by sea; to provide navigational
conservancy; and to make the best use of their assets. Trust ports are not
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profit-making and were not permitted to engage in non-port activities until recently
(Transport and Works Act, 1992). They are required to earn enough revenue to
cover depreciation on assets at replacement cost, to pay interest on loans, and to
provide for loan redemption. In years when they realise surplus revenue they must
devote such a surplus to the furtherance of their statutory objectives, not the least
of which, from the user's point of view, is a reduction in port dues and charges
levied on ships and cargoes. Trust ports are usually capitalised by fixed-interest
borrowing either from normal commercial sources, sometimes supported by
government or directly from government. In the same way as other commercial
undertakings trust ports are liable to national and local taxation. In 1990, 50 per
cent of cargo volume though the UK ports was handled by trust ports. The trust
ports which are included in the 10 largest British ports in 1990, as shown in Table
1.1-1, are London, Dover, Tees & Hartlepool, Milford Haven and Medway.
In 1990, 37 per cent of cargo volume through UK ports was handled by
private ports. These include the Associated British Ports (ABP), Felixstowe,
Liverpool, Manchester and a number of small ports. The list should now also
include Tees & Hartlepool, Medway, Forth and Tilbury (a division of the Port
Authority of London), as a result of the second wave of port privatisation in 1991
and 1992. Needless to say private ports are managed by boards which are elected
by shareholders. Exceptional are London, Medway and Forth, which were privatised
by staff buy-out. Typically private ports are profit-making, and company status
enables them to diversify their activities into non-port areas such as investment in
real estate. Private ports are capitalised by share-issuing and are liable to national
and local taxation.
Municipal ports are owned by local authorities and managed by boards
nominated by local authorities. The boards are divisions of the local councils rather
than autonomous bodies. Like trust ports, municipal ports are non-profit making
and are not free to diversify their activities. Municipal ports are usually required to
generate revenue to cover total cost and to finance new port development. Some
18
municipal ports are sometimes required to make a contribution to the budget of
the local authority. Municipal ports are capitalised by local government at fixed
interest rates and liable to national taxation (except the Corporation Tax) and local
rates. The best—known municipal ports are Bristol, Sullom Voe and Ramsgate. The
remainder are small. In 1990, 13 per cent of cargo volume through UK ports was
handled by municipal ports.
Table 1.1-1 Top Ten British Ports 1990
Order	 Ranging by Trafflc[1] Ranking by Trade Value[2]
(Thousand tonnes)
	 ( million)
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
London
(58,148)
Tees & Hart lepool
(40,248)
Crlsmby & Imxningham
(39,357)
Sullom Voe
(36,011)
Milford Haven
(32,180)
Southampton
(28,849)
Forth
(25,433)
Liverpool
(23,183)
Fel ixstowe
(16,448)
Medway
(15,901)
Dover
(36,256)
Fel lxstowe
(25,048)
London
(13,298)
Crlmsby & lmmingham
(11,665)
Southampton
(10,336)
Harwi ch
(9,422)
Liverpool
(6,496)
Ramsgat e
(5,625)
Medway
(4,544)
Tees & Hart lepool
(2,905)
Notes:
[1] All Foreign and domestic traffic; See figures in the parentheses below each port.
[2J Imports and exports; See figures in the parentheses below each port.
Source: Fort statistics 1990 published by Ministry of Transport and British Ports Federation.
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In addition to the above categories, there are only 4 small ports remaining in
the nationalised sector of the ports industry. A separate administrative unit
responsible to the Government, the British Waterways Board (BWB), owns them
and operates two of them. The share of the national port group in the total UK
port traffic is negligible.
The main features of alternative forms of port ownership are compared and
contrasted in Table 1.1-2. Unlike their counterparts in the rest of the world, for
instance those in continental European countries, public ports in Britain are
financially independent and are required to cover costs with no financial assistance
from the Government. On the other hand they are free to set and vary their
charges, subject only to the right of appeal of port users with regard to two
specific types of charges (section 31 of the Harbours Act 1964). Since 1984 there
has been no requirement for ports to seek government sanction for new investment
regardless of size. Thus they operate as normal commercial undertakings in much
the same way as private ports.
The extent to which port authorities participate directly in port operation in
the UK also varies. Where the infrastructure and the superstructure serve general
cargo they are mostly provided by the port authority. But in the case of bulk
cargo private companies (oil, steel companies, etc.) other than port authorities are
often responsible for a considerable proportion of the investment in the
superstructure. Conservancy in most ports is provided by the port authority. In all
ports cargo handling is mostly undertaken by port authorities and only 20 per cent
is undertaken by licensed stevedoring companies. Piotage used to be provided by
regional piotage authorities in some ports and by port authorities in others. Under
legislation passed a few years ago the responsibility for pilotage was transferred to
the local port authorities. The responsibility for lighterage and towage is fulfilled in
some ports by private towage undertakings and in others by the port authority. By
and large the duties and powers of port authorities are comprehensive. Thus the
typical form of UK port ownership is very close either to the service port or the
Company Port
Trust Port
Municipal Port
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private port types as shown in Fig.1.1-2 (a) or (d).
Table 1.1-2 Features of Alternative Port Ownership
Company Port
Trust Port
Municipal Port
Ownership
Shareholders[1]
Public trust
Local authorities
Management
Elected by shareholders
Appointed by the Ministry
Appointed by local authorities
Ob lect ives
Company Port
	
Profit making
Trust Port
	
Public interests
Municipal Port	 Local Interests
Managerial Constraints
Company Port
	 Shareholders, take over and bankcruptcy
Trust Port
	 Managerial change
Municipal Port	 Managerial change and intervention
by local authorities
Pricing [2]
Company Port
	
No restriction
Trust Port
	
No restriction
Municipal Port	 No restriction
Investment
Company Port
	
No requirement to seek sanction
Trust Port
	
No requirement to seek sanction
Municipal Port	 No requirement to seek sanction
Company Port
Trust Port
Municipal Port
Company port
Trust Port
Municipal Port
Company Port
Trust Port
Municipal Port
Company Port
Trust Port
Municipal Port
21
Table 1.1-2 (Continued) Features of Alternative Port Ownership
Financing
Share Issuing and borrowing from markets
Fixed-interest loan[3]
Fixed-Interest loan[4]
Activity Area
Free to diversify
Legislatively restricted to port act ivity[5]
Legislatively restricted to port activity
Taxation
national and regional taxation
national and regional taxation
national and regional taxation[6]
Right to Exit
Not without the sanction of Parliament
Not without the sanction of Parliament
Not without the sanction of Parliament
Notes:
[1] Three recently privatised trust ports (Medway, Forth and Tilbury) are owned by their
management and employees.
[2J Under the Harbours Act (1964) section 31 port customers are entitled to challenge excessive port
charges over costs.
[3] There is a borrowing limit imposed by Government
[4] There is a borrowing limit imposed by local authorities, which is tighter than the borrowing
limit imposed on trust ports.
[5] Under the Transport And Works Act published in March 1992 restrictions on the right of trust
ports to diversify have been removed.
[6] Except Corporation Tax.
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1.2 Evolution of Port ownership in the UK
The current status of port ownership in the UK is the result of an extended
historical evolution involving the interplay of political, economic and technological
influences.
Municipal ports were the earliest form of port ownership, this being the
approach to port administration under the British Monarchy as early as the 10th
century. Private ports were the product of industrial revolution and the railway era
when railway companies began to build their own docks. The system of trust ports
grew up in the 19th century, and provided a means of ensuring that harbour
facilities in a given area were properly maintained for the benefit of the local
shipping and/or fishing communities. Before World War Two most of the large
ports in the UK were trust ports and the remainder were owned either by public
or private companies or by municipalities. The general view then was in favour of
trust ports because they combined the features of public ports with the advantage
of autonomous status. Apart from diverse status of port authorities, another feature
of port administrative structure at that time was that port facilities and services
were provided by various separate private and public operators.
Since World War Two the UK port transport industry has undergone
considerable organisational change. Many factors have influenced development within
the industry. But political and economic events have been the major parameters in
shaping the present institutional arrangements (Thomas,1981). Table 1.2-1 lists the
principal landmarks of developments since 1945.
Shortly after the Second World War the Labour Government which was in
office from 1945 to 1951 launched a vast nationalisation programme. Following the
nationalisation of the Bank of England, the coal industry and the Air Corporation,
several transport sectors including railways and their ports were nationalised with
the Transport Act 1947.
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Table 1.2-1 Principal Events In the British Port Industry
1945-1992
Time	 Events
1947
1962
1964
1965-1969
1971 -1972
1981
1990-1992
Transport Act of 1947;
Nationalisation of railway ports and
formation of British Transport Commission;
Transport Act of 1962;
Reorganisation of British Transport Commission
into British Transport Dock Board;
Rochdale report of 1962;
Harbours Act of 1964;
Set-up of National Ports Council;
Amalgamation of ports;
Reconstitution of major port trusts;
Transport Act of 1981;
Privatisation of British Transport Dock Board into
Associated British Ports;
Privatisation of Major Trust Ports and Municipal Ports.
Nationalisation, as a modern concept, was aroused on the one hand by the
apparent exploitation of labour by capital, a strand rooted in socialist ideology, and
on the other hand, by a growing awareness of the limitation of competition in
those industries where a natural monopoly seemed to exist, a strand rooted in
pragmatism (Thompson and Hunter, 1973, pp.3). We shall return to the second
24
strand in detail in the next section.
Under the Transport Act of 1947 all properties owned by railway companies
including their ports and docks were transfered to the British Transport Commission
(BTC). The BTC had six assistant authorities, one of which, the Dock and Inland
Waterway Executive was, in charge of ex-railway ports.
After this the organisational structure of UK ports remained unchanged until
the transfer of the publicly owned ports from the Dock Division of the BTC to
the newly created British Transport Dock Board (BTDB) under the Transport Act
of 1962. Two factors led to the passing of the 1962 Act. One was the huge deficit
of the BTC from its railway undertakings. The other was the inability of BTC to
manage its vast undertakings, including railways, the ex—railway ports, long distance
road haulage, road passenger transport, inland waterway transport and London
passenger transport. Under the 1962 Act, the BTC was dissolved and separate
public corporations in the form of various boards were established, each with its
own power and jurisdiction and each responsible to the Minister of Transport. Most
of the ex-railway ports were put under the control of BTDB and the docks linking
with the inland waterway system were put under the control of British Waterways
Board (BWB).
The subsequent structural changes were a direct result of the findings of the
Rochdale Committee in 1962 (Rochdale Report, 1962). The Rochdale report made
detailed recommendations with respect to each of the selected ports, with overall
recommendations on a broad policy for the whole industry. The Committee
suggested considerable benefits would be derived by comlining many port functions
under a single port authority. The Committee favoured the continued existence of
independent trusts although it recommended revisions in the constitution of trust
ports. It was also recommended that ports in direct public ownership should be
replaced by trusts. To improve regional planning of port capacity and unity of
command in the provision of the most important services, the Committee envisaged
the amalgamation of certain existing ports, and proposed grouping them on existing
25
estuary basis. As far as national planning was concerned the establishment of a
national port authority was also envisaged which would be non-operational, would
have responsibility for the overall development of UK ports, and would be given
the necessary statutory powers to accomplish this.
The Conservative Government then in power rejected the idea of a national
ports authority, and established in its place, a National Ports Council (NPC). The
NPC was an advisory body which did not possess the power to enforce policies. It
was established by the Harbours Act of 1964 and given the responsibility, subject
to the Secretary of State's approval, for 'formulating and keeping under review the
improvement and development plans of port authorities in the UK and encouraging
and promoting more efficient management of port facilities and services'.
With respect to organisational structure the work of the NPC can be
conveniently subdivided into two phases (Thomas, 1981). Between 1965 and 1968
the NPC implemented a scheme of port almagamation on an estuary basis and
reconstitution of harbour authorities in line with the recommendations of the
Rochdale Committee. The provision of cargo-handling services, piotage, and
conservancy was, until the early 1960s, very similar to that currently prevailing in
continental European countries with the existence of non-operational port
authorities while port services were provided by private or public operators. The
arguments for the amalgamation of port undertakings on which most emphasis was
usually laid were those concerned with priorities in investment, the avoidance of
the wasteful duplication of resources, better planning in the distribution of traffic,
more realistic charging schemes, and fuller use of port capacity. Following
discussion with interested parties, larger port authorities were established under
which port functions were concentrated. In effect this led to the enlargement of
independent port trusts and the extension of the role of public ownership, since the
type of port administration to emerge from rationalisation was determined by the
predominant authority existing before.
The policy of rationalisation initiated by the Rochdale Committee and
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promoted by the NPC had the support of the law with the introduction of a more
rigid and effective licensing procedure under the Harbour Act of 1966. According
to the provision of the 1966 Act applicants for licences to operate as stevedores
were required to satisfy two principal conditions. First, they must be competent to
manage and supervise operation efficiently and they must be prepared to provide
all necessary and proper equipment for use in connection with their work. This
implies the needs for managerial expertise and investment on the part of the
applicant. Secondly the applicant must be prepared to provide permanent
employment to dock workers in accordance with the provisions of the local labour
board.
The implementation of the policy of rationalisation in the provision of port
services was also accelerated by two further important contributory factors. The
most significant was the amendment (Dock Worker Act, 1967), in 1967, of the
National Dock Labour Scheme introduced in 1947 (National Dock Labour Board,
1947), which required licensed employers to prohibit the continuing practice of
casual employment. The other factor was the organisational and operational change,
as well as new investment in specialised facilities which come with rapid
technological advance in maritime transport industries (namely the introduction of
cargo unitisation and the development of bulk shipments). Many companies were
forced to leave the industry because of inability to cope with the new situation.
The survivors often had to merge with others to acquire sufficient management
expertise and capital for development.
As a result of these changes the number of licensed private operators fell
significantly and port authorities assumed an increasingly important role in the
provision of cargo handling and other port services.
From 1971 the NPC engaged in the reconstitution of major trust ports to
make the boards smaller, to include more executive members and to ensure that
members were appointed for their knowledge and experience rather that by
particular bodies and interests.
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Apart from the nationalisation of the ex-railway ports, successive Labour
governments also initiated a number of unsuccessful attempts to bring the port
sector as a whole under public ownership. The Ports Bill of 1969 was designed to
establish a national ports authority to control all harbours handling more than 5
million tonnes of cargo a year. In August 1974 the Labour government announced
that UK ports were to be nationalised, and a consultative letter outlining the
proposed administrative structure was published. A second consultative document
prepared in April 1975 proposed that all private commercial port undertakings
should be transferred to public ownership. The suggested organisational structure
was intended to increase central control of port management whilst preserving the
maximum degree of local independence and initiative. These documents failed to
become law with the defeat of Labour in the general elections of 1970 and 1979.
In the early I 980s the Conservative government launched a series of
privatisation schemes which in the transport sector included the BTDB ports. The
Conservatives believed that port users would be best served by allowing ports to
compete with each other and by leaving the development of new port facilities to
commercial requirement and market forces. It was not considered appropriate to
attempt to lay down a detailed plan or framework for the operation and
development of UK ports. In May 1981 the Transport Act 1981 empowered the
Government to transfer the ownership of the BTDB from the public sector to the
private sector with the new title of Associated British Ports (ABP).
The privatisation of BTDB was only the first series of privatisations. In
January 1990, Boston, a municipal port, was privatised, which can be considered as
the starting point of a second stage of privatization in the industry. Boston was
followed in 1991 by Bristol - the largest municipal port, which was sold by Bristol
Council to First Corporate Shipping. In August 1990 the then Prime Minister, in
answering a Parliamentary question, said that the Government was looking into the
possibility of an enabling bill aimed at the privatisation of the trust ports. In the
mean time trust ports wishing to become limited companies have been encouraged
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by the Government to submit Private Bills to Parliament. Privatisation of trust
ports was perceived as a means of increasing the ability of trust ports to diversify
activities and to invest in port related transport operations. The opportunity offered
by company status for commercial redevelopment in dockland areas and property
development was seen as an attraction of privatization. Much of the growth of
ABP has been attributed to property development. Company status would also
facilitate a wider access to sources of capital for investment than is currently
available to trust ports. Thus an important objective of port privatisation proposed
at this time was particularly related to development needs. Under the powers of
the Ports Act 1991 Tees & Hartlepool was taken over by a private company,
which beat off a staff buy-out and led the way in the fight to privatise the trust
ports. The sale embroiled the Government in controversy with Labour after it
refused to overturn the offer by the private company. In March 1992 Medway,
Forth, and Tilbury (a division of the Port of London Authority) were taken over
by their management and employees in deals totalling about £90 million as the
Government moved swiftly to offload ownership before the general election
intervened to prevent sales. This time the Government avoided further damaging
rows by agreeing to sell to local managements in regions where any other decisions
could have had political repercussions. The list of trust ports privatised in 1992
also includes Clyde. It is certain that many other trust ports will follow sooner or
later. These changes have brought some 70 per cent of the cargo handling capacity
of Britain's ports into the private sector. Private ports which are rarely seen in the
rest of the world are thus replacing trust ports and becoming the dominant form
of port ownership in Britain.
To summarise: there have been two contrasting approaches towards port
ownership and administration in the UK. While the interventionist approach, which
has been historically influential, points to deficiencies of port markets and insists on
some form of public ownership and some degree of central control of port
development, the market approach currently adopted by the Government maintains
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that the efficient provision of port facilities and services must be left to the market
mechanism. The shift from the interventionist approach to the market approach
reflects a radical change of government industrial policy not only in the port sector
but in other sectors as well. Historically, transport, energy and communications
industries have been targets for public ownership in the UK. In recent years the
UK has abandoned the public ownership approach by pursuing an active
privatisation programme and at the same time setting up a number of regulatory
agencies to monitor and control the behaviour of privatised companies when
necessary. Unlike other industries which were nationalised concerns, public ports
were already largely commercialised and decentralised, but this was not considered
sufficient. The fundamental philosophy underlying the current public policy towards
private business is that whenever competition is feasible, it is generally regarded as
the optimal form of industrial organisation. When it is not, regulation is believed
to be a more favourable instrument of public policy than public ownership. It
seems to be assumed that the port sector falls into the category of industries where
competition is feasible and that instances of market failure in the port sector are
trivial. Thus it is believed that ports should be privatised without need for
regulation of price and investment.
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1.3 Port Ownership in Theory and Practice
The diversity in port ownership is not a unique British phenomenon. It reflects
different perceptions everywhere about the relative importance of 'market failure' as
compared with 'government failure' in port economy. The structures and policies
vary not only between but also within countries all over the world.
Comprehensive private ports are not common. Apart from those in Britain,
private ports in other countries, if any, are usually integrated within a major
manufacturing enterprise (e.g. the oil port of Wilhelinshaven) without coming under
the relevant port administration. Most major ports in the world are in some form
of public ownership in the sense that they are administered either by local
government (e.g. municipality or province) or central government, or by public
autonomy. In the ports directed by the central government one can distinguish two
groups: those administered directly by central government and those where
management is entrusted to a separate administrative service or a similar body.
Non—autonomous ports in France and Italy, all the major commercial ports in
Greece and major ports in many developing countries are examples of the first
group. The second group are represented by the 4 river ports controlled by the
British Waterways Board (BWB) as mentioned earlier, which is responsible to the
central government. Autonomous ports can be found in France, Italy, Britain,
Ireland and Denmark and are the most important ports in the countries in
question. Trust ports in Britain belong to this category and are probably more
autonomous than similar ports in other countries. In the USA, Australia, Western
European countries and Japan, municipal or local ports are the most important
ones of the countries in question. Most of the principal world ports such as
Rotterdam and New York belong to this category. By and large municipal or local
ports seem to be the most popular form of port ownership in terms of the status
of port authorities.
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In terms of the jurisdiction of port authorities, the landlord or tool port,
where the port authority provides the infrastructrue and superstructure and delegates
port services to private sector companies, seems to be the most popular form. In
the USA, Australia and Western Europe there is a common practice which
distinguishes between public port activities (the provision of the infrastructure as
well as port planning, promotion and regulatory activities) and commercial port
activities (the provision of superstructure and cargo handling services). Service ports
where a port authority or a private sector company performs all port activities are
less common. Examples are ports in Singapore and Israel. In Britain, Ireland and
Denmark port authorities perform almost all port activities.
Despite the diversity of institutional structures, by and large ports around the
world have traditionally been among the industries in which government control, in
the form of public ownership, regulation, fmancial assistance etc., is substantial.
This is not exceptional even in the market-oriented economies. Goss (1983)
advances four reasons why it is appropriate that major seaports in a country should
be owned by the public sector. The first reason is that while property rights on
land can be held by private individuals/firms the aquatory rights of the seabed and
water column cannot normally be held by private individuals or companies - but
an authority created by the government can own such rights. Secondly, national
planning is needed in port development and, since ports are sub-systems of the
total transport systems of the country, the public sector becomes the more
appropriate agency to ensure integrated and co-ordinated planning of all transport
services in the country. Thirdly, since the access channel, navigational lights and
buoys and so on can be said to fall under the concept of public goods a public
port authority becomes the most suitable organisation to provide such facilities for
the common good. Fourthly, the public sector would have the flexibility and
organisational adaptability to arrange mergers of a number of ports which can
result in significant economies of scale. Moreover, the public sector could organise
port facilities to be developed on a selective basis taking into account special,
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regional, local and national requirements.
There can be other arguments for ports being owned in the public sector.
One is based on the fear of market power that ports may enjoy because of their
exclusive location (local monopoly) and unavoidable concentration in port traffic
(natural monopoly) especially for container and bulk shipments. This permits
monopoly pricing and profits, deadweight losses of welfare and the absence of any
pressure to keep costs as low as possible. Indeed, as the result of adopting modern
shipping and cargo-handling technology, which are believed to exhibit substantial
economies of scale, both the number of ports and the number of terminal
operators have been reduced dramatically in many countries. The actual behaviour
of port operators in this situation is thus of interest. Goss (1982) outlined an
interesting example of this in Australia, where there are only a very few firms
handling general cargo or operating container berths. Two stevedoring firms with
substantial market shares were studied in some depth by the Australian Prices
Justification Tribunal. A report was produced suggesting not only unjustified high
port charges but also prevalent inefficiencies and excessive costs associated with
these firms which could be linked to a lack of real competition.
Another argument is based on a strong doctrine which underlies port policies
in continental European countries, the USA and many developing countries. It is
believed that the national and regional economy can derive considerable benefits
from the existence and development of ports such as accessing foreign markets,
increased international trade or trans-shipment trade, reduced transport costs, and
attracting and stimulating industries which in turn creates jobs, as well as personal
and business income. Ports are thus viewed not as discrete commercial entities, but
as components of the regional infrastructure acting as catalysts for regional
development. The benefits derived from the provision of port facilities and services
are dispersed throughout the population and are not fully reflected in the accounts
of private operators or commercialised public ports.
In recent decades, however, there has been increasing dissatisfaction with the
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perceived poor performance of nationalised industries and frequent failure of state
control. Privatisation policies, as attempts to reduce the role of government, are
currently in progress the world over. Port industries are not excepted and ports
entirely run by government are considered to be more expensive and less efficient.
The conviction that public ownership is synonymous with productive
inefficiency is often rationalised in two ways in theories of industrial economics.
First of all, the transfer of ownership from the private to the public sector (or
vice-versa) results in a change in managerial incentive structures. Viewed from the
perspective of the principal-agent theory, one can distinguish two effects (Vickers
and Yarrow, 1989). One is the change in the objective of the principals
(shareholders in the case of private enterprises, the voting public in the case of
public enterprises). The other is the change in the arrangements for monitoring the
performance of management. The managers of private enterprises will be concerned
with meeting the requirements of the shareholders and may be faced with threats
of take-over and bankruptcy, whereas the managers of public enterprises will
concentrate on the satisfaction of ministerial objectives. While the capital market
for corporate control is not perfect, it is regarded as more effective than the
public monitoring system, which is subject to multiple levels of hierarchy and is
vulnerable to goal displacement. Thus private enterprises are hypothesized to be in
general more productively efficient than public enterprises, though the former tend
to be less allocatively efficient than the latter.
Secondly, public ownership was one of the main solutions to the problems of
natural monopoly that arose in industries where competition was assumed to be
impossible or undesirable. However, there has been increasing awareness that
competitive forces were too much neglected when they have a useful role to play.
The competitive force provides a spur to productive efficiency as well as serving a
mechanism conductive to allocative efficiency. The absence of competition under
public ownership is thus seen as explaining the correlation between public
enterprises and poor productive performance.
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With these considerations in mind it is then hardly surprising that the esteen
of public enterprises is at a low level and privatisation has become a world-wide
phenomenon. Port privatisation can be achieved in two different ways. In most
countries the privatisation process is limited to the provision of the superstructure
and services and takes the form of the tool port or landlord port as in the case of
many successful world ports such as Rotterdam, New York, Antwerp and Hamburg.
It is believed that ports are better operated privately. Port activities such as cargo
handling, warehousing, towage, lighterage and pilotage (whether piotage should be
provided by a public authority or a private-sector company is still controversial in
many countries) can be readily catered for by private-sector companies. There has
also been a tendency in many countries to increase the share of private investment
in the provision of terminals as much as possible in order to ensure efficient
management on the part of operators. But it is also considered in these countries
that the involvement of government in ports is indispensable and the existence of
public authorities is necessary. This can be justified by the arguments based on the
potential for market failure which may arise in port industries as mentioned above.
In contrast to the classical pattern in other parts of the world, port
privatization in Britain is comprehensive and involves the transfer of the whole port
ownership from the public to the private sector and the possibilities for market
inefficiencies are assumed to be trivial.
In spite of their different perceptions of the relative importance of 'market
failure' as compared with 'government failure' in port economy, the consensus of
both approaches to port privatisation is that in practice public ownership is
inherently inefficient.
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1.4 The Plan of this Study
This study seeks to investigate empirical evidence for the hypothesized productive
inefficiency inherent in public port ownership vis-a-vis private port ownership with
reference to British ports.
The results of this study can have important public policy implications. If one
believes that there are many instances of both 'market failures' in seaports, for
example, in the process of planning, supplying 'public goods' and controlling
externalities, and 'government failure', i.e. productive inefficiency, the dilemma for
public policy is a trade-off between allocative efficiency and productive efficiency.
But if public ports are not necessarily inferior in productive performance or if
public ports can be made more efficient through other means without changing
their ownership status, such a trade-off will not be necessary.
The usual arguments against public ownership are made on general grounds
and are not entirely relevant to ports. Firstly, Vickers and Yarrow (1989)'s notion
of public enterprises corresponds to those in nationalised industries, and hence their
theoretical analysis about the incentive structures under alternative forms of
ownership from the perspective of the principal-agent theory which can be
problematic when applied to port industries where public ports are of several
forms, including trust port, municipal port and national port. One should examine
the principal-agent relationship under different types of public port ownership as
compared with that under private ownership before one can be certain about the
impact of port ownership on productive efficiency. Secondly, competition rather
than ownership per se is an overriding factor in generating efficiency. The size of
efficiency gains from port privatization largely depends on the structure of the port
market. But there is immediately a question as to whether port competition is
workable given modern port technology which is believed to exhibit substantial scale
economies.
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The objectives of privatisation in the port transport industry as in other
industries are many and varied. But at the micro-economic level the most
important objective of any restructuring has been the promotion of increased
economic efficiency, as privatisation is largely motivated by dissatisfaction with the
productive performance of publicly owned ports. It has been more than 10 years
since the Conservative Government first launched its port privatisation programme.
Within that time Britain has become the only country in the world in which the
private sector dominates the port economy. Crucially, has port privatisation
transformed the industry into a paragon of efficiency? To date, however, there is
little concrete evidence on the impact of the transformation upon port efficiency.
The private port Felixstowe is considered as an example of outstanding success
amongst British ports. From virtually nothing the port has grown to become
number one in container traffic by a wide margin. But the growth of Felixstowe
may well be attributed to its non-scheme status while its major competitors such as
London, Liverpool and Southampton were hampered by labour problems. The
overall trend of ABP ports has been one of an improvement in profits since they
were privatised. But much of the growth of ABP, for example, valued at £60
millions in 1983 but valued at £490 millions in 1990, has been due to property
development.
The number of performance studies of alternative forms of port ownership is
sparse. To the author's knowledge the only serious study of this kind was done by
Goss (1979, 1). Based on his visit to the principal world ports he was surprised to
arrive at the conclusion that different port administrative systems can be equally
efficient. As an example he mentioned the port of Hong Kong and the port of
Singapore, with similar geographical environments and comparable cultural
traditions, but taking exactly the opposite philosophies regarding the operation of
their ports. Whereas in Hong Kong the private sector is dominant, in Singapore
the port authority holds all the operations. Interestingly both ports are renowned
for efficiency. Goss believed that if the port of Hong Kong and the port of
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Singapore were to be run in any other way it would be so much in contrast with
the whole of their respective forms of Government that it would become extremely
difficult to operate. It seemed to him that the main factor is that the port system
should be
appropriate to the general system of govermnent and the beliefs of people even though the
latter is expressed as over-simplified slogan.[pp.47J
and therefore
It is a serious error to transplant port organisations as if they were mechanical rather than
social bodies...
There is no concept of "best port" which might be considered ideal and applied to any
places.
While Goss investigated the relationship between port ownership and efficiency
in a global context, this study will examine the same theme in a British context.
There is no shortage of empirical studies to compare the performance of
public and private enterprises in general. Having surveyed US studies, Vickers and
Yarrow (1989, pp.40—I) find that, in industries such as electricity generation and
distribution and water supply, where there is little competition and extensive
regulation, there is no conclusive evidence. Where competition is significant, there
is some evidence that private enterprises perform better, but the existence of
competition tends to limit the differences in efficiency that persist for any
appreciable period. In the UK, early work by Pryke (1971) indicated that the
efficiency of public enterprises was generally superior to that of private enterprises
in the first two decades after the war. But subsequent investigation of performance
in the 1970s (Pryke, 1981) reversed this finding. Thus the results of this empirical
literature have been mixed and there is no firm ground for believing that private
firms perform better.
As Vickers and Yarrow stress, methodological problems abound in all empirical
comparisons. One problem in these studies is that like is not always compared with
like. This problem will be overcome in this study. The British port transport
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industry, which provides a fairly comprehensive "laboratory" of mixed ownership
enterprises, appears to offer a good prospect for a comparative study of port
ownership and administrative structures. An ideal comparative study is a
like-with-like one, to put comparison in a setting of other things being equal in
order to identify the major issues. Obviously UK ports operate under same market
conditions and share the same political system, cultural tradition and geographical
environment. Moreover public ports in Britain are well-known for their financial
independence so that they are able to pursue a professional business approach just
as much as private ports. In addition, UK ports provide an interesting case of
"mixed markets" where public enterprises compete with private enterprises, which is
an issue addressed in a relatively small literature.
Another problem of previous studies is the reliance upon variables that are
easily observable, such as profitablity, factor productivity, and unit cost. These
measures need not bear a close relationship with efficiency and some of them may
even lead to a bias in favour of private ownership. An important feature of this
study is to measure productive efficiency directly to a fairly high degree of rigour
rather than use any other approximate measures. Measures of productive efficiency
in this study are constructed in terms of Farrell (1957)'s frontier production
function, which is consistent with the underlying economic theory of optimising
behaviour.
Since the core of our investigation is concerned with productive efficiency, it
is desirable to spell out its meaning at this point, though formal definitions and
more explanations will be given later. In general, economic efficiency corresponds
to Pareto optimality in resource allocation. There are two kinds of resource
allocation going on in an economy. One is the resource allocation between
economic agents (e.g. firms) through market mechanisms. The other is the resource
allocation within economic agents (e.g. firms). Economics is supposed to deal with
the issue of efficiency. But in the framework of microeconomics the meaning of
allocative efficiency is narrowed to concern the first kind of resource allocation
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only, while "allocative efficiency" related to the second kind of resource allocation
is not usually discussed in any detail. However, an economy will not be Pareto
efficient if the second kind of resource allocation is inefficient. The second kind of
"allocative efficiency" is known as productive efficiency, which can be defined
relative to frontier production functions. A frontier production function simply
represents the most productive technology currently available. A finn is said to be
productively efficient if the firm succeeds in exploiting maximum production
possibilities given by the frontier technology, i.e. the maximum possible level of
outputs given inputs or the minimum possible level of inputs given output. A firm
is said to be productively inefficient if the producer fails to exploit the maximum
production possibilities given by the frontier technology. There are a number of
possible ways that a firm might be productively inefficient. We are particularly
interested in what follows:
(1) purely productive inefficiency: this refers to X-inefficiency and technical
inefficiency. X-inefficiency arises from failures to realise the maximum production
possibilities of the current technology in use, as a result of motivational deficiency
at both management and worker level. It is thus managerial inefficiency. Technical
inefficiency arises from the difference between the current technology in use and
the most productive technology currently available. It is managerial inefficiency at
least in the long run;
(2) congestive inefficiency: this could be a form of inefficiency in transportation.
Congestion inefficiency occurs when a firm is not free to dispose of one of the
inputs for one reason or another. As a result, the amount of the input in use is
so excessive relative to other inputs that the marginal productivity of the input
becomes negative. One suspected cause of congestion inefficiency in British ports
was the National Dock Labour Scheme;
(3) scale inefficiency: a firm is said to be scale inefficient if the firm fails to
operate on the optimal scale which maximises "average productivity" which would
occur in the long-run competitive equlibrium. Scale inefficiency is not necessarily
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inefficiency in private sense. But it is undesirable from the social point of view.
These three types oificiency are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, meaning
that a firm can be inefficient in any one way, any two ways, or in all three ways,
but in no other way. Thus purely productive efficiency, congestive efficiency and
scale efficiency are said to be components of overall non-price productive
efficiency. The composition of productive efficiency in this way enables us to
investigate the productive performance of firms systematically.
The concept of overall non-price productive efficiency and its components
mentioned above are static in the sense that they are measured against a fixed
production frontier in a given period of time. The production frontier, however,
shifts and hence the set of efficient input and output combinations widens and new
possibilities emerge because of technological development. A firm is more
progressive or more dynamically efficient than another if it improves efficiency,
relative to the shifting frontier, faster than the other. While it is important to
make efficient use of resources at any time, it is dynamic efficiency or
progressiveness that counts in the long run. This should be a matter for concern as
well as Static efficiency when we are talking about the comparative efficiency of
alternative forms of port ownership.
We commence, in chapter 2, by providing a theoretical perspective for the
possible effects of port ownership on efficiency. The analysis will focus on the
degree of port competition and the incentive structures of port management under
alternative forms of ownership, since the productive efficiency property of
private-sector companies is often justified in these two ways. We will also provide
a model drawing on the theory of spatial competition to compare the efficiency of
pricing and investment decisions under alternative forms of port ownership. Chapter
2 thus offers a balanced text on the relationship between port ownership and
economic efficiency, though our empirical analysis is concerned with productive
efficiency only.
Chapters 3-4 provides estimates of productive efficiency, both overall and by
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components, for sampled British ports during the period 1983-1990. There are two
competing approaches on how to construct frontiers. The first approach is
deterministic on the assumption that the maximal output (given the level of inputs)
or the minimal set of inputs (given the level of output) can be attained without
error. The deterministic approach is often argued to be consistent with economic
theory. Furthermore it is non-parametric and imposes no explicit functional forms
by using mathematical programming techniques. However, it will over- or
under-estimate the true extent of inefficiency if the data is contaminated by
statistical noise (as always). The second approach is stochastic, assuming that the
maximal level of output or the minimal level of inputs is random rather than
exact. This allows statistical noise to be distinguished from true inefficiency. But
this approach using econometric techniques is parametric and may impose an
unwarranted structure on the frontier technology. Unless panel data is used it has
to assume an explicit distribution function for inefficiencies as well. Since
econometric models should be presumed to be misspecified (Gilbert, 1986), it is
possible to argue that efficiency estimates derived from sophisticated stochastic
frontier models need not be closer to the true extent of inefficiency than those
derived from deterministic frontier models. Thus each approach bas its limitations
and each can be defended. To base solid conclusions on empirical evidence both
approaches will be employed. Thus productive efficiency of British ports is
estimated relative to a deterministic frontier in chapter 3 and relative to a
stochastic frontier in chapter 4.
Compared with the deterministic approach using mathematical programming
methods, the stochastic approach using econometric techniques is less solid. To
enhance the stochastic approach the efficiency frontier of the British port industry
is modelled using a less restrictive structure. An attempt is made to defme purely
productive efficiency, congestive efficiency and scale efficiency tin the parametric
framework. The construction developed enables us to evaluate the productive
efficiency of British ports relative to a stochastic frontier in a systematic way
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similar to the deterministic approach.
In chapter 5 the dynamic efficiency of British ports is estimated. To do this
we have developed a measure of total factor productivity growth in terms of a
stochastic frontier production function, which translates efficiency gains over time in
a different way from Solow's (1957) approach. It is shown that productivity growth
over time can be more meaningfully decomposed into technical progress and
efficiency improvement.
In chapter 6 the study is brought to its conclusion by examining empirical
evidence on the relationship between port ownership and productive efficiency in
the British port industry.
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Chapter 2
Efficiency and Port Ownership:
A Theoretical Analysis
The efficiency implications of port ownership depend on the degree of port
competition and the relative effectiveness of different monitoring systems associated
with ownership. This chapter therefore analyses port market structure and
management incentive structures under alternative forms of port ownership.
Port markets are known to be oligopolistic. Technological development in the
port sector is believed to weaken competitive forces further. Therefore there are
serious doubts as to whether port competition is sufficient to ensure efficiency. It is
perfectly possible to argue within an orthodox microeconomics framework that, in
the context of monopoly, public management will do better in terms of economic
efficiency than private management (Vickers and Yarrow, 1989, pp.1). Section 2.1
thus investigates the structural features of port markets given current port cost and
demand conditions. As far as the British port industry is concerned, we find no
evidence to suggest that the economies of scale formed in modern port and
maritime transport technology are so pronounced that the scope for port
competition has become limited.
While this finding could mean that port competition is sufficient to ensure
satisfactory performance by private ports in terms of both allocative and productive
efficiency, it would not neccessarily imply substantial efficiency gains from port
privatisation. Unlike in other sectors, port privatisation is not seen as a means of
introducing new competition. UK Government port policy has been fairly liberal
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even before port privatisation. Public ports of various forms have been required to
be self-financing and have been largely commercialised. In such circumstances,
public ownership and competition are perfectly compatible with each other. In
mixed markets where public ports and private ports compete productive
performance depends very much upon managerial incentive structures. Section 2.2
then compares and contrasts the managerial incentive structures inherent in
alternative forms of port ownership from the perspective of principal-agent theory.
We conclude that port privatisation in Britain is unlikely to improve the managerial
incentive structure significantly, since the general defects of a public monitoring
system are largely reduced for trust and municipal ports because of their
autonomous and decentralised nature. If we accept that a change of port ownership
neither enhances competition nor improves incentive structures significantly, we will
not be surprised if there is no significant difference in productive performance.
Recall that port ownership represents the degree of devolution as well as the
extent of public control. Transfer of port ownership from the central government
sector to the local government sector or to the private sector implies
decentralisation of pricing and investment decisions. Here the misgivings of
interventionists not only point to monopoly pricing but also to potentially
undesirable port development in the absence of conscious planning by a central
agency, whereas the fear of free marketeers is the ineffectiveness, inaccuracy and
inefficiency of central planning and co-ordination. In section 2.3 the pricing and
investment performance of decentralised public and private ownership as compared
with centralised public ownership is modelled in a simplified setting. We argue that
as long as public ports under indirect ownership are required to maximise the sum
of producers' and consumers' surplus, port decentralisation does not worsen
allocative nor investment performance. Another interesting result that emerges from
the analysis is that port privatisation is likely to lead to higher port prices as
compared with the social optimum, but the resultant allocative inefficiency is
negligible and the undesirable economic effect is mainly distributional. A more
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serious welfare loss due to privatisation, however, is likely to be under— or
over—provision of port facilities.
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2.1 Structural Features of Port Markets
Market structure is important because the ructure determines the behaviour of
firms and that behaviour in turn determines the performance of the industry.
Market structure includes such elements as product differentiation, market
concentration on both the supply side and the demand side, and entry conditions.
Location differentiation
The product of a port is a bundle of services, such as cargo-handling,
warehousing, piotage, towage and many other complementary services. Port services
differ from port to port in many aspects, including quality of facility, turnaround
time, the rate of cargo damage and pilferage, the range of complementary services
available and so on. The most important element distinguishing one port from
another is port location, which has an important implication for port market
power. Consider a line-segment hinterland along the horizontal axis in Fig.2.1 -1,
where cargo is uniformly spread out. The uniform distribution of port traffic
implies that the distance from either port represents the volume of port traffic as
well. Thus, for example, if the most distant customer of port I at 0 locates at a
distance X from the port, the port throughput is X as well. The port services are
supplied by two ports at either end of the hinterland, 0 and C, but are identical
in all other aspects. Port price is P 1
 = OF charged by port 1 at 0 and P 2 = 00
by port 2 at C. In addition to this, it is assumed that inland transport cost is t
per unit of cargo and per mile in both directions and represented in Fig 2.1-1 by
the gradient of the sloping lines. The customer whose cargo origin or destination is
at a distance X from the port at 0 has to pay inland transport cost per unit of
cargo tX if the traffic goes through port I and t(OC-X) if the traffic goes through
port 2. Assuming t is constant, the total transport costs per unit of cargo the
customer will pay at a distance X from port
	 is P 1 +tX or P 2+t(OC-X). This is
F0
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given by the height of the sloping lines. Naturally the customer will choose to ship
his cargo from the port with lower unit transport costs. The point D where the
sloping lines intersect corresponds to a marginal customer who is indifferent
between shipping his cargo through either port. Customers to the left of the
marginal one will choose port I and customers to the right will choose port 2.
Given a common reservation price R, however, only the customers whose cargo is
spread over OA and BC will remain in the market whereas the customers whose
cargo spreads over AB will be prohibited from the market by transport costs. The
market is in effect segmented into two. Each port has a monopoly over its
exclusive hinterland because of its distinct location.
R
0
n. ,r
A	 B	 C X
Fig 2.1 —I Location Differentiation and Local Monopoly
The local monopoly that a port enjoys stems from inland transport costs,
which are determined by the distance from a port and the unit inland transport
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cost t. Obviously, if two ports are close enough so that their markets are no
longer insulated from each other, the market structure will be changed from
monopoly to duopoly and the ports will have to engage in spatial competition. A
change in I will have the same effect. This can be seen by imagining a reduction
in t which causes flatter sloping lines to intersect below the reservation price, say,
at E, so that no customers will now be excluded from the market. Another effect
of a change in I is to change price elasticity of demand facing the port. When t
is higher, the sloping lines are steeper and port customers will be less sensitive to
changes in port prices because the proportion of port charges in total transport
costs is less significant. On the other hand, when t is lower, customers will be
more sensitive to changes in port prices. Thus with high inland transport costs
ports enjoy local monopoly in the sense that they serve an insulated market and
face inelastic demand.
The degree of local port monopoly is country- or even area-specific, being a
function of the geographical separation of the ports, the configuration of the inland
transport system and the nature of the trade. Its long coast line endows Britain
with a large number of seaports and they are connected with their hinterland by a
well-developed inland transport system. it is likely that for Britian sloping lines are
relatively flat. Also British ports are quite close together and in consequence the
demand for individual British ports is likely to be relatively elastic and local port
monopoly power is therefore probably limited.
The degree of local monopoly can be eroded by a reduction in inland
transport costs. Such a reduction can be achieved by improving inland transport
infrastructure and by introducing new cost-reducing transport technology. Indeed,
with the development of transport technology, e.g. specialisation and
containerisation, unit inland transport costs in real terms have become much lower,
and in Fig. 2.1-1 this gives flatter sloping lines. As a result, the demand facing
individual ports is more elastic on the one hand, and port markets are enlarged
and ports are brought into spatial competition with more distant ports on the
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other. Since inland transport cost and transit time have become so much lower,
cheaper and more efficient, importers and exporters can operate just as efficiently
and cheaply through relatively distant ports as through local ones. A favourable
location is no longer sufficient to guarantee a port's prosperity and it becomes
increasingly difficult to defme the limits of a port's natural hinterland. Port traffic
is therefore more likely to be determined by cost and service advantages.
Market concentration
While the development of transport technology has eroded the element of local
port monopoly through its effects on inland transport costs, it has at the same
time enhanced the likelihood of port natural monopoly. Before World War Two
most vessels were general purpose cargo ships. After World War Two specialised
ships began to appear: firstly giant oil tankers developed, followed by ore carriers,
grain carriers and OBO vessels. In the 1960s and 1970s a wide variety of new
types of vessels have appeared to signify a new era of cargo transportation:
container vessels, Ro-Ro vessels, LASH vessels, LOP tankers, new types of ferry
boats and ships specialising in particular products such as certain chemicals,
automobiles and locomotives. The rapid change of maritime transport technology,
combined with rapidly rising labour costs in advanced economies in the post-war
period brought a demand for more productive cargo handling techniques. The
response was the adoption of specialised container and bulk handling facilities,
which can be seen as a revolution in port technology. In contrast to the
conventional port technology which is notoriously labour intensive, the modern
technology of cargo handling is capital intensive. It is believed that there are
substantial economies of scale in port operation. Moreover, substantial scale
economies are also believed to exist in modern maritime technology. Modern cargo
vessels are larger in size and more expensive in terms of the opportunity cost of
staying at ports. Thus the best interests of both ship and port operators require
traffic concentration in fewer and larger ports. This suggests that we should expect
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to observe a tendency for port markets to become more highly concentrated.
However, despite the above, it can be argued that the net impact of
technological development on port market concentration is unclear. Consider Fig
2.1-2, which depicts a conventional U-shaped long-run average cost curve,
LRAC, for a typical port in a particular port market. In the long-run competitive
equilibrium, the port will be of optimal size q 1 and there is a corresponding
market demand 01. The market share of the typical port is q 1/01. Owing to
technological development, the long-run average cost is shifted downwards to
LRAC2, which increases the optimal scale to q 2 and market size to 0 2• follows
that market concentration will increase only when the growth in market size
°2°i is less than the increase in optimal port scale (q 2-q,) (Clarke, 1985,
pp.28-31). But technological development has indeed enlarged the port market size
at the same time as enlarging port size and the net impact of the two effects may
go either way.
PORT
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 c 2	 Qi Q2
Fig 2.1-2 Market Concentration and Technological Development
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Furthermore the extent to which economies of scale can be achieved from
larger ports is questionable. In challenging the idea of a super port, Gilman (1980)
argued that economies of scale in terminal operation are weak. For instance, for
deep-sea trades where container dwell times are typically long, it is found that a
wide spread container exchanges of 3000 to 6000 TEUs are indigestible in many
terminals, and the increase of potential terminal throughput and the reduction of
costs are difficult. The economies of ship size are also not as powerful as
expected. Concentration of deep-sea ship itineraries is associated with a much
higher cost of secondary distribution.
Earlier Bennathan and Walters (1979, pp.43-SO) argued that the concentration
of port traffic in a smaller number of ports increases inland transport costs, and
after a certain level of concentration locational disadvantages may more than offset
economies of scale derived from the concentration of port traffic. Thus there is a
trade-off between economies of scale in operation and diseconomies in location.
Empirical evidence in Britain seems to support the view that economies of
scale are not substantial enough to justify high traffic concentration. Port markets
are better defined in terms of trade areas and cargo group& Unfortunately the
cargo classification adopted from 1981 onwards is different from that used before in
official publications of port statistics, and there is thus no consistent data available
to calculate the trend of market concentration for different trade areas and cargo
groups. Shown in Table 2.1-1 are the 5-Ports concentration ratios (denoted by C5)
in Britain for bulk fuel and other traffic from 1965 to 1990 and for container and
Ro-Ro traffic from 1971 to 1990, which are the shares of the total port traffic
accounted for by the biggest five ports. Although they are calculated on the basis
of aggregate data, they are probably sufficient to reflect the trend of market
concentration for different trade areas and cargo groups.
Surprisingly there is no evidence to show a significant increase in port market
concentration over the last 25 years. From 1965 to 1990 Cs increased by only 6%
for bulk fuel but declined by as much as 19% for traffic other than bulk fuel. For
1970
49%
49%
1975
46%
44%
1979
47%
Years
1980
49%
38%
1983
49%Cont /Ro -Ro
1985 1990 Change
54% 59% +6%
38% 38% -19%
1987 1991
52% 42%	 -3%
Years	 1965
Bulk Fuel	 53%
Others	 57%
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45%	 45%
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container and ro-ro traffic, where scale economies are supposed to be the most
pronounced with the new technologies, Cs has been fairly stable within the range
from 45% to 50%. The corresponding figures calculated for 12 port regions (not
shown) also indicate a stable trend in market concentrations. Therefore, as far as
the UK is concerned, there has been no significant trend of port traffic
concentration over the last 25 years.
Table 2.1-1 5-Port Traffic Concentration Ratio C5 in the UK 1965-1990
Note: Cont/Ro-Ro: Container and Ro-on and Ro-off cargo.
Source: Port Statistics 1990.
Countervaiin power of port users
If modern maritime transport technology had indeed exhibited substantial economies
of scale, this would have implied not only an impetus to market concentration
from the supply side (fewer and bigger ports) but also a tendence for market
concentration from the demand side (fewer and bigger shipping companies).
Galbraith (1952) argued, inter alia, that in modern oligopolistic industries, the
main force compelling sellers to conform to consumer wants and to hold price near
cost is not competition but the contervailing power exercised by strong buyers. An
important influence here is the theory of countervailing power. Briefly, a
concentration of power on the demand side will invoke a balancing concentration
of power on the supply side. When a few large shipping companies bargain with a
few large terminal operators, it is likely to be more difficult for terminal operators
to hold price above cost, all else equal.
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The implications of buyers' power are complicated. On the one hand strong
buyers tend to have some monopsony power over sellers. On the other hand,
strong buyers are also likely to have monopoly power in the market where they act
as sellers. Ideally we would like buyers' power not to be so weak that buyers can
bear on the pricing of sellers and at the same time not so strong that the same
buyers face substantial price competition in their product and service market.
Fortunately such buyers can be found in the port market. There are six logically
possible market structure types involving power on the buyers' side, including a
single buyer facing a single seller (bilateral monopoly), a single buyer facing many
purely competitive sellers (pure monopsony), a few buyers facing a few sellers
(bilateral oligopoly), a few buyers facing many sellers (oligopsony) and so on.
Among the six main market structure types, bilateral oligopoly is the most
promising in the sense that the buying firms possesses some monopsony power but
not monopoly power. Port markets may provide a classical example of bilateral
oligopoly where a few port oligopolists face a few shipping oligopolists.
Shipping companies with strong buyers' power restrain the power of port
oligopolists in several ways. One is that terminal operators are prone to cut prices
in order to land an unusually larger order, especially when they have excess
capacity. Contracts in which shipping companies commit themselves to particular
port terminals are large in quantity and long in duration. Shipping companies can
exploit the weakness of stevedoring operators by dangling the temptation before
each of them to encourage a break from the established tariff structure. An
example of this tactic was found in the bargaining process of Sealand with
Rotterdam and Antwerp in 1987 for a ten year contract from 1990.
Shipping companies with strong buyers' power also play off one port
oligopolist against another to induce price concessions. In continental European
ports, for instance, major shipping companies have a principal terminal ususally,
but each also spreads its business around terminals in other ports so that it can
threaten to shift, or actually shift, its distribution of orders in favour of terminal
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operators who offer more attractive terms.
The power of port users to induce price cuts is strongest when demand for
port facilities and services is slack, so that ports have excess capacity that can be
utiised profitably if an increased share of some major shipping companies' business
can be captured by price cuts.
Contestability of port markets
There are alternative definitions of entry barriers which have been used in the
literature. Demsetz (1982) and Brozen (1975) have sought to confine the idea of
entry barriers to government-based restrictions on entry. Stigler (1968) focuses on
asymmetries in demand and cost conditions between established firms and potential
entrants. The definition of entry barriers, which is given by Bain (1968) and is
most often used in industrial economics, centres on the extent to which established
firms can elevate their selling prices above the minimum average costs of
production. Entry barriers to port markets are probably high on all defmitions.
First of all there are government-based restrictions. Potential operators may be
unable to engage in port business simply because the provision of port services is
controlled by the port authority or an official license must be held. There are also
geographical restrictions because suitable sites to build a port or land needed for
storage areas are not available everywhere. Economic barriers to entry such as
location superiority, absolute cost advantage enjoyed by established port firms and
economies of scale are also present. The most formidable barrier, however, is
probably due to the sunk cost of investment in port facilities which are highly
specialised and they are either not re-saleable at all or re-saleable with a
substantial loss compared to the purchase price. The contestabiity of port markets
is thus hopelessly low.
With these considerations in mind it is interesting to note a policy suggestion
by Goss (1987, pp.31-39) to encourage potential competition in port industries by
making port markets contestable. Basically it is suggested that the port authority
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builds terminals for leasing out on a competitive basis, for a period long enough to
enable the licensed operator to acquire the experience necessary for efficient
operation and to secure an adequate return, but short enough to enable them to
be aware of the possibility of losing the next alteration of leases if they do not
behave properly. Under these circumstances the established operators would set
their price level lower than the limit price so as not to attract competition for
leases. When prices have to be low, the only way to increase profit is to improve
productivity.
Port markets would then be contestable in the sense that everyone would be
free to compete for the franchise in the form of an auction for the monopoly
right actually to provide a particular port service (cargo handling, warehousing,
towage, pilotage, etc.), rather than in the sense that potential entrants are free to
come into the market to compete with established firms. The idea can be
implemented by making purposive use of the structure of landlord ports or tool
ports where investment in infrastructure or even superstructure is undertaken by
port authorities and the amount of private investment in capital assets is limited.
At one extreme all major port facilities and equipment could be leased from port
authorities through contractual arrangements as well as the infrastructure.
There are reasons, however, to doubt that the franchise will be truly
competitive. Although it is possible for investment decisions regarding the
superstructure as well as the infrastructure to be left to public port authorities
while competition is made for the operating franchise, it is argued that the
operating franchise allows market forces to act only to a limited extent, and the
divorce of investment and operating decisions can lead to an undesirable loss of
coordination (Vickers and Yarrow, 1989, pp.110-115). The major change in world
ports since World War Two has been specialisation. Common user quays were
replaced by more specialised ones for handling of container and Ro-Ro, or dry
bulk, or liquid bulk or conventional traffic or for multi-purpose use for particular
shipping companies. On the one hand the business decision to commit to a
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particular cargo, or a particular type of vessel, or a particular terminal user tends
to be obstructed or delayed by bureaucratic procedure if public port authorities are
responsible for investment. On the other hand it is reasonable that he who gains
the benefit of specialisation should take the investment risk of specialisation. For
this reason in the continental European landlord ports there has been increased
private investment in superstructure, while the investment domain of public
authorities has been narrowed to the infrastructure. As long as private investments
are needed, the sunk cost will place potential entrants at cost disadvantage, if
winning the franchise is based on the maximum bid, established operators are more
likely to succeed as compared with new entrants. Since their investment expenditure
on capital assets is sunk, they have firmer commitment to the industry and are
likely to be more determined to win the franchise. While potential entrants have
the opportunity to invest elsewhere, their commitment to the industry is less firm.
Established operators are thus willing to pay more for the franchise than potential
operators. It is also reasonable to expect that potential operators are at a cost
disadvantage, as compared with the incumbents in access to superior port
technology as a result of experience, patented or secret processes and management
expertise and skilled labour. Also there may be long—established customer loyalty to
the existing operator.
If winning of the franchise is not based on the maximum rent to be paid, but
is based on actual performance (as with the British TV franchises), there will be
problems of administration and the idea loses part of its appeal.
There are also problems of asset handover, of contract specification and
enforcement (Vickers and Yarrow, 1989, pp.110-115). When the entrant defeats the
existing operator in the competition for the franchise, there is a tough problem of
asset handover which involves considerable expense in negotiation and arbitration
regarding the appropriate transfer price.
The most difficult problem is that it is probably impossible to specify explicit
conditions in terms of the qualities and the charges of port services to be
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provided. But a contract without such conditions reduces the attractiveness of
franchise as a form of potential competition. The duration of the lease is also a
problem. Relatively short-term leases tend to produce effective and constant
pressure of potential competition on the existing operator. The difficulties of
contract specification and administration also suggest that the short-term contract
has advantages because less future uncertainty needs to be taken into account. But
short-term leases are likely to inhibit technical progress and discourage private
investment as short-term operators tend to be near-sighted. At the time of
specialisation the long-term contract for the use of specialised terminals by a
particular user also makes short-term leases impossible. The building of brand
loyalty for terminal operators also favours long term leases.
These are, of course, just conjectures. The franchising of port services based
on contestability of port markets remains an attractive idea. This can be a form of
port privatisation alternative to the British model. With this option, ports can
preserve their public nature while public involvement in port business is reduced to
the minimum level. Where there is indeed a case of natural monopoly in ports and
the scope of actual port competition is really limited, policy makers with this
option may be in a better position to deal with the dilemma of how to enjoy scale
economies of port traffic concentration without suffering from monopolistic
behaviour. The option merits further discussion and empirical study.
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2.2 Principal-Agent Relationship under Alternative Forms of Port Ownership
The principal-agent problem arises from the diversity of objectives and asymmetry
of information. The agent is supposed to act in the interests of the principal, but
unfortunately the agent does not in general share the same objectives as the
principal. In addition, the principal does not have full information about the
circumstances and behaviour of the agent. Thus the principal has a problem to
induce the agent to act in his interest and to monitor his behaviour and
performance. The performance of the agent depends on the effectiveness of the
monitoring system that governs the principal-agent relationship.
A change in port ownership alters the principal-agent relationship. In any
event port management remains as the agent and normally consists of similar
persons in terms of motivation, personality and managerial skill. What is changed
by a change of ownership are the incentive structures imposed on the management.
which implies two things in particular. First, there will be a change in the
objectives of the principals (shareholders in the case of a private port, the local
public in the case of a municipal port and the general public in the case of a
trust port and a national port). Second there will be a change in the arrangements
for monitoring the performance of port management. Differences in the objectives
and in the monitoring arrangements may cause differences in performance.
Private ports
The principal in the case of a private port is the body of shareholders. Vickers
and Yarrow (1989, pp.7-34) provide a detailed analysis of the principal-agent
relationship between shareholders and management of private-sector companies in
general. Their analysis should also apply to the case of private ports.
The objective of shareholders is assumed to be maximisation of the expected
return from port assets, although, in general, shareholders will not be unanimous in
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their rankings of managerial policies. Port managers are assumed to be concerned
with their own utility but can be induced to pursue profit by three groups of
participants in capital markets:
(i) the port's shareholders, who seek contractual arrangements with port
management that maximise their own payoffs;
(ii) other investors or their agents (e.g. management of other companies), who
might take over or purchase the port and alter existing contractual arrangements;
(iii) the port's creditors, seeking managerial changes in the event of threatened or
actual default.
Under competitive pressure in markets for port services profit—maximising port
producers are unlikely to charge much above marginal costs and the pursuit of
profit thus provides a vigorous and constant incentive to improve productive
efficiency.
Nevertheless the proposition that the managers of private ports will always be
effectively constrained to act in the best interest of shareholders is not uncritically
acceptable.
As far as the monitoring system of shareholders is concerned, the main
problem is associated with the dispersion of shareholders. When the ordinary share
capital of a port is divided amongst many investors, the activity of specifying and
enforcing managerial contracts confers external benefits on other shareholders so
that the intensity of monitoring is lower than the optimal level. A shareholder, in
order to impose his view, must investigate the performance of the port, the extent
to which port management was responsible for poor performance, the extent to
which port managers are able to rectify the failure. Because of information
asymmetry, these efforts require substantial costs, as is also the case if an
individual seeks to remove a management board member through the shareholder
voting system. The enforcement costs incurred are often unlikely to justify the
benefit which accrues to the individual shareholder.
The theoretical and empirical analysis of takeovers suggests a number of
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limitations to this form of capital market constraint on the performance of
managements. One of the problems, for instance, is due to the relatively
insignificant influence of shareholders on acquisition decisions, over which managers
continue to have considerable discretion.
Regarding the effect of bankruptcy, there are at least two limitations on the
strength of the incentives for internal efficiency. Firstly, when probability of
bankruptcy is high managements tend to enjoy managerial discretion in the short
run so that the incentives for the improvement of internal efficiency disappears.
Secondly, the determination of the firm's debt level is frequently at the discretion
of the management and hence the management can ease the constraint it faces.
For all these reasons, although the managers of private ports are concerned
with meeting the requirements of shareholders and may be faced with threats of
take-over and bankruptcy, they clearly have some discretion to pursue goals other
than profit maximisation. More likely they may aim to maximise their own utilities
subject to satisfying certain profit targets.
Public norts
Under this heading are covered trust ports, municipal and national ports. The most
evident feature of the principal-agent relationship under public ownership is that
the principals (voters) do not typically seek to maximise profits and the agents are
not typically threatened by take-over and bankruptcy. However this need not imply
that managerial incentive structures are weaker in public ports than in private ones.
By managerial changes and profit-related bonuses government can induce
management to perform efficiently. A potential advantage of government monitoring
over private monitoring is that public ownership provides an instrument for
correcting the failures associated with dispersed shareholdings and corporate control.
The problem in the case of national ports lies in the multiple levels in the
public monitoring hierarchy, which involve three levels of the principal-agent
relationship, including voting public and elected politicians, elected politicians and
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civil servants, civil servants and port management. Ports in the central-government
sector fall into two categories. One consists of those which are administered
directly by central governments: the other is those where the management function
is entrusted to a separate administration service. National ports in Britain, including
those which once existed (BTDB) and the only one left (BWB), belong to the
second group. They were public corporations, like most other nationalised
enterprises in Britain. Public corporations combine freedom for management from
government's supervision of day-to-day operations with public control of the
broader policies of the enterprises. Nevertheless, the public control hierarchy is
highly vulnerable to goal displacement and excessive ministerial intervention.
The objectives laid down for public port management are often multiple,
varied and unclear. A summary of some conceivable port management objectives,
though not exhaustive, as given by Suykens (1986) is as follows:
--obtaining the maximum throughput with the existing capacity
--maximising net profits of the port aulhority
--operating port at least cost in real terms;
—striving for highest employment level in the port;
--securing national independence of the country's maritime transport;
--promoting regional economic growth;
—offering the shippers and receivers the highest possible quality of service in terms of transit
speed of the goods, reduction of the amount of damage and pilferage etc.;
---optimising vessels' time in port;
--reaching fmancial autonomy of the port authority;
--minimising total cost of maritime transport;
--maximising return on capital investment;
—niinimicing required capital investment.
As Suykens argued manifold objectives reflect the great number of parties involved
in a port, including national and local government, the chamber of commerce,
trade unions, shipping lines, shippers as well as port operators. They all have an
interest in determining port administration objectives, and try to impose their own
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influences in setting the objectives. Public ports are expected to pursue public
interests. But public interests may well be in conflict. The benefits derived from
the existence and development of ports differ across the population. The general
public has an interest in the efficient provision of port facilities and services, for
otherwise they will have to pay more than necessary for the use of ports in terms
of either more tax or higher port tariffs. The local public living around the ports,
however, tends to attach more importance on the prosperity of port economy. It is
in their interest to have more jobs and more business and personal income
generated by the port and port—related industries. As far as dock workers are
concerned an improvement in efficiency may have an adverse effect on their
welfare. For instance, registered dock workers are worse off following the abolition
of the Dock Labour Scheme which protected them from casual employment. There
are also conflicts between commerce and aesthetics, between economic advantages
and social costs, between residential, recreational and commercial land use.
Politicians are assumed to be concerned about their electoral benefits. Given the
divergence in the public interest over ports, it is improbable that politicians will
have a constant incentive, persistently induced by the general public, to administer
national ports efficiently. The priority given to particular objectives, as a result of
political struggle, is likely to keep changing. There is little reason for believing
economic efficiency will always be given first priority in port management.
Since 1978, public corporations in Britain have been exhorted to maximise
efficiency subject to a generally tight set of constraints of financial and production
cost. In contrast to their counterparts in Continental Europe and the USA, public
ports in Britain are unique in their financial independence. A series of financial
objectives for UK ports is contained in a memorandum of the National Ports
Council of 25 November 1975, and these suggest that each port authority should
generate sufficient cash revenue each year to meet: 1) interest and any taxation
and dividends to shareholders; 2) redemption of capital debt actually falling due in
the fmancial year, and provision towards the redemption of capital debt falling due
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for repayment in future years; 3) 50 per cent of all capital expenditure; The
annual consolidated surplus (before exceptional items, taxation and interest charged
to revenue but after making full and proper provision for the depreciation out of
revenue) should present a return on capital of not less than 10 per cent (Financial
Objectives, 1978). The requirement that the port cover its costs provides a valuable
administrative incentive to the port authority to control its costs and its expansion
plans.
While managerial discretion can be reduced by tighter financial constraints, the
problem of ministerial discretion remains. A necessary administrative feature of
national ports is centralisation. Government tends to retain many key decisions such
as investment, tariffs, and personnel at ministry level, or if not made directly by
the ministry these decisions are often subject to ministerial approval. With excessive
intervention national ports tend to suffer from a lack of energy and vigour and
tend to be too bureaucratic, too inflexible to respond adequately and promptly to
the market situation and to customer needs.
Given these fundamental weaknesses it is likely that the incentive structures
imposed on national port managements are in general defective as compared with
private ports, even though the capital market for corporate control is not perfect.
This conclusion, however, cannot automatically apply to the case of municipal
and trust ports. Unlike national ports municipal ports are responsible to local
authorities rather than to national government. As a result of decentralisation, there
are two immediate effects on the public monitoring process. The first is the
alleviation of the problem of information asymmetry. In general local governments
tend to know more than the national government about the circumstances and
performance of port management. This may make it easier for local government to
design and enforce incentive schemes to induce ports to be managed properly. In
general intervention by local government is likely to be better informed. Moreover,
the administration of municipal ports may involve fewer levels of bureaucratic
hierarchy. In some ports management is a department of the local authority. In
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others managing directors are members of local councils. Thus the gap between
local government and port management is narrower. In consequence port
management may suffer less from the inefficiency of red tape and tend to respond
to a changing market situation more promptly and adequately.
Perhaps the most hopeful form of public port ownership is the public trust.
The principal—agent relationship in the case of trust ports possesses two
distinguishing features. One is the autonomous status of the agent. No one is
entitled to intervene as long as trust ports act properly in accordance with statutory
objectives laid down for them by parliament. The other is a simpler process of
public monitoring. Because of their autonomous nature there is less scope for
hierarchial and bureaucratic administration of port matters. The principal—agent
relationships in national, municipal and trust ports are contrasted in Fig 2.2-1.
Although the public monitoring hierarchy for a trust port looks the same as for a
national port, the links between port management on the one hand and politicians
and the Ministry on the other hand are indicated by the lines of dashes, meaning
that trust ports are under no direct administration of either Parliament or the
Ministry.
Given these desirable features trust ports have three potential advantages over
municipal and national ports. Firstly, the management objectives of trust ports are
statutory and there is no way that these objectives can be displaced by political
objectives. Secondly trust ports are free from excessive intervention from
government and enjoy almost the same degree of freedom as private ports. Thirdly
trust ports are likely to suffer much less from the internal inefficiency of
bureaucracy.
The core of the autonomous nature of trust ports is financial independence.
This provides a managerial incentive to improve productive efficiency. Compared
with the pursuit of profit by private ports, the requirement that the port recover
its costs is a constraint rather than a objective. Port management may still have
discretion to pursue their own benefits as long as the constraint is met. It may be
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argued that financial independence is thus not likely to generate as much incentive
to improve productive efficiency as the objective of profit maximisation. But equally
it can be argued that, because of imperfections in the capital market for corporate
control, managers in private ports may also merely pursue the financial objective of
satisfying shareholders.
Z{a1Jonal Port
	 Municipal Port
	 Trust Port
General Public	 Local Public
	 General Public
Politician	 Local Politician
	 Politician
Ministry	 Local Government
	
rMinistry J
Port Management
Fig 2.2—i Alternative Public Monitoring Hierarchies
To summarise; public ports may suffer from deficiences of public monitoring
hierarchies, goal displacement, lack of clarity in corporate objectives and operative
responsibility, and excessive ministerial intervention in operational decisions. The
deficiencies, however, are not unavoidable and in fact can be reduced when port
administration is decentralised, as in the case of municipal ports, or independent
from government as in the case of trust ports. On the other hand, the private
monitoring system also suffers from imperfections. It is therefore not safe to
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conclude which monitoring system is generally more effective as far as the port
industry is concerned. The corollary of this is that the efficiency gains of
privatising ports under indirect public ownership because of the change in
managerial incentive structures are likely to be small correspondingly.
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2.3 Port Pricing and Investment Performance under Alternative Froms of Ownership
This issue has been treated in an important but neglected paper by Bobrovitch
(1982). Based on a two-ports system model, Bobrovitch shows (a) the equivalence
of centralised planning and decentralised maxiinisation of net social welfare; (b) the
apparently suboptimal traffic allocation resulting from competition between profit
maximising ports, but allocative inefficiency disappears when demand density is
symmetric and the two ports are located symmetrically; (c) the port producers
adopt the same investment rule regardless of whether they seek to minimise the
costs of all participants in the system, or to maximise the net social benefit
independently, or to maximise profitability. It is important to note that the result
that private ports adopt the same investment rule as public ports does not mean
that they will necessarily choose the same port capacity as public ports. Port
capacity is a function of port output. If the allocation of traffic in a private-ports
system is suboptimal, the port capacity chosen by private ports will be suboptimal
as well. However, if the assumption of symmetric demand is acceptable, the effects
of suboptimal traffic allocation and hence of suboptimal port capacity can be
neglected.
If the immediate effect of the transfer of port ownership between central
government sector, local government sector and the private sector is a change in
the objectives of port management, Bobrovitch's model can be used to describe and
compare pricing and investment behaviour and performance under the alterative
forms of port ownership. But Bobrovitch's results can be questioned in two aspects.
Firstly, Bobrovitch failed to show whether the port duopoly price level derived by
him is a Nash equilibrium and whether or not such an equilibrium exists. Thus
nothing can be said about the market performance of port duopoly relative to the
publicly owned ports. Secondly, Bobrovitch confined himself to a partial analysis in
which the cargo volume was taken as given in determining the optimal port
capacity. Since the outcome of price competition in the Nash equilibrium depends
Pi
Pi
Distance
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on port capacity among other things, it is more plausible to assume that private
ports will compete to choose the optimal port capacity to improve their position in
the game of price competition. These two problems are tackled in what follows.
The discussion here is based on the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 The hinterland is a line segment of length d; port service is
provided by two ports located at either end of the hinterland 0 and C as shown
in Fig 2.3-1.
,..,c..
0	 B	 C
Fig 2.3-1 A Two—Port System
Assumption 2 The aggregate demand for port services is assumed to be absolutely
inelastic regardless of changes in port charges and capacity. Without loss of
generality, cargo is homogenous and evenly spread over the line segment. The
density of cargo is one. Thus the aggregate demand is d as well.
The assumption of inelastic aggregate demand for port services is quite
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reasonable, since the proportion of port cost in the final product value is
insignificant and port customers in aggregate are unlikely to be very sensitive to
changes in port price. In addition, the assumption of uniform traffic distribution
implies symmetric demand.
Assumption 3 Each port charges a uniform price. Ship time cost at port per unit
of cargo is assumed linear in the port occupancy rate. Inland transport cost per
mile for each unit of cargo is also linear in distance. Thus generalised transport
cost per unit of cargo incurred by a marginal port user at a distance X1 from port
i (i=1 ,2) is given by
xi
(2.3-1)	 T1 - P+ a - + tX1
K'
Where P1 - port i's charge;
X 1 - the length of port Ps market; Civen Assumption 2, X 1 also
represents port l's cargo volume;
K j - port Vs capacity;
X 1 /K1 - port occupancy rate;
a - average opportunity cost of ship time in port per
unit of cargo when port occupancy rate is 100%
- constant inland transport cost per mile per unit
of cargo.
Three points about Assumption 3 need to be explained. First, the work of
Singer (1937) and Hoover (1937), which was subsequently followed up by Greenhut
(1975) and Beckman (1976), suggests that a profit-maximising spatial monopolist
has an incentive and is able to adopt a policy of price discrimination by which he
charges buyers a variable proportion of transport costs. The same applies to a
profit-maximising port monopolist, and in many ports customers are in fact charged
against their cargo origins and destinations. Here, however, consider only the
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simple case where ports charge a uniform price. Second, it may not be realistic to
assume that average ship time cost a(Xj/K 1) is linear in the port occupancy rate
(X/K1). In practice, this will tend to rise rather rapidly as port throughput
approaches full capacity. But a non-linear average ship time cost will increase the
algebraic complexity without yielding much further insight into the problem. Third,
it is implicitly assumed either that ship operators and cargo owners are the same
entities or that competitive ship operators will include port charges and ship delay
costs in their rates so that cargo owners bear generalised transport costs in full.
Assumption 4 Production cost in port equals c 1 X1+rK, where c1 is the constant
marginal cost in port i and r is the constant cost of capital per unit of capacity,
which is identical in both ports.
Assumption 5 Port capital is divisible.
Assumption 6 Three options are available as regards the industrial organisation of
the two-ports system. One option is equivalent to nationalising the two ports and
putting them under a centralised administration. The objective of the central ports
authority, be it the Ministry of Transport or a separate administrative service
responsible to the Ministry, would be to maximise the social welfare of all the
participants in the system. Given inelastic demand, this is equivalent to minimising
the total costs of all the participants in the system. Under the second option, port
administration is decentralised and each port is owned and administered by an
independent public trust or a local authority. Each independent port authority is
expected to maximise the social welfare of port producers and customers within the
physical boundary of its port. The third option is to privatise the public ports. The
managements of private ports are assumed to maximise profits. We also suppose
that competition policy prevents one port from being merged or taken over by
another so that the private-ports system remains a duopoly.
Assumption 7 Private ports engage in quantity-setting competition, in which ports
decide how much cargo volume to handle and let the market decide the price at
which port service is provided. Each private port acts in the belief that its rival
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wifi take the situation as given (i.e. a Cournot-like assumption).
This assumption needs explaining. First, we usually think of the distinction
between quantity-setting (Cournot) and price-setting (Bertrand) behaviour as
determined by the technology: how quickly can a firm alter the rate of output?
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) take a different approach and view the difference of
the two types of competition as depending on whether production capacity is
constrained or not. The distinction between quantity-setting and price-setting can
be made in the port sector from both approaches. Port operators of common user
terminals are unable to predict ship arrivals accurately when they decide to build
terminals. They have to set production schedules in advance and cannot alter
production capacity in the short run once the terminal is built. Thus competition
between common user terminal operators is likely to be of the quantity-setting
type. In specialised terminals, by contrast, long term contracts between port
operators and shipping companies are made for the exclusive use of terminals
before the commitment of either side to the specialised services. Port competition
in this circumstance is likely to be of the price-setting type. However, even in
common user terminals, price undercutting is possible when the existing terminal
capacity is in excess of demand. Therefore it appears that the type of port
competition depends Ex-ante (before terminals are built or re-developed) on the
technology and Ex-pos: (once terminals are built and re-developed) on production
capacity. In the following discussion attention will be confmed to the
quantity-setting type of port competition.
Second, the Cournot-like behavioural assumption in this quantity-setting port
oligopoly model implies zero-price and non-zero-quantity conjectures. Since
aggregate demand is fixed, there can be only two cases of conjectural variation:
either the change in one port's cargo volume is fully absorbed by the opposite
change in the other port's cargo volume (non-zero-quantity conjecture), or the
change in one port's cargo volume is impossible simply because the other port
refuses to change its cargo volume (zero-quantity conjecture). In contrast to general
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oligopoly models, the zero-quantity conjecture in this model is a belief that the
rival port will be very aggressive. To prevent one port from changing its cargo
volume, the rival port must change its price accordingly (non-zero-price
conjecture). But if the rival port takes the situation as given, it must keep its
price unchanged (zero-price conjecture).
Although the aggregate demand is absolutely inelastic, demand for an
individual port is elastic as port users can divert their traffic from one port to the
other. Obviously port users will choose the port with lower combined transport
costs per unit of cargo. The allocation of the total traffic d between the two ports
will not be in equilibrium until the following condition is satisfied:
X1	d-X1
(2.3-2)	 P1 + a - +	 - P 2+ a	 + t(d-X1)
K 1
	
One can derive the demand for port i from Eq(2.3-2)
P -P +S d
(2.3-3)	 X-
si+sj
where S 1 - t + a/K 1 ; i,j=I,2; i^j.
Or the inverse demand function in terms of port charges
(2.3-4)	 P1 - P + S jd - (S+S)X
(i,j-1,2; I^j)
In public policy analysis perfect competition as a welfare ideal is often taken
as a benchmark case to evaluate the performance of alternative market structures.
But the perfect competition model requires an assumption of no externalities in
production and consumption. In a congestion-prone system like ports we cannot
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declare that external effects are of no importance. In the following analysis the
outcome of centralised pricing and investment decision aiming to minimise the total
costs of all participants in the system is taken as the benchmark case to evaluate
the performance of decentralise.d public ownership and private ownership. Here we
assume that administrative deficiency of central planning is of no importance, since
we concern the optimising behaviour only.
Proposition I A centralised and a decentralised publicly owned two-port system are
equivalent in their optimal solutions to pricing and investment problems:
(I) the optimal port price is determined by
(2.3-5)	 c.+a(XjIK1)	 i=1,2;
(ii) the optimal port capacity in both systems will be determined by
(2.3-6)	 Ki*	 X1 j(a/r)	 i,=1,2.
The mathematical formulation of and solution to the centralised and
decentralised optimisation problems and the proof of Proposition 1 are given in
Appendix 2.3-1 and 2.3-2.
The port pricing policy adopted in centralised and decentralised public ports as
indicated in Eq(2.3-5) is based on a marginal cost and congestion pricing rule. cj
is marginal port producer's costs. aX1/K1 is additional ship time costs incurred by
all ships together as a consequence of the entrance of a marginal ship. It is shown
in Appendix 2.3-1 that marginal ship time cost is given by 2aX 1IK 1 and average
ship time cost is given by aX/K1. The operator of the marginal ship will take
account of average rather than marginal ship time cost after its entry when he
calculates the expected profitability of the service. Thus in the case where ship
time costs are linear in the utilisation rate of port capacity the cost taken into
account in private decisions is only half the cost incurred by society. The central
port planner who seeks to minimise the total costs of all participants in the
system, and the decentralised port authorities which seek to ntaximise the net social
benefit in the physical boundary of their ports, will charge port customers the
divergence between marginal ship time cost and average ship time cost, i.e. aX1IK1.
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The marginal cost and congestion pricing ensure optimal allocation of traffic
between different ports and different seasons. The topic of port congestion pricing
is discussed more fully in Vanags (1977) and Bennathan and Walters (1979).
The optimal port capacity KI* as indicated in Eq(2.3-6) in both systems is
positively related to the opportunity costs of ship time a and negatively related to
the opportunity cost of port capital r. Due to the fact that port services are not
storable, there is a problem of reconciling capacity with fluctuating demand. On
the one hand, more capacity would imply lower ship time in port but higher costs
of port construction. On the other hand, if less capacity were constructed, lower
costs of port construction would be incurred, but ship time costs would rise. The
optimal port capacity in the centralised and decentralised optimisation is determined
by balancing the costs from both the port producers' and the customers' side.
Proposition 2 The optimal solution to pricing and investment problems in the
privatised two-port system is different from the social optimum obtained in
centralised decision-making. Particularly, if the two ports are identical in cost and
capacity,
(i) the port duopoly price in the Nash equilibrium will exceed the socially optimal
level;
(ii) the port duopolists will under-invest when they agree on market share and
over-invest when they do not, as compared with the social optimum.
First of all let us identify the Nash equilibrium of the port duopoly in price
and output. it is important to note that in the Hotelling model no Nash
equilibrium exists when two firms compete on both price and location. When
location is fixed and two firms are sufficiently far from each other a Nash
equilibrium in price exists (Graitson, 1982). Given that port location is immobile
and the two ports locate on each end of the line segment, there will be a Nash
equilibrium in price. As shown in Appendix A2.3-3 the profit-maximising cargo
volume based on zero-price and non-zero--quantity conjecture is given by
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Pj + S j d - ci
(2.3-7)	 X1 - ____________
2(Sj+Sj)
(i,j-1,2; i^j)
and the implied port price will be
(2.3-8)	 P1- (l/2)(Pj + Sd +c1)
(i,j-1,2, i^j)
The throughput each port will choose depends upon what it thinks the port
price will be in the other port. In general the zero-price and non-zero-quantity
conjectures are inconsistent. With the aggregate demand d, port i's throughput must
be d-X if port j picks up its throughput as X. But when X is the
profit-maximising throughput of port j, d-Xj need not be the profit-maximising
throughput of port i. The converse is true as well. The port duopoly approaches
equilibrium only when the sum of profit-maximising throughputs of the two ports is
equal to d exactly, i.e.,
(2.3-9)	 X1 + X	 d
or
Pj +Sd_c-I-Pj+Sjd_cj
(2.3-10)	 = d
Substituting Eq(2.3-8) into Eq(2.3-1 0) and rearranging gives
(2.3-11)	 P1 - (l/3)(S1d+2Sd+2c1+cj)
(i,j-1,2, i^j)
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Substituting P in Eq(2.3-l1) into Eq(2.3-7) gives
3td+(a/K j )d+(2a/Ki)d+cj_cj
(2.3-12)	 X1 - _________________________
3(2t+ a/K j+ aIKj)
(1,j-1,2, 1^j)
Crucially, as X1 in Eq(2.3-12) satisfies X 1 +X 2 d, X 1 is port l's optimal
choice given X 2 as port 2's choice, and X 2 is port 2's optimal choice given X1
as port l's choice, (X 1 , X 2 ) determined by Eq(2.3-12) and (P 1 . P 2 ) determined
by Eq(2.3-1 1) are the port duopoly output and price in Nash equilibrium.
When the two ports are identical in cost and capacity, i.e.	 and K1=K
the pair of prices and outputs in Nash-equilibrium reduces to
(2.3-13)	 P1 - c + (ad/K) + td
(2.3-14)	 X1 - d/2
From Proposition 1 it is easy to see that Pi*=c+(ad/2K) and X1*=d/2 is the
social optimum when the two ports are identical in cost and capacity. With the
term (ad/K) included in port charges, port duopoly in effect internalises the
external effect of port congestion. But, as compared with the social optimum
achieved in centralised and decentralised public ports, the port duopoly overcharges
port users by the amount of (ad/2K)+td. The market power of the port duopoly
stems from both the cost of inland transport (td) and the scarcity of port capacity
(ad/2K). The economic effect of overcharging is income redistribution from port
customers to producers. With inelastic aggregate demand overcharging port price
does not lead to a deterioration in efficiency of resource allocation between ports
and other sectors. According to Eq(2.3-1 4), the duopoly level of output is equal to
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the social optimum, provided that the two ports are identical in cost and capacity
and that demand is symmetric (as implied by Assumption 2). Thus there will be
no distortion in traffic allocation either, as long as ports are identical and demand
is symmetnc. Intuitively this is so because traffic allocation depends on the relative
rather than the absolute price level of two ports. The optimal pattern of traffic
allocation divides the hinterland equally and this will not be changed as long as the
two identical ports charge the same level. An important corollary of this is that
the distortion in traffic allocation may well be greater with different objectives of
port pricing as compared with identical objectives of port pricing. Thus mixed port
ownership in this country might be undesirable from a traffic allocation point of
view.
Now consider investment performance of port duopoly. Bobrovitch derived the
profit-maximising capacity by setting aI1/aK1O (where fl 1 is the profit function in
Eq(A2.3-3-1) and he then concluded that the investment rule is the same as
Eq((2.3-6). It was assumed that port oligoplists would treat the pricing and
investment decisions separately. When they chose the profit-maximising output they
would take the capacity as given. And when they chose the profit-maximising
capacity they would take the market share as given. This partial analysis certainly
fails to reflect real features of oligopolistic competition in port sectors. It would be
more plausible to view port competition as a set of interrelated games. Since the
outcome of price games is predetermined largely by the outcome of investment
games, port duopolists would make every effort to improve their position in the
price games through investment competition. In our analysis equilibrium price and
capacity is determined in the following manner: taking port capacity as fixed, Nash
equilibrium price is first sought, then profits are expressed as a function of
capacity alone and the investment rule of port duopolists is sought. Assume that
initially the two ports are identical in capacity and cost and that they take turns to
invest so the two ports remain identical throughout the game of capacity
competition. Recalling P1 in Eq(2.3-13) and X in Eq(2.3-14), the profit in Nash
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equilibrium is given by
(2.3-15)	 flj - (P j - c-)X 1 - rl(
- (c + td +ad/K-c)d/2 - i-K
- (1/2)(t + a/K)d 2 - i-K
Apparently the port duopolists have an incentive to un&r-invest as long as
they agree on maintaining the existing market share in Nash equilibrium, since
capacity expansion erodes profitability:
-'	 2
ofl	 ad
(2.3-16)	 - - ____ - r < 0
aK 1	2K
As already noted, the degree of monopoly power is partly dwe to the scarcity of
port capacity. Given cargo volume port duopolists will be better able to -raise port
charges if port capacity is lower in relation to demand. But each port duopolist
also understands that in general its market share in Nash equilibrium as expressed
in Eq(2.3-12) is a function of its capacity and its rival's capacity among other
things, and that
ax 1	 3adt + 3a2d/Kj
(2.3-17)	 -	 >. 0
aK 1	(6tKj+3a+3aKj/Kj)2
given identical marginal cost. It does not have to maintain its market share. Rather
each port will be able to enlarge its market share by expanding its capacity. But
capacity expansion in one port will then provoke competition on capacity from its
rival port in order to defend its market share, because
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ax 1	 -3adt - 3a2d/Kj
(2.3-18)	 - _________________
akj (6tKj+3a+3aKj/Kj)2
Although each port duopolist knows that
ap 1	 ad
(2.3-19)	 - -	 < 0
aic 1	 3K11c1
which implies that competition on capacity will erode profitability, the situation will
get even worse if the rival port siezes the expansion opportunity, because
<0
(2.3-20)
8p1	 2ad	 8p1
3K 1 K 1	aK1
Port competition on capacity will not stop until the expected profit is zero.
Recall that the profit in Nash-equilibrium when the two ports are identical in
capacity and cost can be written as Eq(2.3-15). The equilibrium capacity denoted
by K' is such that
(2.3-21)	 fl1(K1') - 0
Substituting the socially optimal port capacity K1* into fl we have
(2.3-22)	 fl(J(*) - (1/2)(t + a/Kj*)d2_rK1*
- (1/2)(td 2+ rdj(a/r))> 0
Since
(2.3-23)	 1T.(Ki*) >. fl 1 (K 1 ) - 0
and
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(2.3-24)	 arl1/aK1 < 0
it is obvious that the equilibrium capacity when the port duopolists disagree on
market share is larger than the optimal level:
(2.3-25)	 K1' > I(j*
Therefore in either case the duopoly level of port capacity is different from
the social optimum. The departure from the optimal level of capacity causes a
more serious welfare loss than the departure from the optimal level of price.
Investment efficiency rather than allocative efficiency should be the focus of applied
welfare analysis in port economics.
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Appendix 2.3-1
Optimisation in a Centralised Publicly Owned Two-port System
The optimisation problem of the central planner is how to allocate total traffic d
between the two ports in order to minimise the costs of all participants in the
system, i.e.
(A2.3-1-1) Mm	 TC - E[(1/2)tX+ a(X/I(4) + c 1X+ rKj]
2
Subject to	 - d
i-i
where TCi (i=1 ,2) is generalised transport costs in port i, including inland transport
cost, ship time cost and port operating and capital cost. Recall that the term tX1
is unit inland transport cost for the marginal user at a distance X from port L
Given linear inland transport costs in distance, average inland transport cost for
users at port i is (1 12)tX1. Note that, under the uniform traffic density assumption
(Assumption 2), X is equal to port i's traffic as well. Thus total inland transport
costs for all users in port i is (1I2)tXX. Under Assumption 3 a(X 1/K1) is unit ship
time costs in port 1, hence a(X1/K1)X1 is total ship time costs for all users in port
i. Given Assumption 4 cXj is operating costs and rK capital costs of port 1.
Noting that X=d-Xj , minimum costs are given by setting aTC1/aX 1=O and
aETC/K1=O from which one obtains
(A2.3-1-2) tX 1 - t(d-X1 ) + 2a(X 1 /K 1 ) - 2a(d_X j )/K-I- c j cj - 0
(i,j1,2; i^j)
and
(A2.3-1-3) - a(X/K 1 ) + r - 0
(i,j=1,2; i^j)
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Solving Eq(A2.3-1 -2) for X1 we obtain the optimal throughput in port i, i.e.
d + 2ad/Kj + cj - c1
(A2.3-1-4)	 X1 - _____________________
2(t +	 + aIICj)
(i,j-1,2; I^j)
Rearranging Eq(A2.3-1-2) one obtains
(A2.3-1-5)	 tXj + aX/K 1 + aX 1 /K 1 + c1
- tXj + aXJ /K+ aX/Kj+ cj
(i,j'-1,2; i^j)
Comparing Eq(A2.3-1-5) with Eq(2.3-2) it is evident that the optimal price is
given by
(A2.3-1 -6)	 P4' = c1 + a(X11K1)	 (i = 1,2)
The solution for K1 in Eq(A2.3-I-3) is the optimal capacity of port I (i=1 ,2),
i .e.
(A2.3-1-7)	 Ki* = X1 j(alr)	 (I = 1,2)
Assuming that the two ports are identical so that c c and K 1 =K 2=K, the
least-cost pattern of port traffic allocation determined in Eq(A2.3-1 -4) reduces to
X1*=X2*=d/2. The optimal port capacity in (A2.3-1-7) is then given by
K1*=K2*=(d12)j(alr).
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Appendix 2.3-2
Optimisation In a Decentralised Publicly Owned Two-port System
The real costs, denoted by e, incurred by customers in port i include port charges
P1 and average ship time costs a(Xi/KØ. From Eq(2.3-2) one can derive the
inverse demand function for port i in terms of the real costs, which indicate the
willingness to pay by port users in port i, i.e.
(A2.3-2-1)	 8 1 (X j ) - P 1+ a(X1/K1)
- P+ a(d_X j )/Kj+ t(d-X 1 )- tX1
(i,j-1,2; i^j)
Following Bobrovitch, the net social welfare function that an independent port
authority seeks to maximise is defined as the difference between social benefit
derived from port i's services and social costs incurred by port i's producers and
customers, i.e.
(A2.3-2-2)	 WF -
	 J ' 9 1 (Z)dZ - [a(X/K 1 ) + cX1+ i-K1]
(I,j-.l,2; i^j)
Optimum WF is given by aWF/3Xi = 0 and aWF/aKi 0 from which one obtains
(A2.3-2-3)	 e 1 (X) - 2aX 1 /K- c 1 - 0	 (1-1,2)
and
(A2.3-2-4)	 -aX/K+ r - 0	 (1-1,2)
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Since e1 = P 1 + a(X IK1), Eq(A2.3-2-3) implies that the optimal port charging
level in decentralised public ports is given by
(A2.3-2-5)	 P 1 - c j + aX j /K j	 (1-1,2)
which is identical to the socially optimal level of port charges obtained in
centralised public ports P determined in Eq(A2.3-1 -6).
Eq(A2.3-2-4) implies that the optimal port capacity in decentralised planning
is given by
(A2.3-2-6)	 K1 - X11(a/r)	 (1-1,2)
which is also identical to the social optimum obtained in centralised planning Ki*
determined in Eq(A2.3-1 -7).
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Appendix 2.3-3
Profit in ilmhation in a Privately Owned Two-port System
Recalling the inverse demand function in terms of port price expressed in
Eq(2.2-4), the profit function for port i is then given by
(A2.3-3-1)	 H1 - [P j + S jd - (S+Sj )X - c 1 ]Xj - i-Kj
(1j1,2; I^j)
Maximum profits are given by setting H1/aXj O. Assuming zero-price and
non-zero-quantity conjectures, i.e. aPiaP1=o, the profit-maximising throughput
derived from the normal condition is given by
P+ Sd -
(A2.3-3-2)	 x - ___________
2(S-i-S)
(i,j-1,2; 1^j)
Substituting X1 ' into Eq(2.3-4) the implied port price will be
(A2.3-3-3)	 P -
	
+ S jd + ci)
(i,j-1,2; I^j).
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Chapter 3
Productive Efficiency of British Ports
Relative to a Deterministic Frontier
This chapter and the next two involve estimating productive efficiency for British
ports. In this chapter efficiency is measured against a deterministic reference
technology, on the assumption that the entire deviation of an observation from the
technology is attributed to inefficiency. Both parametric and non—parametric
approaches are available to estimate the deterministic technology against which
efficiency is measured. Since the parametric (deterministic) approach may impose
an unwarranted structure on the production technology, the more flexible
non—parametric approach was chosen, which enables us to explore systematically the
various ways that a port producer might depart from overall productive efficiency
relative to a piecewise—linear reference technology.
The chapter begins, in section 3.1, with a brief outline of the notion of a
frontier function and the computational framework set up by Farrell (1957). The
meaning of inefficiency relative to the production frontier is also discussed. Section
3.2 shows how the simple framework initiated by Farrell has been extended and
developed into more meaningful and less restrictive non—parametric constructions.
This section also provides a background for the development of parametric
(stochastic) models in the next chapter. Given the non—parametric constructions
outlined in section 3.2, the linear programming models used to calculate various
notions of productive efficiency are set up in Section 3.3 and applied to British
ports in Section 3.5. It is found that there has been substantial variation of
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productive efficiency in the industry and that X—inefficiency, technical inefficiency
and scale inefficiency have been the important components of productive
inefficiency.
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3.1 Frontier Production Function
The textbook definition of a production function holds that it gives the maximum
possible output which can be produced from a given quantity of a set of inputs.
The word frontier may meaningfully be applied in this case because the function
sets a limit to the range of possible observations. One may observe points below
the production function frontier but no points can lie above the production frontier.
The measurement of inefficiency has been the main motivation for the study of
frontiers. As a matter of fact a departure from the frontier can be constructed as
an index of inefficiency for the firm concerned. In early work, however, only
average production functions have been estimated, since a linear regression model
was postulated for the underlying technology. A crucial assumption here is that the
mean of the disturbance term is zero. In other words discrepancies of actual output
values from the expected output value are not attributed to any one-sided error
such as inefficiency. Rather they are assumed to be symmetric, as a result of
unspecified influences, randomness in human response and measurement errors, and
will average out at zero. One cannot derive any meaningful efficiency measures
from such an average production function.
The beginning point for any discussion of frontiers and the meaningful
measurement of efficiency is the work of Farrell (1957), who provided definitions
and a computable framework for productive inefficiency, which was decomposed
into technical inefficiency and price inefficiency. Consider a port production activity
involving two factors of input: labour Xi and capital X2, and producing a single
output Y. Assume that the most efficient production technology currently available
is represented by Y=f(Xi ,X2). Also assume that the technology is subject to
constant returns to scale, so that the frontier production function can be written as
1-f(X1/Y,X2IY), i.e. the unit isoquant SS' as illustrated in Fig 3.1-1. The line PP'
is the current isocost line (minimum cost of producing one unit of output). The
0 X2IY
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crosses denote observable input coefficients for the ports in the industry. Let A be
a specific port firm. Given the best technology currently available and the factor
ratio of A, the most efficient production activity should take place at B. The
Farrell measure of technical efficiency is then defmed by the ratio of OB/OA.
Given current factor prices, however, even B is not the most efficient (the least
cost or the most profitable point) because of its non-optimal factor ratio. Hence,
the observed port firm A is also price inefficient. The corresponding point of
minimum cost is D and the Farrell measure of price efficiency for A is defined by
the ratio of OC/OB. The measure of overall productive efficiency for A is then
computed as the product of the technical efficiency measure and the price
efficiency measure and is equal to OCIOA.
'V.. Iv
Fig 3.1-1 Frontier Function and Productive Efficiency
Price inefficiency is due to failures to adopt the least-cost technology defined
by the current isocost line PP'. Farrell suspected of whether a high price efficiency
is desirable (pp.261). Price efficiency measures the extent of a firm's adaption to a
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particular set of factor prices. In the short run it need not indicate any
unavoidable errors in decision making, since, for example, ports which invested
long ago may have had rather different expectations about future factor prices than
would those which invested comparatively recently. Simliarly, in a period of
expansion a port's best policy may be to operate for a time well above its optimal
level of output, although this would imply a low price efficiency. Thus Farrell
believed that price efficiency provides a good measure of efficiency in adapting
prices only in a completly static situation.
Farrell's measure of technical efficiency measures the extent of deviations from
the frontier production technology. Farrell maintained that it indicates "the
undisputed gain that can be achieved by 'gingering up' the management" (pp.260).
In other words Farrell's original intention is to measure managerial efficiency.
Clearly to measure genuine efficiency requires all important factors of production
except the managerial inputs to be included as explanatory variables in the
production function. This also requires the quality of inputs except the quality of
managerial inputs to be homogenous or the quality of inputs to be counted as
further factors of production if they are heterogenous (as always). Recall that, in a
classical regression model of production function, we shall build all important
factors of production into the systematic part, leaving the mean of the disturbance
term to be zero. In a frontier production function model, however, we shall
deliberately leave managerial inputs outside the systematic part. It is the quantity or
quality of managerial inputs that is the source of inefficiency we concern. However,
it is easy said than done to measure input variables accurately and exhaustively.
Failures to so will obscure policy implications of the efficiency estimates, since
inter—firm efficiency may be partly attributed to the non—measurement of a further
factor of production. The problem of the measurement of inputs will be discussed
in Section 3.4. At this stage we need to elaborate on the exact meaning of
managerial efficiency.
Even when we are free from measurement problems there is still room for
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doubt whether departures from the production frontier indicate "undisputed gains
that can be achieved by gingering up the management". This should include
X-inefficiency, which occurs due to motivational deficency at both management and
worker level. The extent of X-inefficiency reveal gains that can be achieved
through improving incentive structures of the management concerned. But
departures from a production frontier need not be attributed to X-inefficiency only.
They may simply represent the efficiency of a technology in relation to the
best-practice technology. Clearly, with technical progress, technologies available
recently are likely to be more productive than technologies available long ago.
Once the technology is chosen, a firm is stuck with that particular technology until
it is profitable to change it. At any moment an industry is likely to be living with
different vintages of technology, which vary in productivity. In the short run, the
inefficiency of a technology is not necessarily avoidable even in a X-efficienct firm,
since it is unwise to replace the existing technology with the frontier technology at
any cost.
Technical efficiency, managerial efficiency and X-efficiency are often used
interchangably in economics literature. Leibenstein (1973) objected to technical
efficiency being synonymous with X-efficiency:
I use the term "X-efficiency" for what some writers may mean whey they speak of
"technical efficiency" (for example, Farrell (1957)) or "efficiency in the engineering
sense" (Schwartzman, 1973). My reason for this is to escape from some of the
behavioural nuances and suggestions contained in the words "technical efficiency" (or,
in some uses, "entrepreneurial efficiency"). One of the implications of "technical
efficiency" is that there is some sort of a "central controller" of inputs who, at least
in principle, is able to determine how the inputs are to be combined in order to
pursue the objective of the firm (i.e. minimize costs). The only difficulty implicitly
admitted is that this central controller is not quite as good at doing his job as he
might be. His leclvüque is off as it were. Hence, a firm may be technically
inefficient. I believe that this involves an undesirable simplification of the nature of
the firm, and hence I will use the more neutral concept of X-inefficiency to mean
the extent to which a given set of inputs do not get to be combined in such a way
so as to lead to maximum output.
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There is some inconsistency in this quoted paragraph. At the begining Leibenstein
seemed to emphasize that X-inefficiency is a better term than technical inefficiency
for what he meant, but finally he seemed to infer that these two terms are
different in substance. It is important to note that the difference between
X-inefficiency and technical inefficiency is not just a matter of nuance.
In this monograph we formally distinguish between X-inefficiency and technical
inefficiency and maintain that they represent two distinctive components of Farrell's
"technical inefficiency", represented by the ratio of OB/OA in Fig 3.1-1. We
replace the term "technical inefficiency" with the term non-price productive
inefficiency. Technical inefficiency arises from the difference in the the frontier
technology and the technology actually adopted due to putty-clay problem. By
contrast X-inefficiency occurs because of failures to explore the maximum
production possibility of the technology actually adopted. The distinction between
these two efficiency notions are important because they have different policy
implications. While X-inefficiency indicates the efficiency gains that can be achieved
by gingering up the management, technical inefficency implies that the efficiency
gains that can be achieved through technical progress. Technical efficiency may
reflect conduciveness of a firm to technical progress and its managerial efficiency in
investment decisions. But if we assume that knowledge of producers are imperfect
so that they need time to adjust their production to the optimal level, technical
inefficiency is unavoidable in the short run.
It is possible to decompose a deviation from the frontier into technical
inefficiency and X-inefficiency. For instance, one may introduce variables in
addition to factors of inputs in the frontier production function to describe the
technical levels of firms in utlising the capital and labour inputs. Since the
additional variables vary over firms using different technologies, firm-specific
production functions can be derived from the common production function. While
the X-efficiency measure can be constructed relative to the firm-specific production
function, the technical efficiency measure can be obtained by comparing the
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firm-specific production function and the most efficient firm-specific production
function.
The efficiency notions we have discussed so far are defined relative to a
frontier technology that exhibits constant returns to scale and strong disposability.
In non-parametric models more efficiency notions can be defined if we specify
different characteristics for the frontier technology.
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3.2 The Non-parametric Approach
Both non-parametric and parametric approaches were proposed by Farrell (1957).
His non-parametric approach specifies the piecewise-linear, free disposable convex
hull of the observed input-output ratio by some mathematical programming
procedure. Farrell's non-parametric method has the advantage that no functional
form is imposed on the data, but has the disadvantage of quite restrictive
assumptions, namely, constant returns to scale and strong disposability of inputs.
Secondly, Farrell illustrated his method for the case of a single output; the
generalisation to permit multiple outputs by his approach is complicated. Finally,
the efficiency estimated by Farrell's approach is susceptible to the presence of
extreme observations and measurement error as the frontier is computed from a
supporting subset of observations from the sample.
Following Farrell, many contributions have been made to construct a less
restrictive piecewise-linear technology in order to generalise the non-parametric
approach. Among the most important ones are the work by Charnes, Cooper,
Rhodes (1978, 1979), and Banker (1984, 1), which is known as Data Envelope
Analysis (DEA); and the work by Fare, Crosskopf, Lovell (1985) which we may
call FCL models.
Both work via an axiomatic formulation from which is constructed a series of
measures of efficiency relative to piecewise-linear technologies. But the efficiency
measures derived from FCL models are more comprehensive than those derived
from DEA models. Both radial and non-radial measures of input-based efficiency,
output-based efficiency and graph-based efficiency are developed by FCL. By
radial measurement overall productive efficiency can be decomposed into price and
non-price productive efficiency. The latter can be further decomposed into purely
productive efficiency, congestive efficiency and scale efficiency. The reference to
sources of efficiency underscores one of the main contributions of the FCL
95
approach.
In this study we will confine our attention to radial measures of input- and
output-based productive efficiency for individual UK ports, as the virtues of the
radial family of efficiency measures include the ease of computation, a
straightforward cost and revenue interpretation, and the consequent decomposability
(for details, see FCL (1985)). The remaining task of this section is to clarify the
various notions of efficiency.
FCL models may be considered as an extension of Farrell's model in two
respects. First, FCL formally distinguish a number of contexts in which a firm
makes its input-output decisions. In this study we shall confine ourselves to two of
them:
(i) a revenue maximisation context, in which a firm takes its inputs as being
predetermined or exogenous;
(ii) a cost minimisation context, in which the firm takes its output as being
predetermined or exogenous.
FCL maintain that different circumstances require different efficiency measures.
Input efficiency, which is appropriate to the situation (ii), measures the efficiency
of an input vector in the production of a predetermined output vector. Output
efficiency, which is appropriate to situation (i), measures the efficiency of an
output vector producible from a predetermined input vector.
Both input and output measures are radial in the sense that they search for
the maximum proportional reduction in inputs or increase in ouputs. The distinction
between input and output efficiency measures can be illustrated in Fig 3.2-1. For
simplicity, consider a single-output Y and a single-input X reference technology
denoted by FPF. Relative to FPF, the production plan in A is inefficient. The
input measure of productive efficiency seeks a maximum reduction of input
consistent with continued production of the same output, and it takes B as the
efficiency reference point of A. The output measure of productive efficiency seeks
a maximum output expansion consistent with continued usage of the same input
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and it takes C as the efficiency reference point of A.
The input measure is unequal to the output measure unless the technology is
homogenous of degree one (FCL, 1985, pp.132). Since Farrell assumed constant
returns to scale, there was no need in his framework to distinguish the two
measures. But in general the efficient use of inputs does not necessarily imply the
efficient production of output. Nor is the converse true.
Y
0
PFP
Fig 3.2-1 Input and Output Efficiency
Secondly, while the technology specified by Farrell is simple and restrictive,
the technologies in FCL models are sophiscated and flexible. In Farrell's model the
frontier technology is subject to constant returns to scale and strong disposability
(we shall return to these shortly). By contrast, three reference technologies are
distinguished in FCL models:
(i) the long—run competitive equilibrium technology, which exhibits constant returns
to scale (CRTS) and strong disposability of inputs and outputs;
(ii) the strongly disposable technology, which exhibits variable elasticity of scale and
strong disposability;
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(iii) the weakly disposable technology, which exhibits variable elasticity of scale and
weak disposability.
The variety of technologies enables us to define various notions of efficiency.
Consider Fig 3.2-2 which illustrates the three reference technologies by the
the three isoquant lines, Ii, 12 and 13, for two inputs, X 1
 (labour) and X2
(capital), to produce a specified level of output Y (denoting either a single output
or a vector of multiple outputs) in a cost—minimisation context where the input
measure of efficiency is appropriate. The points along each technology represent
different senses of the most efficient input combinations. The area above each
technology is the corresponding input possibilities set.
0	 X2
Fig 3.2-2 Input—Based Productive Efficiency
With constant returns to scale and strong disposability of inputs and outputs,
the long—run competitive equilibrium technology denoted by 1 1 (Y) provides the
largest input possibility set required to produce Y. This is so because frontier firms
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operate at the most productive scale size. For a single-input and single-output
case, the most productive size is simply the scale for which the average
productivity measured by the ratio of total output to total input is maximised. In
the case of multiple inputs, the most productive scale size is the scale that
maximises the "average productivity" measured by the ratio of total outputs to total
inputs for a particular input and output mix. The concept of the most productive
scale size is closely related to returns to scale. Outputs per unit of inputs for a
particular input and output mix would be maximised if and only if constant returns
to scale prevailed. In order to maximise average productivity one would increase
the scale size if increasing returns to scale prevailed, and decrease the scale size if
decreasing returns to scale prevailed.
It is useful to distinguish between the problem of determining the most
productive scale size for particular input and output mixes and the problem of
determining the minimum cost mix of inputs and outputs on the basis of their
relative prices (Banker, 1984, 2). Since prices are likely to be more volatile than
the pure technological characteristics, Banker argued that estimation of merely the
cost function is likely to retain its relevance for managerial and policy decisions for
shorter period than the estimation of the purely technological relation between the
physical quantities of inputs and outputs.
Another feature of the long-run competitive technology is strong disposability,
as generally assumed in economics textbooks that technologies are monotonic. In
other words, if one increases the amount of at least one of the inputs, it should
be possible to produce at least as much output as one was producing originally.
The technology is said to be strongly disposable or congestion-free, since if one
can dispose costlessly of any inputs, having extra inputs around cannot do any
harm (Varian, 1990, pp.303-304).
The strongly disposable reference technology denoted by I 2(Y) is also assumed
to exclude the possibility of congestion again but to exhibit increasing returns to
scale or decreasing returns to scale. Since firms that adopt this technology fail to
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maximise average productivity, 1 2(Y) lies above the long—run competitive equilibrium
technology and the input possibilities set shrinks accordingly.
The monotonicity or strong disposability of the technology implies positive
marginal productivity. However, in accordance with the law of diminishing returns,
if more and more of a variable factor is applied to a fixed quantity of other
inputs, eventually the resulting increases in output must diminish. Whenever this
happens and the variable input is not freely disposable for one reason or another,
the technology is said to be congestive in the variable factor. Technologies
exhibiting congestion are frequently found in agriculture, transport, and engineering
industries where a proper subset of production factors is kept fixed and increases in
the others may obstruct output (Fare, 1980). This may be justified in two ways
(Heathfield and Wibe, 1987, pp.26-27). The first relies on the heterogeneous
nature of the fixed inputs. At the initial stage of production only the most
productive parts of the fixed inputs are in use. But as output expands more of the
least productive parts of the fixed inputs are pressed into service and so the
marginal product of the variable input declines. This could be the case in the port
sector where the fixed inputs are land and water area. At first only the most
suitable sites, which are close to urban centres or require less dredging, are chosen
to build terminals. But as output expands the quality of the capital inputs is poorer
and poorer and hence the marginal product of labour declines. The second relates
to the optimum factor ratio given by quantity of the fixed input. Before the
optimal ratio is reached the variable input will become more productive as it
increases. Beyond the optimum, the factor ratio is less and less optimal as the
variable input increases and eventually the marginal product of the variable input
will become negative. An example of this in the port sector of this country could
be the now abolished labour scheme which prohibited casual employment of dock
workers. Under the scheme, port employers were not permitted to dismiss
registered dock workers without consulting with joint boards of employer and trade
union representatives. With dramatically declining labour requirements as a result of
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technical progress in the industry, the labour/capital ratio is less and less optimal
with a redundant labour force. Our attention will be confined to the second type
of congestion in technology which is due to the non-optimal factor ratio. Returning
to Fig.3.2-2, if one of the inputs, say labour Xi, is not strongly disposable,
congestion in X 1 will cause the technology denoted by I 3(Y) to be
backward-bending so that the input possibilities set shrinks further. The
backward-bending frontier indicates that the technology is not monotonic: the
marginal product of labour is negative.
Against these reference technologies various notions of productive efficiency
can then be measured. Following FCL it is useful to categorise three primary
measures and two derived measures of non-price productive efficiency.
The three primary measures include non-price productive efficiency OTE,
weakly productive efficiency WTE and purely productive efficiency PTE. Again
consider Fig.3.2-2 which illustrates the various input-based notions of efficiency
diagrammatically. The observed input combination is denoted by A. First of all,
relative to the long-run competitive equilibrium technology 1 1 (Y), the overall point
of efficient production with the same factor ratio as A would be E. The
input-based measure of non-price productive efficiency (IOTE) for A relative to
1 1 (Y) would be
(3.2-1)	 IOTE - OE/OA
The point C on the strongly disposable I 2 (Y) represents a weak point of
efficient production, since the point C is not attainable with the congested
technology I 3 (Y). But the point D is attainable with I 3(Y) as well as with 2 By
disposing CD units of X 1 , the point C is attainable. The input-based measure of
weakly productive efficiency (IWTE) for A defined relative to 1 2 (Y) would be
(3.2-2)	 IWIt - OC/OA
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Finally, against the weakly disposable and non-CRTS technology I 3(Y) the
input-based measure of purely productive efficiency (IPTE) which is due to
production in the interior of I 3 (Y) would be
(3.2-3)	 IPTE - OB/OA
Two points should be noted about these three primary measures. First, in
Farrell's framework IOTE, and IWTE and IPTE are equal. This is so because
Farrell assumed constant returns to scale and strong disposability, and hence the
three reference technologies distinguished in the FCL framework coincide. But
unless we are convinced that the frontier technology can only be characterised with
constant returns to scale and strong disposability it is necessary to distinguish the
three measures from one another. Second, for the reason explained in section 3.1
IPTE is hypothesized as both technical efficiency and X-efficiency.
Divergency in the values of the three primary measures implies the existence
of two additional categories of inefficiency, known as congestive inefficiency and
scale inefficiency. Given the three primary measures, the latter two measures can
be derived. Congestive inefficiency occurs because of production on the
backward-bending segment of the technology where inputs are not strongly
disposable. To measure input congestion radially, one needs to determine by how
much an input vector can be radially reduced to reach the closest
input-congestion-free technology (i.e. 12) from the congested technology (I ). Such
an input congestion measure can be defined as the ratio of IPTE and IWTE, i.e.
(3.2-4)	 ICE - IWTE/IPTE - OC/OB
Scale efficiency occurs because the firm is not operating at the most
productive scale consistent with the long-run competitive equilibrium. Naturally such
an input measure of scale efficiency relates to the divergency bewteen I and 12
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and should then be derived from IWFE and JOTE, i.e.
(3.2-5)	 ISE - l0TE/IWE - OE/OC
Unlike purely productive inefficiency and congestive inefficiency, scale inefficiency
as a result of departure from the long-run competitive equilibrium is not
necessarily an error on the part of the firm concerned. It is inefficient from the
social point of view.
It is easy to see that non-price productive efficiency (IOTE) can be
decomposed into the categories of purely productive efficiency, congestion efficiency
and scale efficiency, namely
(3.2-6)	 IOTE - (IPTE)(ICE)(ISE)
- (OB/OA) (OC/OB) (OE/OC)
- OE/OA
In a similar vein, radial measures of output-based non-price productive
efficiency can be constructed (FCL, 1985, pp.79-102).
In short, purely productive efficiency denoted by PTE (in the form of either
X-efficiency or technical efficiency or both), congestive efficiency denoted by CE
and scale efficiency denoted by SE are three mutually exclusive and exhaustive
components of non-price productive efficiency denoted by OTE. OTE can occur in
any one way, any two ways and all three ways but in no other ways. The FCL
framework thus enables us to define productive efficiency in a systematic manner as
compared with Farrell's framework.
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3.3 The Non—parametric Frontier Models
In this section FCL's non—parametric models are modified for British ports in order
to bring the notions of purely productive efficiency, congestion efficiency and scale
efficiency into the same framework.
It should be clear by now that different notions of efficiency are defined
against different reference technologies. In non—parametric models the reference
technologies are subsets of the input and output correspondences. A production
technology transforming factors of production X=(Xi ,X2,...,Xn)	 R(n)+ into net
outputs Y(Y1,Y2,...,Ym) 	 R(m)+ can be modelled by an input correspondence Y
- 1(Y) c R(n)+, or inversely by an output correspondence X - P(X) c R(m)+.
1(Y) gives all possible input vectors which yield at least Y. Inversely P(X) gives all
possible output vectors obtainable from X. FCL assumes that the input
correspondence satisfies the following axioms:
L.1 0 does not belong to 1(Y) for Y
	 0, and 1(0) -
L.2 If IIY(1)fl-+°' as l-.,+co, then
	I(Y(1)) is empty;
L.3 If Xl(Y), XX e 1(Y) for X	 1;
L.4 I is a closed correspondence;
L.5 I(OY) c 1(Y) for 0	 1.
L.1 means that a semi—positive output cannot be obtained from a null input vector
and that any non—negative input vector yields at least zero output. L.2 means that
a finite input cannot produce infinite output. L.4 is a mathematical requirement
imposed to enable input isoquants to be defmed as subsets of the boundary of the
input sets 1(Y). L.3 means that a proportional increase in inputs does not decrease
outputs. L.5 means that a proportional increase in output cannot be obtained if
inputs are reduced. L.3 and L.4 are referred to as weak disposability of inputs and
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outputs respectively. These are equivalent to assuming that marginal products are
not restricted to be non-negative.
Occasionally stronger axioms than L.3 and L.5 are needed:
L.3.S t,XEI(Y) -, td(Y);
L.5.S s,YEI(s)c1(Y).
L.3.S states that an increase in inputs, including but not limited to a proportional
increase in inputs, does not lead to a decrease in outputs. L.5.S states that an
increase in outputs, including but not limited to a proportional increase, cannot be
obtained if inputs are reduced. In other words marginal products are restricted to
be non-negative. L.3.S and L.5.S are referred to as strong disposability of inputs
and outputs.
Given the data available we are able to identify two inputs (labour Xi and
capital X2) in the production of a single output Y in a given period of time,
where for k British ports in the sample Xi, X 2 and Y are all k-element column
vectors. Assume that the broad port production technology is piece-wise linear and
modelled by an input correspondence 1(Y) or output correspondence P(X) which
satisfies the properties (L.1-L.5) or (P.1-P.5) inversely related to (L.1-L.5) (see
FCL, 1985, pp.25). Further we use M to denote a (k,1) vector of observed output
and N to denote a (k,2) matrix of observed inputs for k ports, and
Z={Z 1 ,Z2,...,Zk} to denote the activity (intensity) level of each of the k activities.
The reference technology of British ports I 3(Y) with no restriction of CRTS
and of strong disposability is the subset of input set 1(Y) which satisfies no more
than L.1-L.5, i.e.
(3.3-1)	 13(Y)-(X:U.Z.M-Y, Z.N-V.X; U,Vf(O,l], ZeR(k)+)
where EZ1=1 to allow for increasing, constant and decreasing returns to scale; the
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parameters U and V allow for radial scaling of the original observations and their
convex combinations.
The reference technology I 2(Y) with restriction of strong disposability but not
of CRTS is the subset of 1(Y) which satisfies L.1, L.2, L.3.S, L.4 and L.5.S., i.e.
(3.3-2)	 I2(Y)=(X:Z*MY, Z*N(X, ZR(k)+)
where again ZZj=1 to allow for increasing, constant and decreasing returns to scale;
The inequalities replace strict equalities on (3.3-1) to allow for strong disposability.
The reference technology 1 1 (Y) with restrictions of both strong disposability
and CRTS is the same as I 2(Y) except that the sum of Z 1 is not restricted to
unity.
Given these constructions a series of linear programming models can be
formulated accordingly in order to calculate the various efficiency measures.
Recall that non-price productive efficiency OTE is decomposed into purely
productive efficiency PTE, congestive efficiency CE and scale efficiency SE, where
CE is derived from PTE and weakly productive efficiency WTE according to
Eq(3.2-4), and SE is derived from OTE and WTE according to Eq(3.2-5).
Therefore we only need to consider models for three primary input measures of
OTE, PTE and WTE.
The input measure of non-price productive efficiency IOTE for an observation
(X 0 ,Y 0) relative to the technology 1 1 (Y) can be calculated from the following
linear programming problem.:
(3.3-3)	 Mm	 IOTE
Subject to	 Z'*M
Z'*N X0*IOTE
z o
tOTE 0
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The input measure of weakly productive efficiency IWTE for the observation
(X 0 ,Y 0) relative to the technology I 2(Y) can be calculated from the following
linear programming problem:
(3.3-4)	 Mm	 IWTE
Subject to Z*M
Z'*N X0*IWTE
k
LZ 1 - 1
z O
IWTE 0
According to FCL (1985, pp.183) we also have to compute weakly productive
efficiency on the star-input correspondence IWTE* to identify sources of scale
inefficiency. If there is scale inefficiency at (Y,X), then it is caused by increasing
returns to scale if and only if !WTE*<IWTE, and it is caused by decreasing
returns to scale if and only if IWTE*IWTE. The linear programme for IWTE* is
the same as that for IWTE in (3.3-4) except the restriction of returns to scale in
the former should be Z1 (1 rather than 12j=1.
The input measure of purely productive efficiency IPTE for the observation
(X 0 ,Y 0 ) relative to this technology can be calculated from the following non-linear
programming problem:
(3.3-5)	 Mm	 IPTE
Subject to U*Z'*M -
Z'*N - IPTE*V*X0
k
z i - 1
1-1
O<U( 1
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O<v1
z> 0
IPTE ) 0
which is a non-linear programming problem and can be transformed into the
following linear programming problem:
(3.3-6)	 Mm	 IPTE
Subject to Q*M -
Q*N - X0*IPTE
k
1
1-1
S	 1
Q 0
where S = 1/UV, 0 = Z/V. Minimisation of IPTE requires that the restriction
1 reduce to = 1. The equality must hold since otherwise a
proportionate reduction in each element of 0 would allow a lower value of IPTE,
which is the minimand.
From their respective definitions in Fig 3.2-2 it is clear that JOTE
	 IWTE
IPTE. This can also be verified mathematically. The difference between
Eq(3.3-3) and Eq(3.3-4) is the extra constraint that the Z1 sum to unity in the
latter. It is then obvious why IOTE should be less than IWTE. To explain the
relationship between IW1'E and IPTE, we can rewrite Eq(3.3-5) as
(3.3-7)	 Mm	 IPTE
Subject to Z'*M
IPTE*X Q - (Z'*N)/V
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k
il - I
0<U1
O<V(1
Z> 0
IPTE	 0
Both free variables U and V are bounded within (0,1]. Clearly when UV1,
Eq(3.3-7) is equivalent to Eq(3.3-4) and hence IWTEIPTE. In this case the
strongly disposable technology coincides with the weakly disposable technology.
When U or V is less than unity, Y0*U or (Z'*N)/V in Eq(3.3-7) must be larger
than Y 0 or Z'*N in Eq(3.3-4). This means that the minimisation of IPTE has
tighter constraints than the minimisation of IW1'E, and hence that IWTE <
IPTE.
For the output correspondence, P(X) axioms P.1-P.5 and P.3.S and P.5.S
inversely related to the above axioms can be imposed (see FCL, 1985, pp.25), and
the corresponding output-based reference technologies can be constructed. In a
similar vein, one can construct linear programming models to calculate output
efficiency, and these are given in Appendix 3.3-1.
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3.4 Variables and Data
The source of data for this thesis was the annual reports and fmancial accounts
published by port authorities in Britain during 1983-1990. Although there are 100
commercially significant ports in Britain, not all of them provide information on all
variables and some do not publish annual accounts at all. Having deducted
non-commercial ports (e.g. fishing ports or harbours mainly involved in navigation
and conservancy or off-shore supply) from those which do provide annual accounts,
at best one can have 37 observations a year. However, the samples do cover
almost all the well-known British ports and all the important ports in each
category of ownership. The samples also have a fair coverage of ports of different
size, including major ports, medium ports and small ports (a classification adopted
by the British Ports Federation). Associated British Ports are taken as one unit
since the group does not provide data at disaggregated level.
A production frontier is not observable. It can only be estimated from a data
set of relevant input-output variables. An accurate representation of the frontier
technology depends not only on how well the frontier is modelled, but also on how
well the variables are measured. Before constructing the variables, however, one
must know the production process that the technology refers to. For instance, steel
production consists of three processes: mining, iron production and steel production.
Different processes require different inputs to produce different outputs. The mining
process 'produces' iron ore by applying capital and labour to the land. The
production of iron requires capital and labour and iron ore. The steel producing
process uses capital and labour and iron. Alternatively, the three stages can be
regarded as a single process. In this case the inputs would be capital, labour and
iron ore and output would be steel. Needless to say, the capital and labour inputs
used in different processes are different.
The process of port production is complex, consisting of pilotage, towage,
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berthing, cargo loading and unloading, and warehousing. Also modern ports tend to
diversify beyond traditional port activities into distribution, related transportation and
property sale, etc. Ideally, it would be best to concentrate on one particular
production process, for example, cargo handling. But this is impossible with the
data available. The port production process considered in this study is the activity
of the port as a whole. This leaves room for doubt on the interpretation of
efficiency measures since the activities of a given port may not be the same as
those represented by the corresponding point on the frontier. Nevertheless, in
contrast to continental European ports, the internal structure of British ports is
relatively uniform. Although there are exceptions, the duties of British port
authorities are relatively comprehensive. Britain's port activities are thus not
hopelessly uncomparable. In addition, what concerns us is the relative efficiency of
different forms of port ownership rather than of individual ports. it is hoped that,
by averaging efficiency for each group, the effect of the diversity of port activities
will be reduced. In the final chapter we shall consider to what extent the diversity
in activity can account for inter—port efficiency.
The measurement of inputs fraught with difficulties. For instance, it is
well—known that capital represents a particularly difficult problem, which has
provoked, and continues to provoke, a great deal of controversy. In the context of
frontier estimation, the most worrying problem is, however, not how to define
input variables, but how to treat the heterogeneity of factors of production (Farrell,
1957, pp.260). The productiveness of different sets of equipment may vary
considerably. So would the natural fertility of farmers' land, or the quality of the
labour force. Quality differences in a factor favour a firm using relatively high
grade. Whenever this is so, there is room for doubt whether efficiency measures
constructed relative to a frontier are genuine measures of managerial efficiency.
This problem is the same in effect as the problem of omission of one of the
factors, which would give a firm that used relatively much of this omitted factor a
relatively high efficiency. One may consider inability to measure quality difference
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in a factor as an omitted factor: quality of the factor.
Nevertheless, the correct measurement of all relevant factors is subject to
information available, and, in practice, information is notoriously limited. For this
reason, Farrell believed that the productive efficiency of a firm must always, to
some extent, reflect the quality of its inputs, which is not measured in frontier
models. From practical point of view, while one should take every effort, given
information available, to reduce the extent of measured efficiency attributed to
quality differences and unobserved factors through better definition of variables and
specification of the frontier model, interpretation to account for interior points
should be cautious when preliminary work on data processing is constrained by
information available. One could also, use partial or total correlation analysis, to
investigate the factors which influence estimated efficiencies.
With the data available in the financial reports, we are able to identify one
output and two inputs (labour and capital) for British ports.
Output Y is defined as turnover in thousand pounds, which consists of the
amount receivable in respect of port services provided to third parties. In some
ports this also includes revenue from property sales and rent. As a matter of fact
the value of turnover serves as an aggregate measure of the multiple services
provided by a port.
There are several serious problems associated with this measure. The first is
the use of a gross rather than a net output measure. We note that the numerator
of all productivity ratios should be net output or at least a proxy variable for net
output. It is the results that are achieved by the factors employed within the firm
concerned which is necessary to relate to the quantity of such factors. Non-factor
inputs such as bought-in materials, fuels, component parts and services are the
product of other factors from outside the industry concerned. The net output of
the port industry is ideally defined as the difference between the value of its gross
output and the value of its non-factor inputs. It is possible in principle to calculate
figures of value added for many ports based on the financial data provided in their
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company reports. However, the items reported in the financial accounts are not
standardized for all ports, and this means that some observations would be missing
if value added is used as a definition of output [1]. Since the proportion of
non—factor input costs in the value of gross output is not as significant as in other
industries, because the port industry is a service industry, it is hoped that the gross
output measure we have adopted is not a poor proxy of the net output measure
which should ideally be used.
Since we in fact use port prices as weights to aggregate the multiple services
provided by ports, another problem is that turnover would not serve as an
appropriate aggregate measure of the multiple services if port prices fail to reflect
the real costs of port facilities and services. The composition of port facilities and
services varies across ports, and this could lead to a distortion in valuing the true
level of port activities. Port prices consist of two parts: port dues on vessels and
cargoes for the use of port facilities, and port charges for the use of port services
(e.g. cargo—handling charges). The fixing of port charges is subject to negotiation
between port operators and ship operators in specialised terminals. In common—user
terminals port charges also reflect the demand and supply situation. Since the
markets for port services in the UK are quite competitive, it is reasonable to
assume that port charges are more or less in line with port costs. Port dues, on
the other hand, are fixed by port authorities. Although they may be reviewed
every year or so in line with general price index or other considerations, they bear
little relationship with real costs of port facilities. If we agree on the short—run
marginal cost pricing principle, the opportunity cost of some port facilities (e.g.
capital dredging) is zero when the channel is under—utilised, and should reflect the
scarcity of the facilities when a port concerned is congested. These economic
Lii At the initial stage of research it was worrying that the size of actual samples of British
ports was too small to fit production frontiers. It was later realised the smallness of sample size
can be overcome by pooling cross—sectional data. Further research is planned in which the
efficiency measures will be recalculated on the basis of estimated value added.
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principles are rarely considered in the fixing of port dues. Nevertheless, the amount
receivable from collecting port dues is not a major ingredient of port incomes as
compared with the amount received from port charges in a typically commercial
port. The effect of "incorrect" prices might therefore be negligible.
Labour input Xi is defined as total staff costs consisting of wages, salaries and
social security costs in thousand pounds. In ports of the National Dock Labour
Scheme this also includes the National Dock Labour Board Adminstration levy and
the National Volunteer Severance levy. We deliberately include these in order to
reflect the impact of the labour scheme on efficiency.
Capital input X2 is measured by the net-book value of fixed tangible assets in
thousand pounds, and usually includes land, buildings, dredging, dock structures,
roads, plant and equipment etc. The gross value of freehold land required for port
operations is based on the market price. The gross value of other fixed assets is
based on cost where this is known, or on engineering estimates of what the cost
would have been at the date of purchase and construction. Depreciation in British
ports is provided, on assets other than land, on a straight-line basis over their
estimated lives.
A better measure of capital input is replacement cost. Historical cost fails to
reflect the opportunity cost or real cost of capital assets. In the port industry
where fixed assets are typically durable, the adoption of historical cost is likely to
create bias against relatively newly-built ports (e.g. Felixstowe). For some ports
which have not undertaken major investments for years (e.g. Liverpool) the net
book value based on a straight-line basis tend to undervalue the real costs of their
capital assets. This does not apply to the value of land which is based on the
market price. When information is not available on replacement cost, a better
approach would be to adopt a physical measure. For instance, one can design a
proxy measure of capital input which is a function of the size of quays, water
area, and capacity of cranes. However, since different parties (i.e. port operators
other than the port authority) may be involved in a single port, a port-by-port
114
investigation would be necessary to identify the fixed capital assets which belong to
each port authority.
The two inputs available to us may not be sufficient to tie down a frontier
production function. An important factor which is likely to account for inter-port
efficiency is the port location. Every port must possess water area and land to
fulfill its functions, but the quality of port sites varies across ports. Some ports
may claim inherent cost advantages over others because of tidal characteristics and
estuary depth. The measurement of the locational factor is difficult, although not
impossible. This is so because the factor is multi-dimensional. For example, a port
located at the estuary mouth requires less capital and maintenance dredging but this
advantage may be offset by the need to construct breakwaters and stronger quay
walls, which would not be necessary if the port were built at the estuary head.
The omission of some relevant factor input in the deterministic model
produces biased efficiency estimates in favour of firms using relatively much of that
factor. In stochastic models this will result in the inconsistency of efficiency
estimates. One of the difficulties which stochastic frontier models suffer from is the
requirement of non-independence of regressors and the inefficiency term (Schmidt
and Sickles, 1984). But when some relevant factor (say locational factor) is
omitted, it may be incorrect to maintain this assumption. A port with a favourable
location gives a higher productivity. This may well imply relatively higher labour
and capital inputs because of the marginal productivity conditions. In consequence
the inefficiencies (one-sided error component) will not be independent of the
regressors. In chapter 4 we shall tackle the locational effect in a panel data model.
it is possible to argue, at this stage, that the problem may be less serious than
first appears. Some of the locational effect may already be reflected in the
aggregate capital variable which includes land. Since the value of land is based on
market price, this may reflect locational advantage of port sites to some extent.
Production in ports, as production in other transport sectors, is special in the
sense that port customers also contribute by providing factors of production: i.e.
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ship and cargo time (Goss, 1990, 1). The first involves the opportunity cost of
ship time, roughly equivalent to the time—related vessel operating costs at port
(wages, insurance, repairs and the hotel load level of fuel consumption) plus profit
foregone elsewhere. The second mainly relates to the value of time taken to keep
cargo at port (for example the cost of borrowing money to finance goods, although
it is by no means confined to this). From the social point of view these are also
an important component of port costs. Efficiency measures would be more
meaningful if ship and cargo time could be counted as an input variable along with
capital and labour. Unfortunately this was also impossible with the data available.
We are fully aware of the fact that the data set is far from ideal. With the
information available there is little preliminary work that can be done on the
measurement of inputs and output. An alternative data source is Port Statistics
published by the British Ports Federation, in which detailed output data in terms of
tonnage are available. We have also collected data on the number of port
employees by occupation. Unfortunately, there are no capital data consistent with
these output and labour data.
For the purpose of this study, the measurement problems, however, may be
less serious than it appears. Since what concerns us is the relative efficiency of
port ownership rather than of individual ports, mere bias in the measurement of
input and output variables will not matter, so long as it is spread evenly over
different ownership groups. it is when there are systematic differences between
ownership groups in the input and output variables, that an ownership group's
efficiency will reflect the bias as well as its managerial efficiency. To compare
relative efficiency of different forms of port ownership, we will compare their
average efficiency. Although we do not expect the bias in the measurement to
disappear over different ownership groups, it is not difficult to believe that the
effect of the unobserved factor can be reduced by averaging the efficiency measures
of each ownership group.
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3.5 Non-parametric Estimates of Productive Efficiency
In order to estimate deterministic measures of efficiency by the non-parametric
approach, 7 linear programming problems (3 primary input measures, 3 primary
output measures and one measure of weakly productive efficiency on the star
correspondence) have to be calculated for each port in each year. The linear
programming models have been applied to the cross-section data sets of UK ports
for the period 1985-1990. The annual samples of the 6 years consist of 192
observations in total. Thus in total 1344 linear programming problems have been
calculated, using the mathematical programming package GAMS[1]. The estimates
of both input and output measures of productive efficiency, both overall and by
components, for sample ports in each year of 1985-1990 are given in Appendix
3.5 to this chapter.
Recall that, by both input and output measures, non-price productive
efficiency OTE can be decomposed into purely productive efficiency PTE,
congestive efficiency CE and scale efficiency SE. Also recall that we denote IOTE,
1PTE, ICE and ISE for corresponding input measures of and OPTE, OCE and
OSE for corresponding output measures of overall non-price productive efficiency
(OTE), purely productive efficiency (PTE), congestive efficiency (CE) and scale
efficiency (SE) respectively. The most efficient score for both input and output
measures is unity. The value for input measures ranges from zero to unity,
indicating the cost saving that results from moving from the observed point to the
point with same factor proportion on the frontier: input cost at the reference point
is the fraction (indicated by the efficiency value) of input cost at the observed
Note: [lJ GAMS (the acronym stands for General Algebraic Modelling System) which is designed
to make the construction and solution of large and complex mathematical progr2mming is developed
in the Development Research Centre of the World Bank. See Anthony Brooke, David Kendrick, and
Alexander Neeraus, 1988, Gains: A User Guide, The Scientific Press.
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point for any given input prices. The value for ouiput measures is not less than
unity, indicating the revenue increase that results from expanding production from
the observed point to the reference point: the output revenue at the reference
point is the multiple (indicated by the efficiency value) of the observed output
revenue for any given output prices. Thus a port is more efficient if its input
measure is higher or its output measure is lower.
The estimates of JOTE and OOTE for 27 sample ports in 1990 are plotted in
Fig 3.5-1. The picture that emerges from Fig 3.5-2 is one of substantial variation
in overall non-productive efficiency across British ports. The value of IOTE ranges
from 1.0 for Mersey (i.e. Liverpool) to 0.2 for Manchester. This is equivalent to
the value of OPTE ranging from 1.0 for the most efficient observation to 5.0 for
the least efficient observation. In theory, given its factor ratio, the most inefficient
port could increase revenue by 4 times or decrease costs by 80 per cent, if it
managed to move towards the long-run competitive equilibrium technology.
It seems difficult to believe the potential of improvements that has been
revealed. There are two explanations for this. Firstly, the reference technology
arising from the long-run competitive equilibrium is the most rigorous yardstick we
use to measure port performance. Departures from the most rigorous frontier
include technical inefficiency, X-inefficiency, congestive inefficiency and scale
inefficiency, whether they are inefficiencies in a private or social sense.
Secondly, departures from the deterministic frontier also include exogenous
influences (random shocks or non-random factors) beyond the control of producers.
Non-parametric efficiency estimation applied to industries where exogenous
influences are more significant tend to show larger variation in estimates. For
instance, in the work done by Farrell (1957), which applied the method to
American agriculture, the range of efficiency values was as large as ours. One of
the most important sources of random shock in the port industry is the fluctuation
in demand for port services, which is derived from demand for raw materials,
intermediate and final products. Demand fluctuations in all markets will be
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mirrored in the port market. If demand affects ports evenly, it may have little
effect on relative performance which is measured against the best-practice
technology. Since ports differ in cargo mix, demand is likely to affect ports
differently. The influence of random shocks on productive performance can be
largely wiped out by using the stochastic frontier technique which we will adopt in
the next chapter. There are also non-random influences beyond the control of
ports. Location is such a factor. For instance, the gap between Liverpool and
Manchester may be largely attributed to the relative location advantage of the
former over the latter. Nevertheless we still believe the existence of inter-port
efficiency, though the potential for improvements may be overstated. For example,
as far as Liverpool is concerned, successful marketing of this port in recent years
is also an important contributing factor to its performance.
Fig 3.5-2, Fig 3.5-3 and Fig 3.5-4 depict possible sources of overall
non-price productive inefficiency, namely PTE, CE and SE by both input and
output measures. The direction of improvements in overall non-productive efficiency
can be indicated by these components.
An important component of non-price productive inefficiency appears to be
PTE by both input and output measures. In 1990 London, Felixstowe, Liverpool,
Ipswich, Montrose and Lancaster were efficient in terms of PTE. Since purely
productive inefficiency could be either X-inefficiency or technical inefficiency, there
was considerable scope for other ports to raise their PTE value either by improving
internal organisation or through technical progress.
SE was another important component responsible for considerable non-price
productive inefficiency in the industry. This component arises because of failures to
choose the most productive scale size. Whether actual scale size should be
increased or decreased depends on the nature of returns to scale.
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Fig 3.5-1 Non-Price Productive Efficiency of British Ports in 1990
(Non-parametric Measure)
Note: The value of input measure is the fraction of the observed cost in relation to the
minimum cost on the frontier for any given input prices; The value of output measure is the
multiple of the maximum revenue on the frontier in relation to the observed revenue for any
given output prices. For both measures the most efficient score is 1.0.
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(a) Input Measure of Purely Productive Efficiency
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Fig 3.5-2 Purely Productive Efficiency of British Ports 1990
(Non—Parametric Measure)
Note: The value of input measure is the fraction of the observed cost in relation to the
minmum cost on the frontier for any given input prices; The value of output measure is the
multiple of the maximum revenue on the frontier in relation to the observed revenue for any
given output prices. For both measures the most efficient score is 10.
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(a) Input Measure of Scale Efficiency
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
U) . '- >. 0) >. C a) > C C 0) C .0 0) 0) V .0	 C a)0) 0) o C) C) U) Cu C)	 - . 0 (0 00
	
)	 0
CU C
-	 Q	 LL
U)
0)
C)
I—
(b) Output Measure of Scale Efficiency
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Fig 3.5-3 Scale Efficiency of British Ports 1990
(Non-parametric Measure)
Note: The value of input measure is the fraction of the observed cost in relation to the
minimum cost on the frontier for any given input prices The value of output measure is the
multiple of the maximum revenue on the frontier in relation to the observed revenue for any
given output prices. For both measures the most efficient score is LU.
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(a) Input Measure of Congestive Efficiency
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Fig 3.5-4 Congestive Efficiency of British Ports 1990
(Non—parametric Measure)
Note: The value of input measure is the fraction of the observed cost in relation to the
minimum cost on the frontier foi any given input prices; The value of output measure is the
multiple of the maximum revenue on the frontier in relation to the observed revenue for any
given output prices. For both measures the most efficient score is 1.0.
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In contrast to their PTE and SE scores, most ports in the sample remained
congestive efficient. There were only 3 ports that were congestive inefficient
including Ipswich, Lerwick and Montrose. Among them only Ipswich was a scheme
port. On the whole the industry was free from congestion. The labour scheme was
abolished in 1989. But the observation remains true for years before 1989. There is
no evidence of congestion in labour input that obstructed output because of the
labour scheme.
In the above charts ports are ranked by both input and output measures from
the most efficient to the least efficient one. The efficient use of inputs does not
necessarily imply that the output vector is produced in an efficient manner. In
accordance with a theorem stated by FCL (1985, pp.132) input and output
measures of productive efficiency are equivalent if and only if the production
technology is homogenous of degree one. Since overall non—price productive
efficiency is defined relative to the CRTS technology, the values for OOTE are
reciprocal to those for IOTE. Thus JOTE and OOTE suggest exactly the same
efficiency rankings as seen in Fig 3.5-2. This is not the case for other notions of
efficiency. However, the divergency between input and output measures for PTE,
SE and CE is small. In all cases the efficiency rankings suggested by input and
output measures are only slightly different.
The efficiency features of the industry in other years are similar to that in
1990, namely, purely productive inefficiency and scale inefficiency are the main
causes why British ports depart from the frontier technology.
As noted earlier the problems of input measurement in the data sets may cast
doubt on whether the resulting efficiency measures are genuine ones. To see the
effect of variable misspecification, we follow Farrell's (1957, pp.270) suggestion to
look at the frequency distribution of efficiencies. This is analogous to the measure
of goodness of fit in multiple regression analysis. The only difference is that the
objective of regression analysis is to explain away all differences while in
non—parametric analysis one intends to explain away only non—genuine differences
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in efficiency. Farrell argued that a plausible shape of genuine efficiency distribution
is such as the half-normal, with mode at maximum efficiency while any other
shapes (e.g. rectangular, unimodal, the shape with mode at minimum efficiency)
may provide a empirical basis for believing the existence of neglected
non-managerial factors which are important in explaining productive performance.
Fig 3.5-4 shows histograms of components of overall non-price productive
efficiency in 1990. The histograms of other years are not shown because they are
similar. On Farrell's criterion the distribution of IPTE and ICE might be felt
plausible, though they were not particularly well-defined. Farrell's criterion is not
applicable to scale efficiency. Unlike purely productive and congestive inefficiency
which are private inefficiency, scale inefficiency arising from the departure of the
long-run comeptitive equilibrium need not imply managerial inefficiency. By
defmition there are influences other than managerial quality behind, it is then not
surprising that the ISE distribution could be different from the half-normal shape.
Thus it seems that the capital and labour input variables in the analysis have
explained the major component while the neglected factors formed only a minor
component. Being consistent with this, R-square of the regression equation for the
production function consisting of mere capital and labour variables is as high as
96%. This, of course, does not mean that factors like location have no influence
on port production. If the locational variable is included in the analysis, the
resulting distribution of IPTE and ICE may be more plausible. But in the present
context the non-measurement of further factors of production does not seem so
important to invalidate the analysis.
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Fig 3.5-5 Distribution of Non-parametric Efficiency in 1990
Note: The histograms for previous years are similar.
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Appendix 3.3
Non-parametric Output Efficiency Model
The linear programming problems for output measures of non-price productive
efficiency can be formulated in a similar manner to input measures.
The output measure of purely productive efficiency OPTE for the observation
(X 0 ,Y 0) relative to the technology with weak disposability and variable returns to
scale can be calculated from the following non-linear programming problem:
(A3.3-1)	 Max	 OPTE
Subject to U*Z'*M - y0*OPTE
Z'*N - V*X0
k
- i
k-i
O < U, V I
z	 o
which can be transformed into the following linear programming problem:
(A3.3-2)	 Max	 OPTE
Subject to R'*M - OPTE*Y0
R'*N - S*X0
k
k=i'	
1
RO, O<SI
where R = U*Z, S = UV.
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Again the restriction ERkl is, in practice, ERk=1. Otherwise no observed Y
or X can have a weight (Rk) equal to unity.
The output measure of weakly productive efficiency (OWTE) for the
observation (X 0 ,Y 0) relative to the technology with strong disposability and variable
returns to scale can be calculated from the following linear programming problem:
(A3.3-3)	 Max	 OWE
subject to
	 Z'*M OWTE*Y0
Z'*N X0
k
z i - I
1-1
zo
The output measure of non-price productive efficiency OOTE for the
observation (X 0 ,Y 0 ) relative to this technology can be calculated from the following
linear programming problem:
(A3.3-4)	 Max	 OOTE
Subject to Z'*M OOTE*Y0
Z'*N X0
zo
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Appendix 3.5
Non-parametric Efficiency Estimates
Table A3.5-1 Input Efficiency of British Ports 1985
PORTS	 IOTE[4] IPTE[5] IWTE[6] ICE[7] ISE[8] IWTE*[9]
Bristol [1]
Clyde [ 2]
Dover
Fe llxst owe
Fort h[2]
London[2]
Manchester[2]
Medway[2]
Me rs ey [ 2]
Milford Haven
Tees & Hartlepool[2]
Tyne
Aberdeen[3]
Ardrossan
Blyth
Boston[1]
BWB[1] [2] [3]
Cromarty Firth
Ipswich
Lerwick
Poole
Shoreham
Harwich Dock
Milford Dock[2]
Rams gate
0.334
0.442
0.542
0.373
0.574
0.446
0.332
0.496
0.386
0.762
0.523
0.449
0.827
0.383
0.608
0.502
0.163
0.702
0.396
0.671
0.488
0.580
1.000
0.325
0.713
0.567
0.852
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.607
1.000
0.951
0.780
1.000
0.705
1.000
0.443
1.000
0.651
0.312
0.750
0.752
0.671
0.612
0.582
1.000
0.329
0.713
0.567
0.852
1.000
0.867
1 .000
1.000
0.607
1.000
0.911
0.780
1.000
0.705
11 .000
0.443
1.000
0.651
0.312
0.727
0.752
0.671
0.612
0.582
1.000
0.329
0.713
1.000 0.589
1.000 0.519
1.000 0.542
0.867 0.430
1.000 0.574
1.000 0.446
1.000 0.546
1.000 1.000
0.958 0.424
1.000 0.976
1.000 0.532
1.000 0.636
1.000 0.827
1.000 0.865
1.000 0.608
1.000 0.771
1.000 0.521
0.969 0.966
1.0000.527
1.000 1.000
1.000 0.797
1.000 0.996
1.000 1.000
1.000 0.987
1.000 1.000
0.567
0.852
1.000
0.867
1.000
1.000
0.607
0.496
0.911
0.780
1.000
0.705
1.000
0.443
1 .000
0.651
0.312
0.702
0.752
0.671
0.612
0.580
1.000
0.325
0.713
Notes:
[11 Data from the annual report for the year ended on 31 March 1986 while others are for the
year ended on 31 December 1985.
[2] Referred to group.
[3] National Dock Labour Board adminstration levies not included in labour costs.
[4] IOTE-input measure of non-price productive efficiency
[5] IPTE-input measure of purely productive efficiency;
[6] IWTE-input measure of weakly productive efficiency;
[7] ICE-input measure of congestive efficiency;
[81 ISE-input measure of scale efficiency;
[9] IWTE-input measure of weakly productive efficiency on the star-input correspondence.
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Table A3.5-2 Output Efficiency of British Ports 1985
PORTS	 OOTE[4] OPTE[5] OWTE[6] OCE[7] OSE[8]
Brlstol[1)	 2.994	 1.530	 1.530	 1.000 1.957
Clyde[2]	 2.262	 1.156	 1.156	 1.000 1.957
Dover	 1.846	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000 1.846
Fellxstowe	 2.684	 1.000	 1.110	 1.110 2.418
Forth[2]	 1.741	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000 1.741
London[2]	 2.242	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000 2.242
Manchester[2]	 3.016	 1.527	 1.527	 1.000 1.975
Medway[2]	 2.017	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000 2.017
Mersey[2]	 2.593	 1.027	 1.027	 1.000 2.524
Milford Haven	 1.313	 1.228	 1.228	 1.000 1.070
Tees & Hartlepool[2] 1.912	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000 1.912
Tyne	 2.229	 1.373	 1.373	 1.000 1.624
Aberdeen[3]	 1.209	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000 1.209
Ardrossan	 2.680	 2. 1044	 2.044	 1.000 1.276
Blyth	 1.645	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000 1.645
Boston[1J	 1.993	 1.432	 1.432	 1.000 1.392
BWB[1] [2] [3]	 6.144	 2.675	 2.676	 1.000 2.296
Cromarty Firth	 1.424	 1.418	 1.418	 1.000 1.004
Ipswich	 2.526	 1.296	 1.296	 1.000 1.949
Lerwick	 1.489	 1.236	 1.296	 1.049 1.149
Poole	 2.049	 1.472	 1.472	 1.000 1.392
Shoreham	 1.724	 1.724	 1.724	 1.000 1.000
Harwich Dock	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000 1.000
Milford Dock[2]	 3.075	 3.071	 3.071	 1.000 1.001
Rainsgate	 1.403	 1.321	 1.321	 1.000 1.062
Notes:
[1] Data from the annual report for the year ended on 31 March 1986 while others are for the
year ended at 31 December 1985.
[2] Referred to group.
[3] National Dock Labour Board administration levies not included in labour costs.
[4J OOTE-output measure of non-price productive efficiency;
[5] OPTE-output measure of purely productive efficiency;
[6] ICE-input measure of congestive efficiency;
[7] OCE-output measure of congestive efficiency;
[8] OSE-output measure of scale efficiency.
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Table A3.5-3 Input Efficiency of British Ports 1986
PORTS	 IOTE IPTE IWTE ICE
	
ISE
	
I WFE*
Brlstol[1]
Clyde [2]
Dover
Felixstowe
Forth [2]
London[2]
Manchester[2]
Me dway [2]
Me rs ey [2]
Milford Haven
Tees & Hart lepool[2]
Tyne
Aberdeen[3]
Ardrossan
Blyth
Boston[1]
BWB[1] [21 [3]
Cromarty Firth
Ipswich
Lerwick
Poole
Sho reham
Harwich Dock
Milford Dock[2]
Rams gate
0.376
0.565
0.557
0.414
0.591
0.605
0.403
0.511
0.449
0.667
0.653
0.537
0.751
0.408
0.600
0.635
0.190
0.556
0.563
0.638
0.470
0.528
1 .000
0.443
0.655
0.643
0.812
1 .000
1.000
1 .000
1.000
0.705
0.769
0.816
0.668
1.000
0.843
1.000
0.430
0.832
0.703
0.298
0.872
0.801
0.640
0.598
0.541
1 .000
0.464
0.657
0.643
0.812
1.000
0.792
1 .000
1.000
0.705
0.769
0.816
0.668
1 .000
0.843
1 .000
0.430
0.832
0.703
0.298
0.717
0.801
0.640
0.598
0.541
1 .000
0.464
0.657
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.792
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1 .000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1 .000
1.000
1 .000
0.822
1 .000
1 .000
1 .000
1 .000
t.000
1 .000
1.000
0.585
0.695
0.557
0.523
0.591
0.605
0.572
0.665
0.550
0.998
0.653
0.637
0.75 1
0.948
0.721
0.903
0.638
0.776
0.703
0.997
0.786
0.976
1 .000
0.955
0.998
0.643
0.812
1.000
0.792
1.000
1.000
0.705
0.769
0.816
0.667
1.000
0.843
1.000
0.430
0.832
0.703
0.298
0.556
0.801
0.638
0.598
0.528
1.000
0.443
0.655
Notes:
[1] Data from the annual report for the year ended on 31 March 1987 while others are for the
year ended on 31 December 1986.
[2) Referred to group.
[31 National Dock Labour Board administration levies not included in labour costs.
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Table A3.5-4 Output Efficiency of British Ports 1986
PORTS	 OOTE OPTE OwrE OCE
	 OSE
Bristol [1J
Clyde [2]
Dover
Fe Iixst owe
Forth [21
London[2]
Manchester[2]
Medway[ 2]
Me rsey [21
Milford Haven
Tees & Hartlepool[2]
Tyne
Aberdeen [3 1
Ardrossan
Blyth
Boston[1]
BWB[1] [2] [3]
Cromarty Firth
Ipswich
Lerwick
Poole
Shoreham
Harwich Dock
Milford Dock[2]
Rams gate
2.657
1.771
1.796
2.414
1 .693
1.653
2.482
1 .957
2.228
1.499
1.532
1.863
1.331
2.450
1.667
1.576
5.253
1.798
1.775
1.568
2.128
1.893
1.000
2.259
1.526
1.491
1.213
1.000
1 .000
1 .000
1 .000
1.374
1 .278
I . 124
1.364
1.000
1 .161
1.000
2.231
1 .165
1.334
2.858
1.752
1.204
1.216
1.480
1.891
1.000
2.247
1.380
1.491
1.213
1 .000
1.196
l . 000
1.000
1.374
1.278
1. 179
1.364
1.000
1.161
1.000
2.231
1.165
1.334
2.858
1.752
1.204
1.288
1.480
1.891
1.000
2.247
1.380
1.000
1 .000
1 .000
1.196
1.000
1.000
1 .000
1 .000
1 .049
1.000
1.000
1 .000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1 .000
1 .000
1.000
1.000
1.059
1 .000
1 .000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.782
1.460
1.796
2.018
1 .693
1.653
1.806
1.532
1.889
1.099
1.532
1.604
1.33 1
1.098
1 .431
1.181
1.838
1.026
1.475
1.217
1.438
1.001
1-.000
1 .005
1.106
Notes:
(1] Data from the annual report for the year ended on 31 March 1987 while others are for the
year ended on 31 December 1986.
[2J Referred to group.
[31 National Dock Labour Board administration levies not included in labour costs.
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Table A3.5-5 Input Efficiency of British Ports 1987
PORTS
	
IOTE IPTE	 IWrE ICE
	
ISE
	
I WTE*
ABP[2] [3]
Bristol
Clyde [2]
Dover
Fel ixst owe
Forth [21
London[2]
Manchester[2]
Medway[2]
Mersey[2]
Milford Haven
Tees & Hartlepool[2]
Tyne
Aberdeen[3]
Ardrossan
Blyth
Boston[1]
BWB[1] [2] [3]
Cromarty Firth
Dundee Firth[3]
Ipswich
Lerwick
Poole
Shoreham
Cowes
Harwich Dock
King's Lynn
Lancaster
Mont rose
Newlynn
Padstow
Rams gate
Seaham[3J
St ornoway
Workington[3]
Whitehaven
Yarmouth(!OW)
0.140 1.000
0.109 0.638
0.128 0.871
0.176 1.000
0.125 0.846
0.145 0.875
0.135 0.950
0.125 0.731
0.119 0.830
0.113 0.764
0.264 0.686
0.136 0.951
0.153 0.897
0.254 1.000
0.109 0.205
0.118 0.630
0.115 0.528
0.047 0.265
0.261 0.331
0.216 0.737
0.152 0.826
0.434 0.645
0.142 0.631
0.245 0.433
0.227 1.000
1.000 1.000
0.218 0.391
0.094 0.476
0.137 0.153
0.357 1.000
0.358 1.000
0.336 0.769
0.206 0.777
0.150 0.312
0.976 1.000
0.120 0.228
0.125 0.205
1 .000
0.638
0.871
1.000
0.846
0.875
0.950
0.731
0.830
0.764
0.686
0.951
0.897
1.000
0.205
0.630
0.528
0.265
0.305
0.737
0.826
0.645
0.631
0.433
1 .000
1.000
0.388
0.476
0.149
1.000
1.000
0.769
0.777
0.312
1.000
0.228
0.202
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.921
1.000
1.000
1.000
1 .000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.992
1.000
0.974
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.988
0.140
0.172
0.147
0.176
0.148
0.166
0.142
0.171
0.143
0.147
0.384
0.143
0.171
0.254
0.532
0.187
0.219
0.177
0.855
0.293
0.153
0.673
0.225
0.565
0.227
1.000
0.561
0.198
0.918
0.357
0.358
0.436
0.266
0.480
1.000
0.525
0.518
1.000
0.638
0.871
1.000
0.846
0.875
0.950
0.731
0.830
0.764
0.686
0.951
0.897
1.000
0.205
0.630
0.528
0.265
0.256
0.737
0.991
0.645
0.631
0.433
0.227
1.000
0.218
0.094
0.138
0.357
0.358
0.769
0.777
0.150
1.000
0.120
0.105
Notes:
[1] Data from the annual report for the year ended on 31 March 1988 while others are for the
year ended on 31 December 1987.
[2] Referred to group.
[3J National Dock Labour Board administration levies not included in labour costs.
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Table A3.5-6 Output Efficiency of British Ports 1987
PORTS	 OOTE OPTE OWrE OCE	 OSE
ABP[2] [3]
Bristol
Clyde [2]
Dover
Fel ixstowe
Forth [2]
London[2]
Manchester[2J
Medway[2]
Mersey[2]
Milford Haven
Tees & Hartlepool[2]
Tyne
Aberdeen[3]
Ardrossan
B 1 yt h
Boston[1]
BWB[1] [2]
Cromarty Firth
Dundee Firth[3]
Ipswich
Lerwick
Poole
Shore ham
Cowes
Harwich Dock[2]
King's Lynn
Lancaster
Mont rose
Newlynn
Padstow
Ramsgat e
Seaham[3]
St ornoway
Worklngton[31
Whit ehaven
Yarmouth( lOW)
7.160
9.133
7.740
5.686
8.006
6.875
7.308
8.027
8.407
8.873
3.794
7.345
6.515
3.943
9.164
8.510
8.660
20.22
3.914
4.609
6.582
2.303
7.033
4.125
4.410
1.000
4.597
10. 611
7.324
2.799
2.794
2.979
4.846
6.688
1.025
8.347
9.544
1.000
1.489
1.137
1 .000
1.174
1.123
1.051
1 .322
1.194
1.291
1.343
1.050
1 .107
1.000
2.132
1.474
1 .565
2.621
2.938
1 .248
1 .000
1.179
1.458
1.687
1 .000
1.000
2.962
8.145
2.928
1.000
1.000
1.227
1.212
3.179
1 .000
3.172
4.233
1.000
1 .489
1.137
1 .000
1.174
1.123
1.051
1.322
1.194
1.291
1 .343
1.050
1.107
1.000
2.132
1.474
1.565
3.239
2.938
1.248
1.007
1.249
1 .458
1.687
1.000
1 .000
2.962
8.145
2.928
1.000
1.000
1.227
1,212
3.179
1.000
3.172
4.233
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1 .000
I . 000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
I . 000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.236
1.000
1.000
1.007
1.060
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
6.132
6.897
5.686
6.818
6.121
7.036
6.073
7.040
6.872
2.826
6.998
5.884
3.934
4.299
5.775
5.533
6.570
1.332
3.692
6.537
1.844
4.825
2.445
1.000
1.000
1.552
1.303
2.502
2.799
2.794
2.428
3.999
2.104
1 .025
2.631
2.255
Notes:
[I] Data from the annual report for the year ended o 31 March 1988 while others are for the
year ended on 31 December 1987.
121 Referred to group.
(3) National Dock Labour administration levies not included in labour costs.
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Table A3.5-7 Input Efficiency of British Ports 1988
PORTS
	
IOTE IPTE IWTE ICE
	
ISE
	
IWTE*
ABP[2][3]
Bristol
Clyde [2]
Dover
Fel lxstowe
Forth [2]
London[2J
Manchester[2]
Me dway [21
Mersey[2]
Milford Haven
Tees & Hartlepool[2J
Tyne
Aberdeen[3]
Ardrossan
B 1 yt h
Boston[1J
BWB[1][2]
Cromarty Firth
Dundee Firth[3]
Ipswlch
Lerwick
Poole
Shoreham
Cowes
Harwich Dock
King's Lynn
Lancaster
Mont rose
Newl ynn
Padstow
Rams gate
Seaham[3]
St ornoway
Workington[3]
Whi tehaven
Yarmouth(IOW)
0.132
0.091
0.183
0.135
0.110
0.134
0.117
0.102
0.105
0.102
0.215
0.113
0.129
0.197
0.087
0.091
0.107
0.038
0.221
0.175
0.100
0.300
0.117
0.164
0.147
1 .000
0.093
0.081
0.140
0.243
0.233
0.215
0.159
0.116
1 .000
0.105
0.065
1 .000
0.581
0.597
1 .000
0.927
0.846
0.890
0.680
0.651
0.734
0.564
0.762
0.725
0.879
0.089
0.393
0.391
0.245
0.318
0.473
0.567
1.000
0.476
0.234
1.000
1.000
0.275
0.512
0.182
1.000
1.000
0.632
0.500
0.321
1.000
0.230
0.207
1.000 1.000
0.581 1.000
0.597 1.000
1.000 1.000
0.803 0.873
0.846 1.000
0.853 0.958
0.680 1.000
0.651 1.000
0.734 1.000
0.564 1.000
0.762 1.000
0.725 1.000
0.879 1.000
0.088 0.997
0.393 1.000
0.391 1.000
0.245 1.000
0.298 0.938
0.473 1.000
0.567 1.000
0.782 0.782
0.476r000
0.234 1.000
1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000
0.275 1.000
0.512 1.000
0.179 0.982
1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000
0.593 0.937
0.500 1.000
0.321 1.000
1.000 1.000
0.230 1.000
0.205 0.990
0.132
0.156
0.172
0.135
0.137
0.158
0.137
0.150
0.162
0.139
0.381
0.148
0.178
0.225
0.988
0.232
0.272
0.153
0.741
0.370
0.177
0.384
1L245
0.700
0.147
1.000
0.340
0.150
0.780
0.243
0.233
0.362
0.318
0.362
1.000
0.436
0.316
1.000
0.581
0.587
1.000
0.803
0.846
0.853
0.680
0.651
0.734
0.564
0.762
0.725
0.725
0.087
0.393
0.391
0.245
0.221
0.473
0.567
0.782
0.476
0.234
0.147
1.000
0.093
0.081
0.140
0.243
0.233
0.593
0.500
0.116
1.000
0.185
0.065
Notes:
(1J Data from annual reports for the year ended on 31 March 1989 while others are for the year
ended on 31 December 1988.
[2] Referred to group.
[3] National dock labour board administration levies not included in labour costs.
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Table 3.5-8 Output Efficiency of British Ports 1988
PORTS	 OOTE OPTE OWrE OCE	 OSE
ABP[21 [3]
Brlstol[1J
Clyde [2]
Dover
Fel ixstowe
Forth [2]
London[2]
Manchester[2]
Medway[2]
Mersey[2]
Milford Haven
Tees & Hartlepool[2]
Tyne
Aberdeen
Ardrossan
B I yt h
Boston
BWB[1] [2]
Cromarty Firth
Dundee Firth[3]
Ipswlch
Lerwick
Poole
Shoreham
Cowes
Harwich Dock
King's Lynn
Lancaster
Mont rose
Newlynn
Padstow
Rams gate
Seaham[3]
St ornoway
Workington[3]
Whitehaven
Yarmouth( lOW)
7.599
11. 022
9.704
7.381
9.118
7.471
8.573
9.823
9.507
9.803
4.647
8.846
7.754
5.067
11 .470
10. 947
9.377
26. 623
4.445
5.715
9.960
3.329
8.562
6.101
6.805
1.000
10. 704
12.397
7.158
4. 109
4.300
4.661
6.290
8.603
1.000
9.542
15.471
1 .000
1 .567
1.576
1.000
1.037
1.143
1 .054
1.382
1.427
1 .328
1.443
1.268
1 .292
1.111
2.929
2.037
1 .923
1.654
2.452
1 .549
1.672
1.000
1.735
2.017
1 .000
1.000
4.574
8.575
2.965
1.000
1.000
1.097
1 .567
4.051
1 .000
3.603
6.264
I . 000
1.567
1.576
1 .043
1 .230
I . 143
1.163
1.382
1.427
1.328
1.443
1.268
1.292
1.111
2.929
2.037
1.923
3.470
2.495
1.549
1.672
I . 165
1.735
2.107
1.000
1.000
4.574
8.575
2.965
1.000
1.000
1.341
1.567
4.051
1.000
3.603
6.264
2.119
1 .000
1 .000
1 .043
1.187
I . 000
1.103
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1 .000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
2.098
1.017
1.000
1.000
1 .165
1 .000
1.000
1 .000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.223
1.000
1.000
1.000
1 .000
1 .000
7.599
7.033
6.518
7.080
7.413
6.538
7.373
7.212
6.600
7.382
3.220
6.978
6.000
4.561
3.916
5.373
4.876
7.672
1.813
3.691
5.958
2.859
4.934
2.895
6.805
1.000
2.340
1 .446
2.415
4. 109
4.300
3.476
4.014
2.124
1.000
2.649
2.470
Notes:
[1] Data from the annual report for the year ended on 31 March 1989 while others are for the
year ended on 31 December 1988.
[2] Referred to group.
[3] National Dock Labour Board administration levies not included in labour costs.
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Table A3.5-9 Input Efficiency of British Ports 1989
PORTS	 IOTE IPTE
	 IWIE ICE	 ISE	 IWTE*
ABP[2] [3]
Br I St 01(11
Clyde [2]
Dover
Fe lixst owe
Forth [2]
London[2]
Manchester [2]
Medway[2]
Me rs ey [2]
Milford Haven
Tees & Hartlepool[2]
Tyne
Aberdeen[3]
Ardrossan
Blyth
BWB[1] [2] [3]
Cromarty Firth
Dundee Firth
Ipswich
Lerwi ck
Poole
Shoreham
Cowes
Harwich Dock
King's Lynn
Mont rose
Newlynn
Padstow
Rams gate
Stornoway
Workington
Whi tehaven
Yarmouth( lOW)
0.418
0.190
0.329
0.243
0.259
0.387
0.344
0.128
0.317
0.291
0.360
0.371
0.339
0.350
0.248
0.241
0.064
0.810
0.266
0.387
0.423
0.272
0.277
0.462
1.000
0.300
0.195
0.326
1.000
0.254
0.272
1.000
0.308
0.357
1 .000
0.488
0.646
1.000
0.613
0.901
1.000
1 .000
0.718
0.771
0.762
0.853
0.762
0.905
0.287
0.48 1
0.230
0.901
0.611
1 .000
1.000
0.581
0.505
0.696
1.000
0.325
0.201
1.000
1.000
0.772
0.341
1.000
0.319
0.357
1 .000
0.488
0.646
1.000
0.613
0.901
0.891
0.590
0.714
0.702
0.762
0.853
0.762
0.905
0.287
0.481
0.230
0.901
0.611
0.937
1.000
0.581
0.505
0.696
1 .000
0.325
0.199
1 .000
1.000
0.772
0.341
1.000
0.319
0.357
1 .000
1.000
1 .000
1 .000
1 .000
1.000
0.891
0.590
0.994
0.987
1.000
1 .000
1.000
1 .000
1 .000
1 .000
1.000
1.000
1 .000
0.937
1 .000
1 .000
1.000
0.999
1.000
1.000
0.994
1 .000
1 .000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.418
0.390
0.509
0.243
0.423
0.429
0.385
0.216
0.444
0.415
0.473
0.453
0.445
0.387
0.867
0.501
0.280
0.899
0.436
0.413
0.423
0.469
0.548
0.665
1.000
0.922
0.976
0.326
1.000
0.329
0.795
1.000
0.967
0.998
1.000
0.488
0.646
1 .000
0.613
0.901
0.891
0.590
0.714
0.702
0.762
0.853
0.762
0.905
0.287
0.481
0.230
0.901
0.611
0.937
1 .000
0.581
0.505
0.462
1.000
0.325
0.195
0.326
1.000
0.772
0.272
1.000
0.319
0.357
Notes:
[1] Data from the annual report for the year ended
	 31 March 1990 while others for the year
ended on 31 December 1989.
[2] Referred to group.
[3] National Dock Labour Board administration levies not included in labour costs
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Table A3.5-1O Output Efficiency of British Ports 1989
PORTS	 OOTE OPTE OWTE OCE	 OSE
ABP[2] [3]
Bristoif I]
Clyde [2]
Dover
Fel Ixst owe
Forth [2]
London[2J
Manchester [2]
Medway[2]
Mersey[2J
Milford Haven
Tees & Hartlepool[2]
Tyne
Aberdeen
Ardrossan
B I yt h
BWB [1]
Cromarty Firth
Dundee Flrth[3]
Ipswich
Lerwick
Poole
Shore ham
Cowes
Harwich Dock[2]
King's Lynn
Mont rose
Newlynn
Padst ow
Ramsgat e
Stornoway
Workington[3]
Whi tehaven
Yarmouth( lOW)
2.392
5.256
3.038
4.109
3.858
2.585
2.911
7.836
3.155
3.435
2.777
2.692
2.950
2.856
4.027
4.156
15.53
1 .235
3.752
2.582
2.362
3.673
3.613
2.162
1 .000
3.338
5.135
3.066
1 .000
3.942
3.683
1 .000
3.247
2.804
1.000 1.000
1.904 1.904
1.491 1.491
1.000 1.000
1.623 1.623
1.106 1.106
1.000 1.114
1.000 1.578
1.302 1.319
1.317 1.380
1.271 1.271
1.167 1.167
1.292 1.292
1.089 1.089
2.340 2.340
1.853 1.853
2.649 3.831
1.105 1.105
1.403 1.403
1.000 1.043
1.000 1.000
1.607 1.607
1.577 1.557
2.0432.O43
1.000 1.000
2.854 2.854
2.617 2.617
1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000
1.172	 1.172
3.205 3.205
1.000 1.000
2.835 2.835
2.555 2.555
1.000
1.000
1.000
1 .000
1.000
1 .000
1.114
1.578
1 .013
1.048
1 .000
1 .000
1 .000
1.000
1 .000
1.000
1.446
1.000
1 .000
1.043
1 .000
1.000
1 .000
1 .000
1 .000
1 .000
1 .000
1 .000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
2.392
2.761
2.038
4.109
2.378
2.338
2.614
4.966
2.392
2.490
2.186
2.306
2.284
2.622
1.721
2.243
4.053
1.118
2.675
2.476
2.362
2.286
2.320
t.059
1.000
1.170
1.962
3.066
1.000
3.362
1 .149
l.000
1 .146
1.097
Notes:
[IJ Data from the annual report for the year ended on 31 March 1990 while others are for the
year ended on 31 December 1989.
[2] Referred to group.
[3] National Dock Labour Board administration 'evies not included in labour costs.
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Table A3.5-11 Input Efficiency for British Ports 1990
PORTS
Bristol [1]
Clyde [2]
Dover
Fel ixstowe
London[2]
Manchester[2]
Medway[2]
Mersey[2]
Milford Haven
Tees & Hart lepool [2]
Tyne
Ardrossan
Blyth
Boston[1]
Cromarty Firth
Dundee Firth
Ipswich
Lerwick
Poole
Shoreham
Cowe s
King's Lynn
Lancaster
Mont rose
Rams gate
Stornoway
Whi tehaven
IOTE IPTE
0.236 0.400
0.433 0.666
0.345 0.509
0.296 1.000
0.399 1.000
0.201 0.201
0.344 0.686
1.000 1.000
0.306 0.442
0.359 0.742
0.333 0.517
0.265 0.330
0.300 0.426
0.340 0.465
0.853 0.902
0.341 0.436
0.429 1.000
0.336 0.627
0.325 0.477
0.322 0.368
0.607 0.607
03 I 503 15
1.000 1.000
0.227 1.000
0.294 0.304
0.290 0.290
0.377 0.377
ICE
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1 .000
1 .000
1 . 000
1.000
1 . 000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.865
0.536
1.000
1.000
1.000
r000
1.000
0.227
1.000
1.000
1.000
I SE
0.590
0.650
0.677
0.296
0.399
1 .000
0.487
1.000
0.691
0.484
0.644
0.803
0.705
0.731
0.945
0.781
0.497
1.000
0.680
0.901
1.000
0195
1.000
1.000
0.969
1.000
1.000
Notes:
[1 Data from the annual report for the year ended on 31 March 1991 while others for the year
ended on 31 December 1990.
[2] Referred to group.
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Table A3.5-12 Output Efficiency for British Ports 1990
Ports	 OOTE OPTE OCE	 OSE
BristoIf 1J
Clyde[2]
Dover
Fel Ixstowe
London[2)
Manchester[2]
Medway[2]
Mersey[2]
Milford Haven
Tees & Hartlepool[2J
Tyne
Ardrossan
Blyth
Boston[1]
Cromarty Firth
Dundee Firth
Ipswich
Lerwick
Poole
Shoreham
Cowe s
King's Lynn
Lancaster
Mont rose
Rams gate
Stornoway
Whit ehaven
4.237
2.310
2.902
3.376
2.505
4.975
2.996
1.000
3.272
2.784
3.001
3.770
3.332
2.942
1 . 173
2.935
2.329
2.976
3.079
3.016
1.647
3.173
1.000
4.406
3.399
3.453
2.65 1
2.301
1.297
1.448
1.000
1 .000
3.045
1.384
1.000
2.080
1 .304
1 .611
2.649
2.277
2.036
1.084
2.221
1.000
1.596
1.848
2.572
1.647
2.809
1.000
1.000
3.325
2.888
2.337
1 .000
1.000
1 .000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
l.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1 .000
1 .000
1.091
1.865
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
4.406
1 .000
1 .000
1.000
1.841
1.781
2.004
3.376
2.505
1.634
2.165
1.000
1.573
2. 135
1.863
1.423
1.463
1.445
1.086
1.322
2.134
1.000
1.665
1 . 173
1.000
1 . 130
1.000
1.000
1.060
I . 196
1.134
Notes:
[1J Data from the annuaJ report for the year ended on 31 March 1991 while others are for the
year ended on 31 December 1990.
[2J Referred to group.
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Chapter 4
Productive Efficiency of British Ports
Relative to a Stochastic Frontier
The deterministic approach assumes that it is meaningful to defme exactly the
maximal possible output level given inputs, or the minimal possible input level
given outputs, and hence uses a purely one-side error. Although it is argued that
deterministic frontiers are consistent with economic theory, their chief disadvantage
is that they are bound to be contaminated by statistical noise. In this chapter we
intend to estimate price-independent productive efficiency, both overall and by
components, of British ports relative to a stochastic rather than a deterministic
frontier. This requires the stochastic frontier to be modelled using a less restrictive
functional form, and measures of various efficiency notions to be constructed in a
parametric framework.
A brief critical review of the development of the parametric approach is
provided in section 4.1. Section 4.2 outlines the methodological framework for
various notions of productive efficiency to be defused in terms of parametric
measures. Section 4.3 discusses the specification and estimation of the stochastic
frontier production function model for efficiency measurement. Section 4.4 applies
the model to a panel of input and output data for British ports from 1983 to
1990. In Section 4.3 and 4.4 the analysis treats the pooled data as it were
cross-sectional and it is assumed that inefficiency is uncorrelated with regressors
and distributed as half-normal or exponential. By taking the qualitative advantages
of panel data these structures are tested in Section 4.5. The variety of different
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methods for panel data analysis are applied to the same data set. However, the
efficiency distribution derived from the panel data analysis is not found more
plausible than that derived from the cross-sectional data analysis on Farrell's
criterion. Production frontiers with different technological characteristics are
estimated, against which efficiency estimates are derived for British ports. These
parametric estimates are compared with the non-parametric estimates. Although
parametric measures suggest a smaller magnitude of inefficiency than
non-parametric measures, the two measures are in agreement that the main sources
of non-price productive inefficiency in the industry are purely productive
inefficiency (either X-inefficiency or technical inefficiency) and scale inefficiency.
142
4.1 The Parametric Approach
The alternative to the non-parametric approach is to specify a parametric
representation of technology. It should be noted that a frontier model can be
either a single equation (e.g. production, cost, revenue, distance function) or a
system of equations (e.g. cost system). In what follows only a single-equation
model of the frontier production function is considered. As a matter of fact a
production function written as
(4.1-1)	 Y - f(Xfl)
represents a single-output reference technology in the context of revenue
maximisation, where Y denotes the output, X denotes a vector of inputs and
denotes the input coefficients. This approach was also proposed by Farrell, but first
implemented by Aigner and Chu (1968) in order to generalise Farrell's
non-parametric approach. By applying the techniques of linear and quadratic
programming to cross-section data of firms, Aigner and Chu established the frontier
function by controlling the disturbance term to be of one sign. For a linear
programming formulation the objective function appears as the sum of such
disturbances (a linear loss function), while for the quadratic programming the
criterion is a minimum of the sum of squared residuals (a quadratic loss function).
The parametric approach was considered to be superior to its non-parametric
counterpart as no presumptions need to be made about returns to scale for the
production function, as was necessary in Farrell's work. But as argued by Aigner
and Chu themselves, the estimation potential of these techniques is reduced to
some extent by a lack of available statistical inference procedures, since no
efficiency differences between the units are assumed to be generated by an explicit
efficiency distribution.
143
In an attempt to give them a statistical basis, Afriat (1972) assumed that the
error term is a result of technical inefficiency and is distributed as a two
part-parameter beta distribution while Richmond (1974) assigned a gamma
distribution to the error term. The frontier production function can then be
estimated by the maximum likelihood method (ML), or by the corrected ordinary
least square (COLS) method which uses the mean of the disturbance term to
correct the constant.
Schmidt (1976) has proved that the assumption that the error term has an
exponential distribution leads to the linear programming approach, while the
assumption that the error term has a half-normal distribution leads to the quadratic
programming technique. Therefore Aigner and Chu's estimates can be viewed as
ML estimates under a particular error specification.
Unfortunately the regularity conditions for the application of ML are violated
as far as most error specifications are concerned. Since Ycf(X,5), the range of the
random variable depends on the parameters to be estimated. One way round this is
to search for a certain error distribution which satisfies the regularity conditions
(e.g. gamma distribution, see Greene, 1980). The alternative is to adopt the COLS
method.
Like non-parametric frontier models, the early parametric frontier models are
deterministic in the sense that all firms share a common fixed family of frontiers.
This is of course unreasonable and ignores the real possibility that the firm's
observed performance may be affected by exogenous (random shock) as well as
endogenous (inefficiency) factors. In addition to random shocks there are
possibilities of specification and measurement error. To lump all these things,
favourable and unfavourable, under or beyond the control of the production unit,
together into a single disturbance term and label the mixture as inefficiency is
questionable. As a result the parametric representation of the reference technology
is highly sensitive to extreme outliers. This can cause an over- or under-estimation
of the true extent of inefficiency.
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The parametric approach was proposed as a superior alternative to the
non-parametric approach as the early non-parametric models require restrictive
assumptions. After the non-parametric models had been generalised by later
development, the parametric approach lost much of its attraction until stochastic
frontier models were proposed. Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), and Meeusen
and van den Broeck (1977) constructed a more reasonable error structure than a
purely one-sided one. To simplify discussion they considered a linear model for the
frontier production function:
(4.1-2)	 Y- - a + X'fi + Z,
i - 1,2,...,N
Here i indexes firms. a is constant, which is the first element of the parameter
vector	 in Eq(4.1 -1). Their disturbance term Z consists of two parts
(4.1-3)	 - V 1 - U1
The error component V represents a symmetric disturbance and permits random
variation of production across production units due to the effects of measurement
and specification error, and of exogenous shocks beyond the control of the
production unit. The error component U 1 0 is one-sided and represents
price-independent productive inefficiency. Recall that the reason why we term U
non-price productive inefficiency rather than technical inefficiency was made clear
in section 3.1 of chapter 3: the departure from the frontier is hypothesized as both
X-inefficiency and technical inefficiency. The deviation of an observation from the
deterministic kernel of the stochastic production function arises from two sources: a
symmetric random variation of the deterministic kernel (a + X 1 ') across
observations captured by the component V1 , and asymmetric variation captured by
the component U1.
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Non-price productive inefficiency should then be measured by the ratio
(4.1-4)	 + X,' + V,)
relative to the stochastic frontier f(X;)+V rather than by the ratio
(4.1-5)	 Y'/(cr + X1t)
relative to the deterministic kernel of the stochastic frontier f(X;(3).
Both the ML and COLS can be used to provide consistent estimates of the
parameters. The ML is asymptotically efficient, but it needs the distributional
assumption for inefficiency.
The problem of early stochastic frontier models is that they provide estimates
of productive efficiency only in terms of sample mean, rather than for each
observation, since V is unobservable. Fortunately, Jondrow, Lovell, Materow and
Schmidt (1982) have shown how to extract estimates of productive efficiency for
each observation in the sample, by decomposing the composed error term into its
components. This is done by calculating the conditional distribution of U given Z,
and estimates of U for each observation are provided by the mean or mode of
the conditional distribution of U1 given Z1 truncated at zero.
Nevertheless the estimate of the firms' inefficiency levels is not consistent, as
it contains statistical noise as well as productive efficiency (Schmidt and Sickles,
1984). In addition, stochastic frontier models suffer from two other difficulties. One
is the requirement of specific assumptions about productive efficiency and statistical
noise. These assumptions can be avoided by using the COLS if one wishes to
estimate the frontier function only, but will be necessary if one needs to separate
productive efficiency from statistical noise for each observation. The other is the
requirement of the assumption of non-independence of regressors and productive
inefficiency.
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Over the last ten years one further development in the frontier field is
estimation techniques for the use of panel data. The first paper to develop
techniques to use panel data to estimate frontier functions, was Pitt and Lee
(1981), but their ML approach fails to take qualitative advantages of panel data
and requires strong assumptions exactly as for the cross-sectional model. Schmidt
and Sickles (1984) suggested a number of desirable features of the techniques (the
Within estimator, the generalised least square (GLS) estimator and the
Hausman-Taylor estimator for panel data analysis. First of all, consistent estimates
of the productive efficiency of a firm can be obtained as the number of time
periods tends to infinity. This is so because adding more observations on the same
firm yields information not attainable by adding more firms. Secondly, unlike the
techniques for cross-sectional analysis which draws evidence of inefficiency in
skewness, the technique of panel data analysis draws evidence of inefficiency in
constancy over time. As a result, strong distributional assumptions are not necessary
when panel data are available. Finally, the parameters and the firms' efficiency
levels can be estimated without assuming non-independence of regressors and
productive inefficiency.
It should be noted that the desirable properties of the techniques for panel
data analysis are not unconditional. Suppose that the frontier production function is
of the form
(4.1-6)	
- a + Xjt'13 +	 - Ui
I - 1,2,... ,N, t - 1,2,. - - ,T.
where i indexes firms and t indexes time periods. The Within estimator which
treats the effects U, as fixed and relies neither on their uncorrelatedness with the
regressors nor on the distribution of these effects. The Within estimate of is
consistent as either N or T -* . But consistency of the individual estimated
intercepts (a-U,) requires T -i and consistent separation of the overail intercept
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(a) from the one-sided individual effects (U1) requires N - . The GLS estimator
treats the effects U1 as random and requires the assumption that they are
uncorrelated with the regressors but not the assumption about the distribution of
the effects. Consistent estimation of productive inefficiencies by the GLS also
requires both N - and T -, m Under the assumption of uncorrelatedness of
effects and regressors the GLS is more efficient. If N is large and T is small, the
GLS has its appeal as consistent estimation of cr requires N - . Another
advantage of the GLS over the within estimator is its ability to include
time-invariant regressors which is impossible with the latter. If only a subset of
regressors are assumed to be correlated with the effects, Schmidt and Sickles
suggested use of the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator, which has the same
properties as for the GLS.
While the stochastic approach can handle statistical noise, its chief
disadvantage vis-a-vis non-parametric models remains the imposition of a restrictive
function form for technology and an explicit distribution for the inefficiency.
Although the techniques of panel data analysis enables us to relax this assumption,
this approach requires another assumption, that firm inefficiency is invariant with
time, since the techniques of panel data analysis are focused on cross-sectional
variation. Further efforts need to be made in this direction. On the other hand,
the problem of restrictive functional form for technology remains almost untouched.
The most widely-used functional form is Cobb-Douglas, which is homogenous and
monotonic. Firstly for the Cobb-Douglas function the elasticity of scale (returns to
scale) is fixed. In other words if the elasticity of scale is 'n' for one level of
output and one factor combination, then it will be 'n' for all levels of output and
all factor combinations. The resultant long-run average cost curve is either
continuously rising, or constant, or continuously falling rather than 'U'-shaped.
Secondly the monotonicity of technology requires a positive marginal product of
inputs. That is equivalent to assuming that the technology is free from congestion.
The reference technology represented by the Cobb-Douglas function is restrictive,
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so that congestive efficiency is missing and scale efficiency is meaningless. The
inefficiency estimates derived from the Cobb—Douglas technology are crude, and the
information about the frontier and the relative efficiency of firms yields less precise
policy implications than in non—parametric models, in which a variety of efficiency
notions are measurable.
We are now in a position to consider less restrictive structures for technology
in order to restore the missing notions of productive efficiency.
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4.2 Parametric Measurement of Productive Efficiency
Recall that in the non-parametric framework the less restrictive production structure
is represented by the subsets of the output and input correspondence which satisfy
weak axioms L.1-L.5, or P.1-P.S. Apparently a production function representing
the less restrictive technology can then be defined in terms of input and output
correspondences (Shephard, 1953), i.e.
(4.2-1) f(X) - max(Y: X L(Y)) - max(Y: Y	 P(X))
Shephard has shown that if the production technology satisfies (L.1 -L.5) or
(P.1 -P.5), then the production function (4.2-1) has the following properties
f.1 f: R(n) -, R, f(0)=O,
f.2 f is upper semi-continuous,
f.3 f(XX)	 f(X) for X	 1.
A production function which satisfies only f.1 -f.3, imposes a less restrictive
structure on technology than is normally the case. Particularly, as f.3 states,
proportional increases in inputs do not decrease outputs. The axiom is referred to
as weak disposability of inputs. A stronger axiom than f.3 obtained by imposing
strong disposability of inputs is
f.3.S f(X')	 f(X) for X'	 X.
By f.3.S an increase in inputs, including but not limited to a proportional increase,
cannot lead to a reduction in output. While strong disposability of inputs implies a
positive marginal product, weak disposability of inputs requires that the marginal
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product is unconstrained in sign. If inputs are strongly disposable they are also
weakly disposable. But the converse is not true. The strong disposability axiom
excludes congestion in the technology. With the weak disposability axiom the
possibility of congestion in technology is not ruled out, and one can define
congestion efficiency in this less restrictive framework.
Definition 1: A technology represented by f(X) satisfying only f.1 -f.3 is congestive
efficient at X=X 0 if af/aX	 0 at XX 0 and congestive inefficient at X=X 0 if
8fI8X < 0 at X=X0
Secondly, the technology which satisfies only f.1 -f.3 does not restrict the
variability of the elasticity of scale with the level of output and factor combination.
It is then meaningful to define scale efficiency.
Definition 2: A technology represented by f(X) satisfying only f.1 -f.3 is scale
efficient at X=X 0 if the elasticity of scale (df/Y)/(dX/X) = I (constant returns to
scale) at X=X 0
 or scale inefficient at X=X 0 if (df/Y)/(dX/X) ^ 1 at XX 0
 due to
either (dfIY)/(dX/X) 1 (increasing returns to scale) or (dfIY)I(dX/X) 1
(decreasing returns to scale).
As far as computational methods are concerned, one may first construct and
estimate the three reference technologies separately. The function form for the
weakly disposable technology (with variable scale elasticity and weak disposability) is
an f(X) which satisfies no more than f.1-f.3. The functional form for the strongly
disposable technology (with variable scale elasticity and strong disposability) is
obtained by imposing a non-negative marginal product restriction on f(X). For the
long-run competitive equilibrium technology (with constant returns to scale and
strongly disposability) a further restriction is that f(X) be homogenous of degree
one. As with the non-parametric approach the three primary efficiency measures
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(purely productive efficiency PTE, weakly productive efficiency WTE and overall
non-price productive efficiency OTE) can be obtained against the three technologies
respectively and the measures of congestion efficiency and scale efficiency can be
derived from the three primary measures accordingly. In stochastic models, each
primary measure corresponds to an one-sided error term U associated with a
frontier technology which has relevant properties of returns to scale and
disposability. Thus the estimate of U derived from the long-run competitive
equilibrium frontier technology gives the value of overall non-price productive
inefficiency; the estimate of U derived from the strongly disposable frontier
technology gives the value of weakly productive inefficiency; the estimate of U
derived from the weakly disposable frontier gives the estimate of purely productive
inefficiency. Meaningfully, it should be the case that the value of overall non-price
productive inefficiency is not less than the value of weakly productive inefficiency,
which is in turn not less than the value of purely productive inefficiency, since the
production possibilities set shrinks as a less restrictive technology is applied and the
departure from the less restrictive technology tends to be smaller for a particular
observation. This is always the case when the frontiers are deterministic. But if the
frontiers are stochastic there is no guarantee that the deterministic kernel of the
estimated stochastic production frontier generated by the long-run competitive
equilibrium technology lies above that generated by the strongly disposable
technology, which in turn lies above that generated by the weakly disposable
technology. In consequence the inequality does not necessarily hold in terms of
estimated one-sided terms.
To escape from this apparent impasse, an alternative procedure is used. We
first estimate the stochastic frontier associated with the weakly disposable technology
(the least restrictive one) and extract estimates of purely productive inefficiency
accordingly. We then derive the two restrictive technologies (the strongly disposable
technology and the long-run competitive equilibrium technology) from the
deterministic kernel of the estimated stochastic frontier, and estimate congestive
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inefficiency and scale inefficiency against the technologies derived. The treatment is
illustrated diagramatically as follows.
Suppose that the deterministic kernel of the stochastic frontier, f(X), which
represents a weakly disposable reference technology, has already been estimated (the
procedure will be discussed in the next section). Consider first how to derive the
strongly disposable technology and construct a measure of congestive efficiency.
Since the technology does not rule out the possibility of congestion in inputs, it is
then possible that output will be obstructed by increases in one input while other
inputs are kept fixed. Fig 4.2-1 illustrates such a situation in a case of two inputs
(Xi ,X2) where the first input Xi causes congestion at A in the congested region
of the weakly disposable technology f(Xi ,X2). To evaluate the degree of congestive
efficiency for the point A, we vary Xi while the second input X2 is fixed at the
observed level (X2X2A). The graph in Fig 4.2-1 is obtained by cutting the
surface of f(Xi ,X2) with the vertical plane X=X2A. It represents a partial function
of f(Xi ,X2) denoted by f(Xi ,X2A). Given X2, the factor ratio (X1/X2) increases
with Xi. The maximum level of output is obtained at the factor ratio given by
X 1M/X 2A. Before the optimal ratio is reached (when Xi <Xi output increases
with increases in Xi. Beyond the optimal ratio (when Xi >XIM), however, output
declines with increases of Xi. The declining portion of the graph represents the
range of output obstructed by congestion in Xi.
By Definition 1, a straightforward way to detect congestive inefficiency is to
evaluate the sign of the marginal product at observed input values. If the marginal
product of the input of interest is non-negative, this implies the use of the input
is free from congestion. If, however, the sign of marginal product is negative, then
the firm involved is congestive inefficient. To construct the congestive measure, a
congestion-free (strongly disposable) technology has to be derived from the possibly
congested (weakly disposable) technology f(Xi ,X 2). For the congestively inefficient
observation A, the strongly disposable technology can be constructed as
YB
0
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f ( Xi , X2 A)	 O<XiXiM
(4.2-2) Y - {
f ( X1 M, X2A) 	 X1>X1M
which consists of the increasing portion of the graph and the line segment MB.
Given the actual usage of inputs (X1A,X2A), the maximum possible level output
obtainable from the strongly disposable (congestion-free) technology would be B•
This output level is, however, not obtainable from the weakly disposable
technology, but, by disposing of Xi AX1M units of the first input, the output level
is obtainable. The reference point B is efficient in the weak sense. Thus for the
congestively inefficient observation A, a possible measure of congestion can be
constructed as the ratio of [ f(X1 M,X2A)- f(X1 A, X2)] in relation to f(X1M,X2A),
i.e. the ratio of (B-A)'B•
f (X 1,X2 A)
X 1M X 1 A	xl
Fig 4.2-1 Parametric Measure of Congestive Inefficiency
To measure scale efficiency, consider Fig 4.2-2, where again f(Xi,X2) is the
deterministic kernel of the estimated stochastic production function in the case of
YD
LX2A)
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two inputs. For simplicity, assume that there is no congestive inefficiency so that
the weakly disposable technology f(Xi ,X2) coincides with the strongly disposable
technology. In the presence of congestive inefficiency, one needs to replace the
weakly disposable technology with a strongly disposable technology, which can be
derived following the procedure described above. To evaluate the degree of scale
efficiency for A on the strongly disposable technology, we vary operational scale
while the factor ratio is fixed at the level given by A (X1AIX2A). The graph in
Fig 4.2-2 is obtained by cutting the surface of f(Xi ,X2) with a vertical plane
through the origin along the ray of the factor ratio X1A/X2A. This is a two
dimensional section of the production possibility set which indicates the deterministic
maximum possible output for the given factor proportion X 1AIX2 A at the different
levels of operational scale. While the vertical axis represents output Y, the
horizontal axis represents the level of input X (zXi A,12A) at varying operational
scale	 for the given factor ratio.
,cX
0	 Xn	
x (X1 A, zX2A)
Fig 4.2-2 Parametric Measure of Scale Inefficiency
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The strongly disposable technology f(X1,X2) allows for increasing, constant and
decreasing returns to scale. By Definition 2, the technology is scale inefficient
either when increasing returns to scale prevail (o<X<X& or when decreasing
returns to scale prevail (X>XE). To construct a scale efficiency measure, one needs
to derive the long-run competitive equilibrium (CRTS and strongly disposable)
technology from f(Xi ,X2). The point E on f(Xi ,X2), where constant returns to
scale prevail, represents the production possibility that maximises the 'average
productivity' for the given factor ratio and is scale efficient. By connecting the
origin and the point E, one obtains the CRTS and strongly disposable technology,
which can be defined as
(4.2-3)	 Y - icX
where K is the maximum 'average productivity' and scY/X when the elasticity of
scale (dY/Y)/(dX/X) = 1. A scale other than XE would be non-optimal for the
same factor ratio. As far as the observation A is concerned, the maximum possible
output obtainable, for the factor ratio and the input level implied by XA, from the
CRTS and strongly disposable technology is given by D• The shortfall of output
due to sub-optimal scale operation is given by DA• The scale efficiency for A
can then be measured by the ratio of (D-A)'D•
156
4.3 The Stochastic Model of the Production Frontier
As argued above the specification of a less restrictive structure for the frontier
technology enables us to define productive efficiency in a more meaningful and
systematic way. Efficiency estimation in this framework involves two steps:
(1) to specify and estimate the stochastic model of the weakly disposable frontier
technology f(X) and then extract estimates for the one-sided disturbance term, i.e.
purely productive inefficiency.
(2) once the unrestrictive technology has been estimated, the restrictive
technologies, i.e. the strongly disposable technology given in Eq(4.2-2) and the
CRTS and strongly disposable technology given in Eq(4.2-3) can be derived from
f(X). Estimates of congestive efficiency and scale efficiency can then be obtained
against the restrictive technologies accordingly.
In the previous section we assumed that the unrestrictive technology was given
and outlined the procedure of the second step. In this section we consider the
procedure of the first step. The functional form chosen to model the unrestrictive
technology should be flexible enough to allow for variable scale elasticity and weak
disposability. One such flexible functional form is the Translog Production Function.
For the two-input case, where Xi denotes labour and X2 denotes capital as
before, the function is
(4.3-1) logY1-log'y0+c1IogX11+1logX21+2(logX11)2+f32(logX2)2
i' logXi 1lOgX2J
Note that no presumptions regarding disposability and scale elasticity are
imposed by this function on the structure of production technology. The elasticity
of scale (4) for the function is given by
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(4.3-2) '' - a1+f31+(2c2+-y1)1ogX1J+(2fi2+y1)IogX21
From this it is clear that in general the elasticity of scale changes with factor
proportions and with the level of production. Thus the long-run average cost curve
can take the 'U-shape' so often assumed for it in the theory of firms.
The marginal product of labour (MPL) and the marginal product of capital
(MPC) are given by
(4.3-3) MPL - (Y1/X11)(a1+2c2logX11+y1IogX2J)
and
(4.3-4) MPC - (Yf/X21)(1+292logX2j+y1logX1j)
respectively. Since MPL and MPC are unrestricted in sign, the translog technology
is not free from congestion. Therefore the translog function can be used to model
the weakly disposable production technology.
The translog model is a generalisation of a Cobb-Douglas model or of a
Taylor series approximation of a CES model. Thus a further advantage of the
translog model is that it provides a testable functional form, which enables us to
choose an appropriate specification for the deterministic part of the frontier
production function.
While Eq(4.3-1) is the deterministic part of the stochastic translog frontier
model, the whole model is given by,
(4.3-5) logY1-logy0+c1IogX11+1logX2+c2(logX11)2+f32(1ogX2ç)2
+y 1 1ogXi JlogX21
+ vi-Ui
where in the stochastic part the symmetric error component V permits the
production function to vary across ports and captures exogenous influences,
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measurement and specification error. Thus the stochastic translog frontier, i.e.
(4.3-6) logYJ-log70+a1logX1f-I-1logX2J-4-Q2(logX1f)2-.-2(logX21)2
4-)f logXi 1logX2J-fVJ
is unique for each observation. The one-sided error component UO relative to the
stochastic translog frontier represents purely productive inefficiency. Given the
logarithmic form, the value of U 1 is approximately the shortfail of output below
the stochastic frontier in percentage terms. Thus EXP(-U,) is purely productive
efficiency as a percentage.
The symmetric error component V is identically and independently distributed
to N(O,cTv 2). Two possible specifications are considered for the one-sided error
component:
(1) Ui is half-normal, i.e. U1 u - N (0°2)
(4.3-7)	 f(U1) - (2/T)" e_1'2uh'01)2
E(U 1 ) - crço(0)/4(0) - ( 2/13/12 o•U
2Var(U 1 ) = (l-2/i-) 0u
where cr 2 =	 + r,, and çc'(.) and 4)(.) denote the standard normal density and
distribution functions;
(2) U is exponential, i.e.
(4.3-8)	 f(U1) - Oe0U1
E C U1) - 1/0
Var(Ui) - (1/0 )2
Stochastic frontier models can be estimated in several ways. The most
commonly-used estimator is the ML method. Given cross-sectional data, the
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log-likelihood function is given by
(4.3-9) Z 1 InL 1 - -Inc -(1/2)ln(2/i) _(Z1/or)2+1r4[_ZjVc]
for half-normal error specification, and
(4.3-10)	 jlnLj- mO + (1/2)O2o + OZ + lndJ[.(Zj/*7v+OtTv)1
for exponential error specification. In both cases Z 1 is the composed disturbance
and Z1=V-U1.
An alternative estimator is the corrected ordinary least square (COLS) method.
Except for the constant term, the COLS is exactly the same as the OLS. The bias
of the constant term can be corrected by adding to the OLS estimated constant
term the mean of Z, i.e. E(U) in Eq(4.3-7) if U 1 is half-normal, or E(U1) in
Eq(4.3-8) if U is exponential. The variances o3 and c.3 can be consistently
estimated from the second and the third moments of OLS residuals.
Both the COLS and ML are consistent estimators for the model Eq(4.3-5).
The main advantage of the COLS is that it is easier to compute than the ML
estimator. Its main disadvantage is that it is asymptotically inefficient as compared
with the ML. Now that computers do most of the work the extra complexity of
calculation involved in ML estimation is less important. However, Olson, Schmidt
and Waldman (1980) found that, based on their Monte Carlo experiments with a
constant term only model, the COLS method is more efficient than the ML
method in terms of means square error for sample size below 200. We have also
conducted a few experiments with a Cobb-Douglas model consisting of a constant
and two regressors. To reduce sampling error in Monte Carlo results, our
experiments were based on more replications (200 times). The results are shown in
Table 4.3-1 for sample points N=30, 50, 100, 150, 200 and the variance ratio
rfcr,=1 in each case. Our results confirmed better performance of the COLS in
small samples, but the difference is not as large as suggested by Olson, et at.
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While the COLS is as (MES) efficient as the ML in terms of coefficient ()
estimates, the former outperforms the latter in terms of the variance (o 2.+ty)
estimate. In addition, the sample size, beyond which the ML performs better for
all estimates seems to be 150, which is lower than suggested by Olson et a!.
Table 4.3-1 Comparative Performance of the ML and COLS Estimator [1]
Sample	 3o	 0• 2
Size COLS	 ML	 COLS	 ML	 COLS	 ML	 COLS	 ML
Bias [2]
30	 -0.265 -0.978	 0.033 -0.012	 0.058 -0.029
50	 -0.245 -1.464	 0.009	 0.013	 0.046	 0.018
100 -0.108 -0.988	 0.040 -0.018 -0.003 -0.024
150	 0.192	 0.354	 0.035	 0.012	 0.013	 0.022
200	 0.180	 0.161 -0.002	 0.003 -0.016	 0.017
0.950 -2.755
0.684 -2.580
	
0.402	 2.621
	
0.411	 1.398
0.363 -0.834
30
50
100
150
200
30
50
100
150
200
19.04
10.21
5.958
4.931
3.048
19.11
10.27
5.970
4.968
3.080
20.25
8.646
5.318
4.812
2.934
21.20
10.79
6.294
4.937
2.956
0.275
0.138
0.081
0.067
0.029
Variance [2]
	
0.235	 0.286
	
0.113	 0.140
	
0.063	 0.060
	
0.058	 0.053
	
0.014	 0.034
0.221
0.109
0.061
0.049
0.028
13.59
6.929
4.151
3.754
2.858
14.50
7.397
4.312
3.923
2.990
2.207
2.681
2.534
2.087
1.930
9.797
9.337
9.404
4.041
2.626
Mean Square Error [2]
	
0.276	 0.236	 0.290	 0.222
	
0.138	 0.113	 0.142	 0.110
	
0.082	 0.063	 0.060	 0.062
	
0.068	 0.058	 0.053	 0.049
	
0.029	 0.014	 0.034	 0.028
Notes:
Ill Replications.200.
12] Bias, variance and mean square error are the Monte Carlo moments of parameter estimates.
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The finite sample distributions of both the COLS and the ML estimators are
unknown. Since we can derive the asymptotic distribution of the estimators of the
second and the third moments of the COLS residuals using the central limit
theorem, and COLS estimates of the parameters of the model are differentiable
functions of these estimated moments, the asymptotic distribution of the COLS
estimator is tractable. But the expressions are messy (Olson, et at., 1980). Large
sample tests based on the ML method are applicable in frontier models. For
instance, 'asymptotic t ratios' (the ratio of the coefficient estimate to the square
root of the appropriate diagonal element of the inverse of the information matrix)
are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis that the associated
coefficient is zero (Aigner et at, 1977). An asymptotic chi-square static can also
be used for significance test, since the negative of twice the logarithm of the
generailsed-likelihood ratio for a number of problems (e.g. the significance of the
one-sided term U or the restrictions on parameters) has approximately chi-square
distribution (Battese and Coelli, 1988).
According to Jondrow et a!. (1982) we can use either the mean or the mode
of the distribution of U conditional on as an estimate of U 1 for each
observation. Given normal V 1 and half-normal U 1 , V1 and U1 are independent,
and Z1 = V1 -U1 , the mean of the distribution of U1 conditional on Z1 is
(4.3-11)	 E(U1/Z1) -	 + 
cr* 1_4(_t*/cr*)
where 11* -
— 
crr/r.
For the exponential model, this is
(4.3-12)	 E(U1/Z1) -
	
+	 (z1/o)/l'(z1/o)
where	 - Z-- Oo..
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4.4 Parametric Estimates of Productive Efficiency: "Cross-sectional Analysis"
The empirical exercise involves fitting the two-factor stochastic frontier model
Eq(4.3-5), using both the ML and OLS (COLS except for the constant term), to
a cross-section of British port data. The annual samples of British ports during the
period 1983-1990 contain no more than 37 observations. A problem, which
frequently arises in frontier estimation when the sample is not large enough, is the
occurrence of wrong (negative) skewness of OLS residuals. In a stochastic frontier
model, if there is no inefficiency, the true disturbance will be symmetric. In the
presence of inefficiency the disturbance should be positively skewed. As such, the
skewness of sample residuals is informative about the extent of inefficiency
(Greene, 1991, 1, pp.328-329). Actually our 1989 and 1990 samples do involve
wrong skewness of OLS residuals. The negative skewness of OLS residuals casts
doubt on the existence of inefficiency. However, there can be other causes for the
wrong skewness: either because the model is not well specified, or simply due to
sample variation. It has been confirmed in our Monte Carlo analysis that the
occurrence of wrong skewness becomes higher as sample size gets smaller even
though the true disturbance is asymmetric. Thus a proper strategy to deal with
wrong skewness is to enlarge the sample size before jumping to the conclusion that
there is no inefficiency or that model specification is inappropriate.
For this reason we enlarged the sample of British ports by pooling
cross-sectional and time-series data and treated the pooled data as if they were
generated from the cross-sectional units in one period. T1e panel of observations
used here consists of 28 major and medium British ports during 1983-1 990. In
total there are 189 observations. it is unbalanced because of missing and incomplete
data. Since no information on input and output prices is provided in annual reports
of British ports, the best thing that can be done is to deflate the time series data
by using general price indices. Output is defined as turnover in constant GDP
163
market prices of 1985. Labour input is defined as staff costs in constant GDP
factor cost of 1985. Capital input is defined as net-book value of fixed capital
assets at 1985 prices. The implied deflator for capital is derived from capital
consumption at current prices and at 1985 prices for the transport sector.
This was a procedure adopted by Greene (1991, 2) who applied a
cross-sectional frontier model to an unbalanced panel of observations on output and
inputs for 10 American airlines from 1970 to 1984. Strictly speaking, the procedure
is justified only if the state of technology remains unchanged over the time period
under investigation. Otherwise efficiency comparison between firms will be biased
against firms observed in the earlier years because the most productive technology
currently available was not available earlier. Practically the problem is negligible as
long as the technology does not change rapidly and/or the span of the time period
is relatively short. In the port industry, while the "container revolution" of the
1960s and 1970s rapidly changed cargo handling out of all recognition, the speed
of the cargo handling techonology development slowed down in 1980s. It is then
reasonable to fit one best-practice technology to measure inter-port efficiency for
the whole period. In the next chapter we will consider if there is any sample
evidence to suggest structural changes in the best-practice technology. A further
justification for this procedure is that every port in the sample has observations for
the early years as well as for later years. Thus every port has a more or less
equal chance of being "fairly" or "unfairly" treated even if there are significant
shifts in the production frontier due to rapid technical progress.
Furthermore frontier functions are closely related to long-run or ex-ante
production functions, since firms can, in the long run, choose the best technology
(Heathfield and Wibe, 1987). We cannot expect firms to move to the best-practice
technology at any cost in the short run. Thus it can be argued that comparison of
productive performance is more meaningful over a longer period of time provided
that the best-practice technology remains fixed.
Using the pooled data instead of the annual data also helps us in getting
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more precise estimates. There was a severe problem of multicollinearity, probably
because of larger number of variables in the translog function, when the annual
data set is used. As we will see shortly that the problem disappears when the
pooled data is used.
As mentioned in section 4.1, existing frontier models can be modified to allow
the use of panel data. One can specify either a fixed-effect or a random-effect
frontier model with a firm effect but no time effect in the usual framework of
panel data literature. Actually some serious difficulties with the cross-section models
are potentially avoidable in the panel-data models. Nevertheless, the techniques of
panel-data analysis are focused on cross-sectional variation assuming there is no
variation over time. This is equivalent to assuming that the efficiency of the
individual firms is invariant with time. It is this questionable assumption that makes
the panel data models unattractive to us. In the next chapter, a framework will be
set up to investigate the time-series variation of port efficiency.
Numerous solution algorithms are available for finding the ML estimates. But
based on our experience in the Monte Carlo analysis, the likelihood function seems
ill-behaved and the function either converges slowly or does not converge if the
algorithm and the step size are not properly chosen. This is so when using the
Newton procedure, for instance, even if the initial value and step size are very
carefully chosen. The occurrence of algorithm failure is high especially when a
sample is small and the variance ratio (X=cr /o) is high. The iterations were
performed by the Fletcher-David-Powell procedure that we programmed using
Gauss (Version 2.0 [1]). The procedure, which belongs to the class of
quasi-Newton methods, was very powerful as compared with the Newton procedure
in our Monte Carlo experiments. The initial values of parameters were given by
the consistent COLS estimates. Econometric packages for frontier estimation are
readily available now, for instance, in Limdep (Version 6.0 [2]).
Notes:
(1J For the manual of Gauss (Version 2.0) see Eñlefsen and Jones (1984).
[2J For the manual of Limdep (Version 6.0) see Greene (1990,2).
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The estimation procedure begins with checking the skewness of the OLS
residuals, since if they are not significantly positively skewed there is no point in
proceeding. The histogram of the OLS residuals plotted has a longer tail on the
negative direction. This means that the OLS residuals derived from our model is
'ciell-shaped. Waldman (1982) has suggested checking the sign of the third moment
Histogram for OLS Residuals
64
43
32
C
Fig 4.3-i Skewness of the OLS Residuals
of the OLS residuals. The true compound disturbance term has a negative mean
(-E(U)) and is positively skewed in the presence of inefficiency. Since the sample
of OLS residuals converges to the sample of true disturbances, the OLS residuals
are wrongly (negatively) skewed if the third moment is positive. Whenever this
happens the maximum likelihood estimator for the stochastic production frontier
model is simply the OLS estimator and the implied o is zero. Greene (1991, 1),
pp.328-330) has provided a procedure to test normality of the true disturbances,
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when the third moment of the OLS residuals is indeed positive, by computing the
skewness and excess coefficients. The third moment of the OLS residuals for our
frontier model is -0.607, impling that the OLS residuals are correctly (positively)
skewed. This is confirmed by the histogram of OLS residuals plotted in Fig 4.3-1,
which has a longer tail on the negative direction. Thus at this point sample
evidence is neither against the specification of our model - either the deterministic
(here translog) or stochastic part, nor the existence of inefficiency.
Various sets of parameter estimates of the stochastic translog frontier
production function Eq(4.3-5) are presented in Table 4.4-1. The first column of
entries corresponds to the result running the OLS. The second two columns of
entries are the results of the ML estimation under half-normal and exponential
assumptions.
Since the sample size is larger than 130, the ML is expected to perform
better according to our experience of the Monte Carlo analysis. It can be seen that
asymptotic variances of the ML estimates tend to be smaller than the variances of
the OLS estimates. The comparison between the ML and the OLS estimates sheds
light on the difference between the frontier technology and the average technology
in the industry. As expected, on the frontier the intercept term, indicating the
level of purely productive efficiency, is greater than in the OLS 'average' function.
The frontier technology is characterised with the higher output elasticity for labour
and lower output elasticity for capital.
To test the appropriateness of the functional form, two alternative
deterministic specifications are considered: Cobb-Douglas and CES. The
corresponding estimates of the Cobb-Douglas model are given in Table 4.4-2. The
Cobb-Douglas model assumes unitary elasticity of substitution, constant elasticity of
scale (estimated to be 0.867), and strongly disposability for the best-practice
technology. A Cobb-Douglas function may be written
(4.4-1) mY 1
 - my0 + orilnXi 1 + Q2InX21
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which is a restricted version of the translog function Eq(4.3-1). The relevant
restrictions are 91 =f32yO. A test of the adequacy of the Cobb-Douglas model is
obtained from the generalised likelihood ratio. The negative of twice the logarithm
of the likelihood ratio has approximately a chi-distribution with degree of freedom
equal to 3. Given the maxinaised values of the logarithm of the likelihood function
in the exponential and the half-normal cases for both the translog and the
Cobb-Douglas models, the values of this statistic are 45.0 in the half-normal case
and 51.0 in the exponential case. These values are significant even at the 0.5%
level. We thus conclude that the Cobb-Douglas is not a suitable specification for
the efficiency frontier of the British port industry.
The CES function having the property of homogeneity and constant elasticity
of substitution, which can be written
V
(4.4-2)	 mY1 - my 0 - - ln[(1-ô)X7+ Xi]
p
A Taylor series approximation to this function around the point p =O is
(4.4-3)	 mY1- lrry 0 + u(1-6)lnXi 1 + V61flx21- (112)pvô[lnXlJ-lnX21]2
or
(4.4-4)	 mY,- ln-y 0 + oilnXi 1+ O2lnX21+ 31[lnX11-lnX21]2
where cti=u(1-6), 02=uô, '3i=-(1I2)pu6.
It is easy to see that Eq(4.4-4) can be obtained by imposing restrictions on the
translog model I12=-2y 1 . The estimates of the CES model are presented in
Table 4.4-3. The negative of twice the logarithm of the likelihood ratio has
approximately a chi-distribution with degree of freedom equal to 2. The value of
general likelihood ratio is 3.44 for the half-normal case and 0.98 for the
exponential case. The critical value from the chi-square table is 5.99 at the 5%
level, so we would not reject that the CES model is appropriate.
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Table 4.4-1 The Translog Production Frontier of the British Port Industry:
"Cross-sectional" Analysis
Estimator	 OLS	 ML
Error Specification	 Half-Normal	 Exponential
R2	 0.956	 -	 -
	
0.955	 -	 -
Residual-squared	 12.553	 -	 -
Log-likelihood	 -12.349	 -8.064	 -1.758
Constant
logXi j
IogX2J
2
(logXi j)
2
(logX2f)
logXu JlogX21
XO_u/Tv
0
-2.229
(1 .102)
0.696
(0.267)
0.949
(0.265)
0.113
(0.028)
0.046
(0.021)
-0.195
(0.048)
0.193
(1.114)
0.608
(0.204)
0.562
(0.264)
0.089
(0.021)
0.048
(0.025)
-0.148
(0.043)
1.851
(0.563)
0.361
(0.028)
0.620
(1.009)
0.687
(0.181)
0.370
(0.257)
0.077
(0.019)
0.056
(0.021)
-0.139
(0.036)
0	 -	 5.531
-	 (0.735)
0 v	 -	 0.176
-	 (0.018)
Note: Standard errors of the estimators are given in parentheses below the parameter estimates.
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Table 4.4-2 The Cobb-Douglas Production Frontier of the British Port Industry:
"Cross-sectional" Analysis
Estimator	 OLS	 ML
Error Specification	 Half-Normal	 Exponential
R2	 0.943	 -	 -
	
0.942	 -	 -
Residual-squared	 16.205	 -	 -
Log-lIkelihood	 -36.350	 -30.575	 -27.246
1.850
(0.115)
0.636
(0.014)
0.235
(0.012)
Constant	 1.699
(0.128)
IogXi 1	0.638
(0.167)
logX2 1	0.229
(0.021)
X'Tu/rv
a
2.024
(0.117)
0.632
(0.015)
0.230
(0.014)
1.920
(0.470)
0.410
(0.028)
o-
-	 (0.736)
av	 -	 0.206
-	 (0.019)
Note: Standard errors of the estimators are given in parentheses below the parameter estimates.
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Table 4.4-3 The CES Production Frontier of the British Port Industry
"Cross-sectional" Analysis
Estimator	 OLS	 ML
Error Specification	 Half-Normal	 Exponential
R2	 0.952	 -	 -
	
0.951	 -
Residual-squared	 13.652	 -	 -
Log-likelihood	 -20.24	 -9.777	 -2.245
Constant	 1.249	 1.461	 1.227
	
(0.166)	 (0.151)	 (0.137)
logXi j	 0.778	 0.755	 0.770
	
(0.031)	 (0.082)	 (0.066)
logX2f	 0.138	 0.164	 0.167
	
(0.027)	 (0.084)	 (0.068)
log(X21/X1 I)	 0.060	 0.057	 0. 061
	
(0.010)	 (0.020)	 (0.017)
X=-Tu/Tv	 2.259
(0.568)
0	 0.384
(0024
0	
-	 5.263
-	 (0.603)
-	 0.170
-	 (0.017)
Note: Standard errors of the estimators are given in parentheses below the parameter estimates.
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The existence of inefficiency can also be tested on the significance of the
one—sided term U in the frontier model Eq(4.3-5). If the error term is absent
from the model (i.e., E(U)=0), then the OLS estimator is identical to the ML
estimator. The negative of twice the logarithm of likelihood ratio is approximately
chi—distributed with I degree of freedom. The value of this statistic is 8.6 in the
half—normal case and 21.8 in the exponential case, both of which are significant
even at the 0.5% level.
The mean of the inefficiency component U according to Eq(4.3-7) is
E(U 1 ) - 0.254
under the half—normal assumption, implying that the average shortfall of output is
25% below the stochastic frontier. This is equivalent to 78% (=EXP(—U))
efficiency. Under the exponential assumption, the mean of the inefficiency
component U according to Eq(4.3-8) is
E(U 1 ) - 0.181
implying an 18% average shortfall of output below the stochastic frontier or 84%
efficiency. The difference between the two estimates is 7%.
The relative importance of inefficiency in relation to exogenous influences can
be indicated by the relative variability of the two sources of random error that
distinguish ports from one another. In the half—normal case, given the estimated
values of ) (u'0 v) and (ff2'J+o-,), the implied estimates of r0.101 and of
o,5=0.029. The variance of U, according to Eq(4.3-7), is calculated as
Var(U1)—O.036
which is 55% of the total disturbance (N.B. Var(Z)Var(U)+Var(V)=Var(U)+o). It
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is important to note that the variance of U is not	 while the variance of V is
cr). In the exponential case, given estimated 0 and o, the variance of U
according to Eq(4.3-8) is calculated as
Var(U j )-0 .033
which is 52% of the total disturbance. Again both measures are close. Therefore,
the picture that emerges is one of substantial variations of observed output beneath
the frontier as much as variations in the frontier across ports.
Estimated pure productive inefficiencies, for 28 British ports from 1983 to
1990 relative to the best—practice technology available during this period, are
computed using Jondrow's procedure and are given in Table A4.4-1 of Appendix
4.4. Shown in Fig.4.4-2 and Fig 4.4-3 are the histograms of time averages of
estimated efficiencies for each port for the half—normal and exponential cases
respectively. It appears that the distribution of estimated efficiencies under the
exponential assumption is half—normally shaped while the distribution of estimated
efficiencies under the half—normal assumption is not. Farrell (1957) believd that a
plausible shape of genuine efficiency distribution is such as the half—normal, with
mode at maximum efficiency while any other shapes, such as rectangular, unimodal,
the shape with mode at minimum efficiency, are implausible. If Farrell's criterion
is accepted here, we should feel that the assumption of exponential distribution and
hence the corresponding efficiency estimates are more plausible.
The translog specification does not exclude the possibility of congestion and
allows variability of scale elasticity in the technology. Thus the efficiency frontier
itself can be congestive and scale inefficient. To detect congestion inefficiency, the
marginal productivity of labour and capital on the translog frontier are calculated
for each observation. The results, shown in Table A4.4-2 of Appendix 4.4, suggest
a positive marginal product of capital and labour for all sample ports except
Harwich Dock during 1983-1990. This implies that the weakly disposable frontier
$4
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Histogram for Purely Productice Efficiency
Fig 4.4-2 Distribution of Pure Productive Efficiency of British Ports 1983-90
(Half-Normal Assumption)
Histogram for Purely Productive Efficiency
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0
Fig 4.4-3 Distribution of Pure Productive Efficiency for British Ports 1983-90
(Exponential Assumption)
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coincides with the strongly disposable frontier. Therefore most sample ports during
this period are congestively efficient.
The values for the elasticity of scale on the translog frontier for all
observations are also evaluated and given in Appendix 4.4-3. The values are less
than one for most observations, indicating the existence of scale inefficiency and
that was due to operation at non-optimal scale when decreasing returns to scale
prevailed. Following the procedure outlined in the previous section, scale
inefficiencies are calculated for 28 British ports during 1983-1990. The results are
shown in Tables A4.4-3 (derived from the weakly disposable technology associated
with the half-normal assumption) and A4.4-4 (derived from the weakly disposable
technology associated with the exponential assumption) of Appendix 4.4. The
distribution of estimated scale efficiencies plotted in Fig 4.4-4 is far from
half-normally shaped. However, Farrell's criterion is not relevant to scale
efficiency. As indicated earlier, while purely productive and congestive inefficiency
are private inefficiency, scale inefficiency arising from the departure of the long
run competitive equilibrium need not imply managerial inefficiency, though it is
undesirable in a social sense. It is hardly surprising that the distribution of scale
efficiency could be irregular.
As a final note, the estimated values of efficiency is meaningfully related to
the values of scale elasticity. As can be seen in Fig 4.4-5 the values of scale
efficiency are higher when the values of scale elasticity are closer to unity,
meaning that scale inefficiency can be eliminated by moving actual scale size
towards the most productive scale size.
-;
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Histogram for Scale Efficiency
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Fig 4.4-4 Distribution of Scale Efficiency of British Ports 1983-1990
(Exponential Assumption)
1Ø	 200
Ports x Years
Fig 4.4-5 Scale Efficiency and Scale Elasticity
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4.5 Parametric Estimates of Productive Efficiency: Panel Data Analysis
In the last section we applied the cross-sectional frontier model to the pooled data.
As stated in Section 4.1 the cross-sectional analysis hinges on assumptions about
non-independence of regressors and productive inefficiency and about the the
distribution of inefficiency. However, if a port knows its efficiency level, this will
affect its choice of inputs. In consequence the regressors are likely to be correlated
with inefficiency. The same effect may arise if some relevant factor of production
is omitted. For instance, some ports may appear as more efficient than others
because of the non-measurement of location in our models. It might be reasonable
to expect that ports with a favourable location nay tend to be larger because of
the higher marginal productivity of capital and labour. The distributional
assumptions (half-normal or exponential) can ailso be questioned since they are
arbitrary. Both of these two assumptions are potentially avoidable if one has panel
data. In this section we consider whether better estimates can be obtained from the
extra information provided by panel data.
The estimators to be used are the Within, the GLS and the ML, which have
been briefly described in Section 4.1. Note that the ML estimator here is the one
developed by Pitt and Lee (1981) for panel data rather the one used in the last
section for "cross-sectional data". The appropriateness of these estimators depends
on the validity of the assumptions about the independence of the regressors and
inefficiency and about the distribution of inefficiency. These assumptions can in
turn be tested using Hausman-type tests. Since the GLS estimator assumes that the
effects (U1 ) are uncorrelated with the regressors while the Within estimator does
not, the null hypothesis that effects and regressors are uncorrelated can be tested
by testing the significance of difference between these two estimators. In using the
ML estimator the effects are assumed independent of regressors, and specific
distributional assumptions are assigned for U and V. Given that the effects are
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uncorrelated with the regressors, a Hausman test on the difference between the
GLS and ML is equivalent to a test of the distributional assumption. Finally the
joint hypothesis that the effects are uncorrelated with the regressors and that the
distributional assumptions are correct can be tested by a Hausman test of the
difference between the Within and ML.
Table 4.5-1 displays the Within, GLS, and ML estimates of the frontier
production function. We assume a translog technology and Hicks-neutral
technological change. The ML estimates are obtained under the exponential
distribution. The DFP algorithm is unable to locate a maximum for the likelihood
function under the half-normal distribution. The estimated rate of technical progress
is between 1.3% and 1.6% per year. All three sets of results are close in terms of
the coefficients, 2, r,, and significance of the coefficients.
Table 4.5-1 The Translog Production Frontier of the British Port Industry:
Panel Data Analysis
Estimator	 Within	 GLS	 ML
	
0.996	 0.950	 0.950
cr	 -	 0.110	 0.259
	
0.006	 0.006	 0.006
Time	 0.013	 0.014	 0.016
	
(0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)
Constant	 -	 -0.976	 0.897
	
(1.366)	 (2.296)
logX1 1	 0.739	 0.670	 0.367
	
(0.211)	 (0.191)	 (0.273)
logX2	 0.760	 0.791	 0.726
2	 (0.220)	 (0.190)	 (0.374)
(logXi)	 0.047	 0.058	 0.070
2	 (0.014)	 (0.013)	 (0.022)
(logX2)	 0.009	 0.009	 0.010
	
(0.010)	 (0.009)	 (0.014)
IogXi logX2 f	 -0.094	 -0.107	 -0.090
	
(0.022)	 (0.021)	 (0.029)
Note: Standard errors of the estimators are given in parentheses below the parameter estimates.
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The Hausinan test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a chi-distribution
with 6 degrees of freedom. The value of the statistic is 5.828 for the difference
between the Within and the GLS. This means that the null hypothesis of no
correlation between effects and regressors is accepted. Given the uncorrelatedness of
the effects and regressors, the distributional assumption is tested by comparing the
GLS and ML. The value for the relevant Hausman test statistic is 0.522. So we
would not reject the exponential distribution. The test of the joint hypothesis of
uncorrelated regressors and correct distributional assumption is based on the
difference between the Within and the ML. For this test, the value of the statistic
is 1 .267. Again this is well Within the acceptance region at the 5% level.
Given that there is no sample evidence against the ML estimator for panel
data, we are now in a position to compare the ML estimates from the panel data
with the ML estimates from the pooled data. The efficiency estimates derived from
both estimators are displayed in Table A4.5-1 in Appendix 4.5 to this chapter.
While the estimates from the panel data are constant for each port over time, the
corresponding estimates from the pooled data are time averages. There is no direct
test between these two estimators, but we may use Farrell's (1957) "goodness of
fit" measure to compare the plausibility of efficiency estimates. The efficiency error
distribution derived from the Pitt and Lee ML estimator is plotted in Fig 4.5-1.
Recall that, on Farrell's criterion, the distribution of efficiency estimates derived
from the cross-sectional model is plausible under the exponential assumption (see
Fig 4.4-3). The distribution of efficiency estimates derived from the Pitt and Lee
ML estimator plotted in Fig 4.5-1, however, is implausible.
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Histogram for Purely Productive Efficiency
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F1g4.5-1 Distribution of Purely Productive Efficiency of British Ports 1983-1990
(Panel Data Model/Exponential Assumption)
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4.6 Stochastic versus Deterministic Frontier
It is hardly surprising that efficiency estimates relative to a stochastic production
frontier are different from efficiency estimates relative to a deterministic frontier.
In this study the deterministic frontier is assumed to be piece-wise linear, while
the stochastic frontier is assumed to be translog for the technology, and
half-normal or exponential for inefficiency. Which measure is closer to the true
extent of efficiency? Recall that the deterministic approach imposes no structure but
cannot deal with statistical noise, whereas the stochastic approach can handle
statistical noise but imposes structure. The answer to this question should then
depend on whether the data was contaminated by statistical noise, and whether the
structure was well-specified for the stochastic frontier. The results from estimating
the stochastic frontier model suggest substantial statistical noise, because the
estimated variance of the symmetric error component is as high as the estimated
variance of the asymmetric error component. In other words we have empirical
evidence for believing that the data set has been contaminated by statistical noise.
Certainly this is based on the structure we pre-specified so that we are not
absolutely sure whether this is true unless we are convinced that the structure has
been correctly specified. However, in the following two aspects the study described
in this chapter represents an advance as compared with previous work on stochastic
frontier models. First, we have specified and estimated a less restrictive model for
the production technology. Secondly, specifications for the production technology
and error structure have been subject to statistical tests. These enable us to base
our efficiency estimates on a well-specified structure consistent with the sample
evidence. Therefore we have some reasons for preferring the stochastic measures.
Table 4.6-1 shows estimates of average productive efficiency of British ports
relative to deterministic and stochastic frontiers based on exactly the same sample
(observations of 28 British ports during the period 1983-1990). For the purpose of
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comparison between stochastic and deterministic measures, the sample chosen here
for non-parametric estimation is the pooled data set used in this chapter instead of
the annual data sets used in Chapter 3. Since efficiency measures derived from
production functions are output-based, the efficiency measures relative to the
deterministic frontier presented in the same table are output-based as well. For
deterministic measures structural efficiency was taken as the average value. To
compute structural efficiency (see van den Broeck, et aL, 1980), we construct an
average port (arithmetic average of each amount of inputs and output) for the
industry, and regard this average port as an arbitrary observation on the same line
as the other observations, and then compute efficiency for this average port. For
parametric measures EXP(-E(U)) was taken as the average value for purely
productive efficiency (PTE) and the arithmetic mean is taken as the average value
for scale efficiency (SE) and congestive efficiency (CE). The average of non-price
overall productive efficiency (OTE) is the product of average values of PTE, SE
and CE.
Table 4.6-1 Deterministic and Stochastic Measures
of Average Productive Efficiency of British Ports
Measures	 OlE	 PIE	 SE	 CE
Relative to a stochastic frontier
half-normal	 63.6%	 77.6%	 81.9%	 100%
exponential	 66.3%	 83.4%	 79.5%	 100%
Relative to a deterministic frontier
39.2%	 70.5%	 56.7%	 98.1%
Notes:
All measures are output-based
Stochastic measures of PTE are the means of
Stochastic measures of SE are the sample means of SE;
Deterministic measures are values of structural efficiency.
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Several points in the table are worthy of comment. First, the deterministic
measures are lower than the stochastic measures of efficiency probably because the
former over-estimate the true extent of inefficiency. Second, while both measures
differ largely in terms of SE, they are relatively close in terms of PTE and very
close in terms of CE. Therefore the results obtained from the stochastic and the
deterministic model are in agreement that the most important ways in which British
port producers depart from overall non—price productive efficiency are purely
productive and scale inefficiency, while congestive inefficiency is negligible.
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Appendix 4.4
Parametric Efficiency Estimates
Table A4.4-1
Parametric Estimates of Purely Productive Inefficiency
Ports	 Years	 Purely Productive Inefficiency
Half-Normal Exponential
ABP
1
2
5
6
7
Bristol
3
4
5
6
7
8
Clyde
0.158488
0.242491
0.098600
0.082702
0.062430
0.423384
0.345564
0.361331
0.349330
0. 388054
0.367 197
0. 112576
0.172336
0. 072303
0. 063579
0. 05 1277
0.347037
0. 256288
0.276000
0.260463
0. 304398
0. 279895
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.260444
0.252833
0. 248500
0. 237925
0. 227030
0. 240896
0. 225717
0. 146627
0. 165642
0.160260
0. 154694
0. 143723
0. 136235
0. 145696
0.135643
0.092238
Dover
Fel ixstowe
Forth
0. 149820
0.158695
0. 160068
0. 131578
0. 152205
0.189387
0. 110438
0. 101946
0. 209644
0.221887
0. 279664
0. 256327
0. 176924
0. 155843
0.182448
0.192618
0.186406
0. 142833
0.130415
0. 133026
0. 178051
0.144723
0.107891
0. 106109
0. 114149
0.116754
0. 095995
0. 112166
0. 143487
0.084669
0.078486
0.132974
0. 145115
0.208277
0. 181843
0. 121298
0. 107155
0.130223
0. 135173
0. 126716
0.097493
0. 089897
0. 089246
0. 116142
0.095408
0. 073824
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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Table A4.4-1 (Continued )
Parametric Estimates for Purely Productive Inefficiency
Ports
	 Years	 Purely Productive Inefficiency
Half-normal Exponential
London
0.1903 15
0.203702
0.209024
0. 157436
0. 133331
0. 132470
0.149865
0.131959
0.121322
0.128946
0. 132201
0. 099960
0. 089644
0.089988
0. 100907
0089126
Manchester
Medway
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Mersey
3
4
5
6
7
8
Milford Haven
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Tees & Hart lepool
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0. 332562
0. 346537
0.415296
0.288669
0.280993
0. 360128
0.505329
0.4 16402
0.237693
0. 182700
0. 188166
0.246483
0.233324
0. 215692
0. 209374
0. 172159
0.248706
0.233924
0.226375
0.20 1602
0.228465
0. 172964
0.350189
0. 313943
0.209944
0.191539
0. 196294
0. 161840
0. 148902
0.232478
0. 153787
0. 165900
0. 147030
0. 13 1942
0. 157911
0. 170500
0. 126789
0. 114486
0. 238803
0.250417
0.326524
0.205988
0. 200756
0. 296906
0. 509785
0. 392460
0. 143622
0.109605
0. 114476
0. 153172
0.143151
0.133007
0. 131722
0. 113066
0. 172437
0. 158137
0. 150908
0. 134257
0. 151899
0. 113451
0. 247085
0.212588
0.133792
0. 121121
0. 124538
0. 102842
0. 094648
0. 147641
0.102660
0.108682
0. 096946
0.084617
0. 099412
0.107625
0. 084863
0. 080228
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
3
4
5
6
7
8
3
4
5
6
8
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Table A4.4-1 4.4-1 (Continued)
Parametric Estimates for Purely Productive Inefficiency
Ports	 Years	 Purely Productive Inefficiency
Hal f-normal Exponent Ia!
Tyne
3	 0.285271	 0.194546
4	 0.187531	 0.119964
5	 0.170215	 0.108699
6	 0.168150	 0.107153
7	 0.166610	 0.106210
8	 0.170836	 0.109855
Aberdeen
Ardrossan
Blyth
Boston
BWB
0.089828
0.08873 1
0. 098721
0. 109800
0. 105851
0. 104377
0. 102876
0. 487969
0.440100
0.45353 1
0. 455688
0. 447500
0.479749
0.448451
0.391359
0.140345
0. 167435
0.332785
0.403014
0.35 1085
0.256377
0.234 125
0. 195675
0. 346285
0. 243304
0.226944
0.063404
0. 062682
0. 069210
0.074923
0.072476
0.07 1314
0. 070417
0.383840
0.329230
0.343790
0. 347292
0. 338549
0. 375933
0. 339865
0. 278281
0. 089680
0. 103930
0. 219889
0.287387
0. 240681
0.163114
0. 146072
0. 121090
0.230905
0. 151568
0. 141459
3
4
5
6
7
Cromarty Firth
3
4
5
6
7
8
Dundee Firth
I
2
0.5 13647
0.484032
0.557016
0.522740
0. 547008
0.375859
0.391662
0.612019
0.357517
0. 398107
0.419826
0.219556
0.185143
0.558632
0. 514115
0. 560840
0.620020
0. 678660
0.240633
0. 258334
0. 508867
0.227625
0. 267965
0. 290395
0. 136929
0. 115539
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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Table A4.4-1 (Continued)
Parametric Estimates for Purely Productive Inefficiency
Ports	 Years	 Purely Productive Inefficiency
Hal f-normal Exponent lal
Dundee Flrth
5
6
7
8
Great Yarmouth
3
4
7
8
Harwich Harbour
3
4
5
6
7
8
Ipswich
0.155650
0. 167724
0.167506
0.189934
0. 069168
0. 061994
0. 063036
0. 07 1066
0.146440
0.082245
0. 083553
0. 076670
0. 074500
0. 070371
0. 098346
0.105289
0.106101
0.119933
0. 049993
0. 045864
0. 046566
0. 051213
0. 091632
0. 057053
0. 057904
0. 055459
0. 053841
0. 051265
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0. 284762
0. 304852
0. 349167
0. 284875
0. 270898
0.277211
0.268906
0. 252363
0. 171713
0.185558
0. 228 142
0.172040
0. 160467
0.164196
0.158911
0.149431
Lerwi ck
Poole
Shoreham
0.3 15653
0.212414
0.199876
0. 186324
0. 162005
0. 185966
0. 298286
0. 362604
0. 296445
0. 289004
0. 294243
0.284823
0. 265567
0. 213936
0. 366410
0. 342883
0. 359644
0. 354862
0. 287283
0. 341403
0.178440
0. 211650
0.215376
0. 135389
0.127675
0. 118824
0.104223
0. 119354
0. 194397
0. 255392
0.195756
0. 187775
0. 191877
0.183850
0. 170698
0. 134386
0. 249697
0. 227926
0. 242436
0. 238668
0. 182129
0. 228474
0.111286
0.131939
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Table A4.4-1 (Continued)
Parametric Estimates for Purely Productive Inefficiency
Ports	 Years	 Purely Productive Inefficiency
Half-normal Exponential
3
4
5
6
7
Harwich Dock
Rams gate
0.139141
0.176591
0.1705 13
0.2024 10
0. 186538
0.090889
0. 114739
0. 113548
0.133894
0. 125506
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.225626
0. 198213
0. 150508
0.2446 12
0.21423 1
0.193410
0.142308
0. 125325
0.096527
0. 164307
0. 143055
0.129400
Notes:
Years 1-8 denote 1983-1990;
Values of inefficiency are percentages beneath the stochastic frontiers under half-normal and
exponential assumptions respectively.
188
Table A4.4-2
Marginal Products of Labour (MPL) and Capital (MPC)
(based on half-normal distribution)
Ports Years	 MPL	 MPC
ABP
1
2
5
6
7
Bristol
3
4
5
6
7
8
Clyde
1.43062
1. 21472
1. 77817
1. 90920
2. 20951
1.03013
1.15387
1 .12841
1.14523
1. 09408
1 .13655
0. 179231E-01
0. 105213E-01
0.319279E-01
0. 524436E-01
0.915199E-01
0. 794544E-01
0.941 169E-01
0. 902326E-01
O.924813E-01
O . 885414E-01
0.953135E-01
1
2
3
4
S
6
7
8
1. 34585
1. 37206
1. 39138
1.42770
1.45919
1. 42386
1. 46585
1. 74309
0. 133377
0. 145301
0.157923
0.169506
0. 178933
0. 179893
0. 194704
0.229522
Dover
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Fel ixst owe
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Forth
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1.65445
1.61488
1. 60986
1.73754
1.62996
1.50405
1. 88101
1.95366
1.42334
1. 37056
1.19742
1.24770
1. 45608
1. 52677
1. 40500
1. 38821
1.50727
1. 68611
1. 75398
1.74600
1.55804
1.70044
1. 93271
0. 128256
0. 119867
0. 115663
0. 127653
0. 114432
0.997311E-01
0. 126694
0. 132954
0.915503E-01
0. 875 193E-01
0.732190E-01
0.723439E-01
0. 843305E-01
0. 829483E-01
0 .755580E-01
0. 7665 17E-01
0. 124174
0. 143096
0. 149335
0.157867
0. 144606
0. 161747
0. 187223
0. 728083E-01
0. 789821E-Ol
0. 802395E-01
0. 897502E-01
0. 876316E-01
0. 102469
0. 106849
0. 115399
0. 141784
0. 157097
0.166159
0. 186016
0. 232225
0.177891
0. 131416
0.129805
0.141238
0. 147398
0.137134
0.129587
0. 153223
0.154769
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Table A4.4-2 (Continued)
Marginal Products of Labour (MPL) and Capital (MPC)
(based on half-normal distribution)
Ports Years	 MPL	 MPC
London
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Manchester
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Medway
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1.44772
1. 41653
1. 40383
1. 58115
1. 65797
1.65557
1. 57086
1. 66985
1 .16223
1 . 14455
1. 04232
1.25086
1. 27082
1 .14501
0. 993801
1.15630
1.42104
1.58308
1.55249
1. 38406
1. 41792
1.45635
1.45964
1.56864
0.436041E-01
0.441917E-01
0. 452561E-01
O . 502643E-01
0. 838307E-Ol
0. 884520E-01
0.842141E-01
0 .949361E-01
0. 897230E-01
0. 905268E-01
0. 828687E-01
0. 100341
0.102102
0. 801470E-01
0. 539503E-01
0. 627442E-01
0.149798
0. 160310
0.158536
0. 139731
0. 140523
0.139636
0. 133791
0.140197
Mersey
3	 1.27170
4	 1.31859
5	 1.34294
6	 1.40995
7	 1.34724
8	 1.51663
Milford Haven
1	 1.54398
2	 1.62110
3	 1.89499
4	 1.91761
5	 1.80367
6	 1.94829
7	 1.76616
8	 1.48538
Tees & Hart lepool
1	 1.61492
2	 1.57237
3	 1.65826
4	 1.75855
5	 1.63143
6	 1.57337
7	 1.76769
8	 1.84520
Tyne
3
4
5
6
7
8
Aberdeen
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ardrossan
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Blyth
3
4
5
6
7
8
Bo s t on
3
4
5
6
8
1. 32338
1. 56056
1.62179
1. 62890
1. 64068
1.64189
2. 30555
2.3 1583
2. 23687
2. 09901
2. 13693
2. 12316
2.12126
1. 03498
1. 09599
1. 07774
1. 06299
1.07805
1. 02959
1. 07559
1.18318
1. 79340
1. 65999
1. 24861
1.13539
1. 24172
1. 44087
1. 45496
1. 54565
1. 21038
1. 41133
1. 50731
BWB
3	 0.531696
4	 0.555624
5	 0.486042
6	 0.441711
7	 0.488127
Cromarty Firth
3	 1.57292
4	 1.49871
5	 1.14819
6	 1.57746
7	 1.46189
8	 1.40082
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Table A4.4--2 (Continued)
Marginal Products of Labour (MPL) and Capital (MPC)
(based on half-normal distribution)
Ports Years	 MPL	 MPC
0.128717
0.164731
0.174492
0.176547
0.180728
0. 178223
0. 232695
0. 236607
0. 207724
0. 212192
0. 218981
0. 228668
0. 231466
0.169913
0. 186569
0. 179518
0.191529
0.193556
0.188595
0. 194831
0.200378
0. 233158
0.23 1448
0.175393
0.155073
0.157388
0. 1837 16
0. 259868
0. 298561
0. 235955
0. 281927
0.240659
0.339794E-01
0.350217E-01
0.291818E-01
0. 240759E-01
0. 269565E-01
0.132503
0.136489
0. 985559E-01
0. 139824
0. 135283
0. 1357 10
0. 213982
0. 222995
0.233592
0. 223446
0.201116
0.193959
0. 390950
0. 44 1971
0. 477653
0. 412978
0. 151107
0. 206025
0. 207727
0. 223764
0. 283943
0. 302795
0. 150843
0. 147601
0. 139847
0. 154586
0. 154498
0. 152137
0. 157459
0. 178874
0. 106195
0.129521
0. 135411
0.138291
0. 145972
0.138463
0.174787
0.141266
0.159351
0. 172002
0. 17 1503
0.177036
0.169104
0.188334
0. 144897
0.150024
0. 145832
0. 140008
0.157571
0.143910
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Table A4.4-2 (Continued)
Marginal Products of Labour (MPL) and Capital (MPC)
(based on half-normal distribution)
Ports Years	 MPL	 MPC
Dundee Flrth
1	 1.55840
2	 1.69343
5	 1.83342
6	 1.79150
7	 1.82196
8	 1.68834
Great Yarmouth
3	 2.64301
4	 2.75754
7	 2.64081
8	 2.52169
Harwich Harbour
3	 2.33079
4	 3.03141
5	 2.98468
6	 2.85121
7	 2.47569
8	 2.54695
Ipswich
1	 1.33751
2	 1.30231
3	 1.20450
4	 1.33706
S	 1.37537
6	 1.36537
7	 1.38164
8	 1.41363
Lerwi ck
3	 1.67337
4	 1.97861
5	 1.99866
6	 2.07094
7	 2.18722
8	 2.05084
Poole
1	 1.33893
2	 1.24890
3	 1.36653
4	 1.36049
5	 1.35304
6	 1.36335
7	 1.39498
8	 1.52010
Shoreham
1	 1.39374
2	 1.44192
3	 1.42006
4	 1.45087
5	 1.58480
6	 1.44668
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Table A4.4-2 (Continued)
Marginal Products of Labour (MPL) and Capital (MPC)
(based on half-normal distribution)
Ports Years	 MPL	 MPC
Shoreham
7
8
Rarwich Dock
3
4
5
6
7
Rams gate
3
4
5
6
7
8
1.77345
1.72348
1.99668
1.96136
1.87951
2.07540
2. 29354
1.77292
1.87610
2. 08093
I .74535
1.76592
1. 83939
0. 216481
0.181451
0 .744754E-01
-0.565418
-0.126171
-2. 14949
-3.91729
0. 153343
0.156857
0.178149
0. 120778
0. 13 1628
0. 135145
Notes:
Years 1-8 refer to 1983-1990;
Values of MPL and MPC are marginal products of labour and capital on the deterministic kernel
of the stochastic frontier.
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Table A4.4-3
Scale Elasticity and Inefficiency
(based on half-normal assumption)
Ports	 Years	 Scale	 Scale
Elasticity Inefficiency
ABP
1	 0.875951	 0.284516
2	 0.878477	 0.274798
5	 0.879934	 0.269220
6	 0.873999	 0.292075
7	 0.865826	 0.324081
Bristol
3	 0.885311	 0.248874
4	 0.892700	 0.221582
5	 0.888382	 0.237430
6	 0.892185	 0.223455
7	 0.887975	 0.238940
8	 0.890265	 0.230481
Clyde
1	 0.922236	 0.123282
2	 0.923989	 0.118125
3	 0.932483	 0.094420
4	 0.945479	 0.062625
5	 0.949082	 0.054847
6	 0.948766	 0.055510
7	 0.953210	 0.046515
8	 0.940779	 0.073466
Dover
1	 0.879336	 0.271506
2	 0.873316	 0.294729
3	 0.868770	 0.312491
4	 0.872463	 0.298047
5	 0.866736	 0.320490
6	 0.858177	 0.354424
7	 0.860109	 0.346733
8	 0.861259	 0.342165
Fel ixstowe
1	 0.910078	 0.161318
2	 0.901888	 0.188955
3	 0.877632	 0.278039
4	 0.884885	 0.250471
5	 0.887663	 0.240096
6	 0.887863	 0.239354
7	 0.877507	 0.278519
8	 0.881740	 0.262346
Forth
1	 0.891221	 0.226978
2	 0.894297	 0.215799
3	 0.893944	 0.217075
4	 0.904390	 0.180357
5	 0.906494	 0.173231
6	 0.908381	 0.166921
7	 0.909491	 0.163249
London
1	 0.903108	 0.184746
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Table A4.4-3 (Continued)
Scale Elasticity and Inefficiency
(based on half-normal assumption)
Ports	 Years
	
Scale	 Scale
Elasticity Inefficiency
London
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.905128
0.905621
0.907819
0.897911
0.895299
0.894381
0.897707
0.177846
0.176176
0.168791
0.202883
0.212195
0.2 15496
0.203605
Manchester
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Medway
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Mersey
3
4
5
6
7
8
Milford Haven
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Tees & Hart lepool
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.898052
0. 900114
0.895633
0. 8897 88
0.887682
0. 864984
0. 830754
0. 829999
0. 940055
0. 941789
0. 934904
0. 928672
0. 931217
0. 926980
0. 918402
0. 904 106
0.889104
0. 893811
0. 896612
0.895943
0. 898190
0. 9013 12
0.858291
0. 862059
0. 868639
0. 879926
0. 893220
0. 8975 12
0. 934266
0. 923262
0. 899934
0.904694
0. 906177
0. 921920
0. 920724
0. 916969
0. 907195
0.893756
0. 202382
0.195126
0.210996
0.232234
0.240024
0. 327405
0. 463778
0.466758
0.075204
0. 071072
0. 088072
0. 104787
0. 097812
0.109529
0. 134860
0.181325
0.234760
0. 217556
0. 207496
0. 209888
0. 201894
0. 190953
0.353971
0. 338986
0. 313007
0. 269251
0. 219696
0.204295
0. 089728
0.120251
0. 195759
0.179321
0. 174296
0. 124221
0.127799
0. 139287
0.170878
0.217754
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Table A4.4-3 (Continued)
Scale Elasticity and Inefficiency
(based on half-normal assumption)
Ports	 Years	 Scale	 Scale
Elasticity Inefficiency
Tyne
3
4
5
6
7
8
Aberdeen
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ardrossan
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.902578
0.915482
0.918460
0.919929
0.920487
0.915132
0.902580
0.903980
0. 893033
0.902773
0. 904309
0. 910089
0.911739
0.957335
0.961390
0.959036
0. 967880
0. 967308
0. 969594
0.968285
0. 960902
0.186568
0.143941
0.134680
0.130197
0. 128511
0.145044
0.186562
0.181754
0. 220373
0. 185898
0.180633
0.161284
0. 155902
0. 038829
0. 031914
0. 035850
0. 022196
0. 021198
0. 019910
0.021646
0. 032710
Blyth
3
4
5
6
7
8
Boston
3
4
5
6
8
BWB
3
4
5
6
7
Cromarty Firth
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.934636
0.94470 1
0.944521
0.94 1006
0. 929415
0. 9295 17
0. 967614
0. 978782
0. 982815
0. 983872
0.954235
0. 892918
0. 897058
0. 863705
0. 843586
0. 845507
0. 881975
0. 893654
0. 884988
0. 890002
0. 895878
0. 901697
0. 088766
0.064367
0. 064772
0. 072923
0.102729
0. 102449
0. 022561
0. 097466
0.006404
0. 005643
0. 044545
0. 220791
0.205909
0. 332464
0.412739
0. 405060
0. 261451
0. 218123
0. 250083
0. 23 1448
0.210120
0. 189617
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Table A4.4-3 (Continued)
Scale Elasticity and Inefficiency
(based on half-normal assumption)
Ports	 Years	 Scale	 Scale
Elasticity	 Inefficiency
Dundee Flrth
1
2
5
6
7
8
Great Yarmouth
3
4
7
8
Harwich Harbour
3
4
5
6
7
8
Ipswich
0.937353
0.932775
0.9292 10
0.926937
0. 913181
0. 917309
0.946403
0. 954931
0. 968220
0.957061
0. 835722
0.851452
0. 856451
0. 874549
0. 917462
0. 92 1579
0. 081844
0. 093643
0. 103295
0. 109652
0.151251
0.138232
0. 060586
0. 043229
0. 021734
0. 039320
0. 444094
0. 381276
0. 361304
0.289941
0.137757
0.125236
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0. 954627
0. 957583
0. 944076
0. 955202
0. 959754
0. 961500
0. 961386
0. 962237
0.043804
0.038390
0.065781
0.042725
0. 034626
0.03 1734
0.031920
0.030549
Lerwi ck
3
4
5
6
7
8
Poole
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Shoreham
I
2
3
4
5
6
0. 844092
0.848791
0.854771
0.852281
0.852291
0.854444
0.93267 1
0. 9 15690
0. 919214
0. 928979
0. 929094
0. 932295
0. 925463
0. 928369
0.908257
0. 908412
0. 907099
0. 899892
0. 903307
0. 902943
0. 4107 16
0.391922
0.368010
0. 377960
0. 377920
0.3693 16
0.093920
0. 143285
0. 132375
0. 103933
0. 103617
0. 094922
0. 113857
0. 105629
0. 167333
0. 166820
0. 171196
0. 195906
0. 184062
0. 185311
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Table A4.4-3 (Continued)
Scale Elasticity and Inefficiency
(based on half—normal assumption)
Ports Years	 Scale	 Scale
Elasticity	 Inefficiency
Shoreham
7
	 0.924911	 0.115448
8	 0.908765	 0.165648
Harwich Dock
3
4
5
6
7
Rams gate
3
4
5
6
7
8
1.08003
1.10151
1.09647
1 .12512
1.13852
0. 886430
0. 882331
0. 885131
0. 858810
0. 867936
0. 866184
0. 130063
0. 200841
0. 183282
0.288668
0. 341286
0. 244686
0. 260103
0.249546
0.351902
0.315768
0. 322669
Notes: The values of scale elesticity are the ones on the deterministic kernel of the stochastic
production frontier.
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Dover
Fel ixstowe
0.914275
0.911196
0. 908864
0. 910790
0. 907888
0. 903449
0.904428
0.905000
0. 28272
0. 29994
0.31310
0. 30223
0. 3 1863
0.34396
0. 33835
0.33508
Forth
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Table A4.4-4
Scale Elasticity and Inefficiency of British Ports
(based on exponential assumption)
Ports	 Years	 Scale	 Scale
Elasticity Inefficiency
ABP
I
2
5
6
7
Bristol
3
4
5
6
7
8
Clyde
0.9 14258
0.915569
0.916182
0. 913065
0. 908668
0. 917559
0.921291
0.9 19058
0. 921054
0. 918783
0.919851
0. 28282
0.27555
0. 27216
0. 28946
0 .3 1421
0. 26459
0. 24431
0. 25640
0. 24559
0. 25789
0. 25209
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0. 936269
0. 936996
0. 941264
0. 947952
0. 949752
0. 9495 15
0.951709
0. 945112
0.16778
0.16430
0. 14444
0. 11529
0. 10789
0.10885
0. 10008
0.12735
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0. 9307 19
0. 926555
0.914173
0. 917991
0. 919413
0.919593
0. 9143 19
0. 916448
0. 19510
0. 2 1644
0.28329
0. 26222
0. 25446
0. 25349
0. 28248
0. 27069
0. 920457
0.921985
0. 921779
0. 927 139
0.928163
0.929075
0. 929595
0. 24883
0.24059
0.24 169
0.21341
0. 208 12
0. 20344
0. 20079
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Manchester
Medway
0. 924267
0. 925283
0. 922927
0. 919799
0. 918659
0. 906907
0. 889116
0. 888527
0. 22844
0. 22309
0.23555
0. 25237
0. 25857
0. 32421
0. 42648
0. 42987
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Table A4.4-4 (Continued)
Scale Elasticity and Inefficiency
(based on exponential assumption)
Ports Years
	
Scale	 Scale
Elasticity inefficiency
London
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.927660
0.928662
0.928898
0.930007
0.924765
0.923392
0.922923
0.924554
0.21072
0.20556
0. 20435
0.19870
0. 22582
0. 23308
0. 23558
0. 22692
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0. 945384
0. 946343
0. 942784
0. 939579
0.940936
0. 938810
0. 934457
0. 927030
0. 12618
0. 12207
0.13759
0.15217
0.14593
0.15575
0.17654
0.21397
Mersey
3
4
5
6
7
8
Milford Haven
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Tees & Hart lepool
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0.920 164
0.9225 11
0. 923943
0. 923521
0. 924641
0. 926186
0.901498
0. 903405
0. 906799
0. 912614
0.9 19623
0. 921753
0. 941394
0. 935 808
0. 925118
0.927567
0. 928264
0. 936434
0. 935816
0. 933920
0. 928751
0.25039
0. 23777
0.23016
0. 23239
0. 22647
0.2 1836
0.355 15
0. 34420
0. 32483
0.29199
0. 25332
0. 24183
0. 14385
0. 16999
0. 22396
0.21119
0. 20760
0.16699
0. 16995
0. 17918
0. 205 10
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Table A4.4-4 (Continued)
Scale Elasticity and Inefficiency
(based on exponential assumption)
Ports Years
	 Scale	 Scale
Elasticity	 Inefficiency
Tees & Hart lepool
8
Tyne
3
4
5
6
7
8
Aberdeen
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ardrossan
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Blyth
3
4
5
6
7
8
Boston
3
4
5
6
8
BWB
3
4
5
6
7
Cromarty Firth
3
4
5
6
7
0.921745
0.925744
0.932431
0.933961
0.934726
0.934946
0.932042
0.925022
0.925737
0.920119
0.925131
0.925883
0.928898
0.929802
0. 952549
0. 954606
0. 953464
0. 957952
0.957579
0. 958764
0.958066
0.954112
0. 941746
0.946943
0.946788
0.945002
0. 938855
0. 938786
0.957984
0.963853
0.966063
0.966497
0.950993
0.921966
0.924 105
0.906962
0. 896606
0. 897584
0. 912748
0.918803
0.914309
0.916960
0. 920059
0. 24188
0. 22068
0. 18653
0.17897
0. 17523
0. 17417
0.18846
0.22446
0.2207 1
0.25064
0.22389
0.21994
0. 20435
0.19974
0. 09680
0.08896
0.09328
0. 07683
0.07814
0. 07400
0. 07643
0. 09082
0. 14225
0. 11952
0. 12017
0. 12783
0.15554
0. 15586
0.07672
0. 05737
0. 05074
0. 04948
0. 10291
0. 24069
0. 22930
0. 32390
0.38331
0. 37767
0. 29124
0. 25778
0. 28254
0. 26788
0. 25096
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Table A4.4-4 (Continued)
Scale Elasticity and Inefficiency
(based on exponential assumption)
Ports	 Years	 Scale	 Scale
Elasticity Inefficiency
Cromarty Flrth
8
Dundee Firth
I
2
5
6
7
8
Great Yarmouth
3
4
7
8
Harwich Harbour
3
4
5
6
7
S
Ipswich
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Lerwick
3
4
5
6
7
8
Poole
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Shoreham
1
2
3
4
0.923044
0.942443
0.940000
0.938130
0.936935
0.929981
0. 932286
0.94662 1
0.95 1043
0.958088
0. 952268
0. 889369
0. 897549
0. 900167
0. 909973
0. 932703
0. 934789
0. 952767
0. 954275
0. 947273
0. 953024
0. 955398
0. 956300
0.956213
0. 956495
0. 894070
0. 896442
0. 899586
0. 898267
0. 898283
0. 899448
0. 940478
0. 93 1736
0. 933540
0. 938610
0. 938632
0. 940326
0. 937022
0. 938527
0. 926956
0. 927018
0.926303
0. 922624
0. 23493
0. 13911
0.15022
0 15893
0.16460
0.19883
0.18725
0.12088
0.10271
0. 07636
0.09789
0. 42502
0. 37788
0. 36280
0. 30683
0. 18517
0.17493
0. 09595
0.0902 1
0.11813
0. 09496
0.08602
0.08273
0. 08304
0.08202
0. 39794
0.38426
0.36614
0. 37374
0 .37364
0.36693
0.14803
0.18999
0. 18104
0.15668
0. 15658
0.14872
0.16418
0. 15707
0.21436
0.21404
0.21776
0.237 17
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Table A4.4-4 (Continued)
Scale Elasticity and Inefficiency
(based on exponential assumption)
Scale	 Scale
Elasticity Inefficiency
Ports Years
Harwich Harbour
3
4
5
6
7
Rams gate
3
4
5
7
8
1.01617
1. 02727
1.02452
1.03947
1.04638
0.9 15945
0. 913874
0.902034
0.906907
0.906030
0. 01175
0. 03306
0. 02682
0.06803
0. 09269
0. 27347
0. 28496
0. 35207
0.32421
0.32920
Notes: The values of scale elasticity are the ones on the deterministic kernel of the stochastic
production frontier.
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Appendix 4.5
Parametric Efficiency Estimates: Panel Data Analysis
Table A4.5-1
Parametric Estimates of Purely Productive Inefficiency
Ports	 Purely Productive Inefflciency[1]
N Cross_sectional w
 Data[2J	 Panel Data
ABP	 0.885	 0.988
Bristol	 0.683	 0.547
Clyde	 0.796	 0.631
Dover	 0.872	 0.866
Felixstowe	 0.813	 0.733
Forth	 0.870	 0.808
London	 0.850	 0.800
Manchester	 0.695	 0.582
Medway	 0.810	 0.672
Mersey	 0.797	 0.697
Milford Haven	 0.802	 0.652
Tees & Hartlepool	 0.866	 0.801
Tyne	 0.823	 0.682
Aberdeen	 0.909	 0.889
Ardrossan	 0.639	 0.407
Blyth	 0.752	 0.565
Boston	 0.777	 0.551
BWB	 0.386	 0.287
Cromarty Firth	 0.641	 0.444
Dundee Firth	 0.836	 0.644
Great Yarmouth	 0.936	 0.940
Harwich Harbour	 0.915	 0.990
Ipswlch	 0.748	 0.575
Lerwick	 0.807	 0.723
Poole	 0.752	 0.554
Shoreham	 0.739	 0.530
Harwich Dock	 0.841	 0.845
Ramsgate	 0.812	 0.682
Notes:
[1] Both ML estimators assume half-normal distribution for inefficiency
[2J Time averages for each port.
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Chapter 5
Productive Efficiency of British Ports
Relative to a Dynamic Frontier
The deviation of port production from the frontier, whether deterministic or
stochastic, is hypothesized as either X—inefficiency or technical inefficiency or both.
While X—inefficiency is due to motivational deficiencies at both management and
worker level, technical inefficiency need not involve any avoidable mistakes in the
short run. It may be perfectly rational for a port to stay where it is, since
scrapping of existing terminal facilities and equipment would be a wrong decision
before the end of their economic lives. However, failures to move from old
"vintage" technology to the best—practice technology in the long run may well
indicate that the port is not conducive to technological development. With the
elapse of time it is also possible for ports to eliminate X—inefficiency. They
become more and more efficient at producing even with the existing vintage
because of an improvement in internal organisation, or the abolition of restrictive
practices, or better trained dock workers and so on. Moreover, in the long run not
only does the average technology move towards the best—practice technology, but
the best—practice itself moves as well. Efficiency gains over time are thus
compounded by the movement towards the frontier by eliminating technical and
X—inefficiency, and the shift of the frontier because of technical progress on the
frontier. In the previous two chapters we assumed that the production frontier
against which port performance is evaluated is fixed. This chapter allows a shift of
the production frontier over time and investigates the dynamic dimension of
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productive performance or progressiveness of British ports.
The pioneering work on measuring dynamic efficiency by invoking an explicit
specification of a production function is that of Solow (1957). He demonstrated that
the rate of productivity growth could be identified with the rate of technical
change, assuming constant returns to scale and competitive markets. From the
perspective of frontier function theory, the production function used by Solow
represents the average rather than the frontier technology and he implicitly assumed
that there is no static inefficiency. Efficiency gains over time are thus solely due
to technological advance. Since in this study productive performance is evaluated in
the framework of frontier theory, Solow's methodology is unattractive. However,
one can redevelop Solow's measure of productivity growth in Farrell's framework.
It can be shown that, by substituting the frontier function for the average function,
the growth rate of total factor productivity can be more meaningfully interpreted as
the rate of technical progress on the frontier (the shift of the frontier function)
and the rate of efficiency improvement (the movement towards the shifting
frontier).
The theoretical basis of total factor productivity growth measurement in terms
of a stochastic frontier function is provided in section 5.1. The dynamic efficiency
of British ports is modelled by a dynamic translog production frontier in section
5.2. The construction developed is then applied to the data set of British ports for
I 983-1990.
It is found that the structure of the best-practice technology of the British
port industry appears to have remained unchanged over this period, and that total
factor productivity change came predominantly from efficiency improvement or
deterioration.
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5.1 Total Factor Productivity and the Frontier Function
Solow (1957) translated the movement in output into the movements in the inputs
and the technical progress. The term "(neutral) technical progress" is used as a
shorthand for the shift of production function over time representing the change in
output that cannot be attributed to the change in inputs, which is synonymous with
the growth rate of total factor productivity (oTFP).
While Solow's ÔTFP is derived from an aggregate production function for a
sector or an economy, his methodology certainly applies to, and in fact is more
relevant to, a micro decision-making unit. This is because the production function
originally refers to a micro unit whereas the existence of aggregate production
functions has been widely questioned. To establish Solow's measure at firm level,
suppose that a number of firms in an industry share a commonly micro production
33function that changes over time because of technical advance. Thus in the
dynamic framework output is a function of time t as well as the usage of inputs:
(5.1-1)	 Yit	 f(X1,t,X21t,t)
where subscript i denotes production units and t denotes time periods.
Following Solow, differentiating Eq(5.1-l) totally with respect to t and dividing
it by
	 one obtains
1 dY1t
(5.1-2) --
'1it dt
+
This is equivalent to
Xi,	 df	 dXi	 1
dX i 1 	 dt Xi,
X2 1t df	 dX2jt I	 df
+---
Y -t dX2 jt dt X21t	 '' it dt
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dInY ,t 	 dlnXi1t	 dlnX2jt	 dlnf
(5.1-3)	
- flit
	
^
dt	 dt
	
dt	 dt
where +ljt and $j are the elasticities of output with respect to labour and capital
for production unit i in time period t respectively. In other words, the change in
output over time can be segregated into the change in inputs and technical
progress. The shift in the production function is Hicks-neutral if dlnf/dt is
independent of Xi and X2 1, namely shifts in the production function leave
marginal rates of substitution untouched but simply increase or decrease the output
attainable from given inputs. It should be noted that neutrality is only a special
case rather than a necessary assumption of Solow's result.
Replacing time series of dlnY1 t/dt,
 dlnX i i t/dt, dlnX 2 j t/dt , dlnf/dt by their
discrete year-to-year analogues, we get
(5.1-4)	 öYj -
	
+ 'kit ô > 2 it +
where 6Yj =i1nYIEit, .5X1	 1nX iMt and so on. Since
(5.1-5)	 6Y	
- MnY 1t/ t	 ln'i',-InY,1 - ln(Yjt/Yjt....1)
6 signifies relative change in terms of the exponential rate of growth in the value
of a variable and	 signifies absolute change which is the difference in the value
of a variable from the previous period to the current period.
Turning Eq(5.1-4) around gives
(5.1-6)	 ôYJt -
	 - !kit6X2it -
If inputs are weighted by their output elasticities, the LHS of Eq(5.1 -6) is
the growth rate of total factor productivity oTFPjt and it is equivalent to the rate
of technical progress, i.e.
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(5.1-7)	 ÔTFP1L - ofu
Solow's work was published in the same year as Farrell's when the idea of
frontier functions was largely unknown. From the point of view of the frontier
theory, a crucial assumption implicit in Solow's work as in the classical framework
of economics is that firms never deviate from the efficiency frontier of the
industry. It then follows that efficiency gains over time are brought about only by
the shift of the frontier. An interesting question is what ÔTFP11 will look like if
we start from a stochastic frontier production function instead of a deterministic
average production function expressed in Eq(5.1-1) and carry out similar reasoning
as in the Solow's work. Assume that the observed output Y can deviate from a
stochastic frontier with inefficiency and that the error structure is multiplicative so
that
(5.1-8)	 Y1 - F(Xljt,X2jt,t)EXP(Vft-Ujt)
where the one-sided error term UuO represents inefficiency and the symmetrical
term V represents statistical noise. Note that U11 and V11 differ with i and t in
general. The cross-section variation of U11 represents inter-firm efficiency in period
1 and the time-series variation of U 11 represents inter-period efficiency for firm i.
Differentiating Eq(5.1 -8) totally with respect to t and dividing by Y11 we get
dlnY 1 t 	 dlnXi11	 d1nX211
(5.1-9)	
- Iit	 + kit
dt	 dt	 dt
dlnF	 dVjt	 dUjt
+	 +
dt	 dt	 dt
or
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dInY t	 dlnXl1t	 dlnX2it(5.1-10)	
- flit________ -
	 ________
dt	 dt	 dt
dlnF	 dV1t dUjt
+--
dt	 dt	 dt
which is similar to Eq(5.1-3). But note that 4'ij:=(X it/F)(dF/dX iit) and
kit=(X2itfF)(dF/dX2it) are output elasticities with respect to labour and capital on
the deterministic kernel of the stochastic frontier. They are characteristics of the
frontier rather than the average technology in the industry.
Replacing the time series by their year-to-year analogues yields
(5.1-11) oY j t -	 - *kit> 2 1t - ô F jt +	 -
i.e.
(5.1-12) ôTFP 1
 - ô F jt +	 -
where SF11
 is the rate of technical progress on the frontier, LWu is the rate of
absolute change in exogenous influences, and Uu is the rate of absolute change in
efficiency. zUu > 0 indicates deterioration in efficiency and iU	 < 0
improvement in efficiency for firm i from i-I to t.
Excluding exogenous influences beyond the control of producers, the growth
rate of total factor productivity is given by
(5.1-13) b TFP It -	 -
In contrast to Eq(5.1-7), total factor productivity growth is translated into the rate
of technical progress on the frontier and the rate of efficiency improvement
-i1U. By Eq(5.1-13) one can characterise the following four possible situations of
progressiveness in an industry:
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(1) a progressive frontier technology co-existent with improvement in efficiency;
(2) a progressive frontier technology co-existent with deterioration in inefficiency;
(3) a static frontier technology co-existent with improvement in efficiency;
(4) a static frontier technology co-existent with deterioration in efficiency.
The progressiveness of the frontier technology may be correlated with the change
in efficiency. A highly progressive frontier technology in an industry may lead to
deterioration in efficiency of average firms. But there are other driving forces
behind efficiency change, such as the demise of restrictive practices, changes in
labour-management relationship, improvements in training of labour, etc. Thus the
dynamic efficiency of the industry can exhibit any one of these patterns. 6TFP is
more meaningful in Eq(5.1-13) than in Eq(5.1-7). Efficiency gains over time
depend not only upon expanding production possibilities because of advances in the
best-practice technology, but also the extent to which firms succeed in realismg the
expanded possibility. Actually Solow's TFPt is only a special case of Eq(5.1-13)
when firms always operate on the frontier, i.e. U = 0. This assumption is of
course rejected in the frontier theory. A more likely situation when Eq(5.1 -13)
reduces to Eq(5.1 -7) is that efficiency is invariant with time, i.e.
	 = 0. The
firm's pace of technical progress is just equal to the pace of technical progress on
the frontier.
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5.2 The Dynamic Frontier Model
As seen in the last chapter the data set has rejected the Cobb—Douglas model in
favour of the translog model. To model dynamic efficiency in the industry we
again assume that the frontier technology is translog. The model is flexible so that
each point of interest has to be separately evaluated. In particular, elasticity of
scale and elasticities of output with respect to labour and capital vary with the
level of production and factor proportions. To characterise technical progress, the
time variable is introduced into parameters of the frontier production function, thus
allowing that the frontier technologies not only vary with factor proportions and the
level of production but also change with time. Moreover the translog form of
technical progress is not necessarily Hicks neutral, enabling us to study the
neutrality of technical progress.
For a two—input case a dynamic translog production frontier model may take
the form
(5.2-1)	 lnY 1 - lrry0+p0t+(a1+p1t)lnX1+(131+p2t)lnX2i
+a 2 ( lnX it) +13 2 ( lnX2 t) +y1lnX1tlnX2It
+vit-Uit
where
lrry0+p0t+(&1+p1t)lnXi It+(1+p2t)lnX21t
4 2( lh lt)	 + 2 ( lflX2 Jt)	 YiIitl1(2it
is the logarithm of the deterministic kernel of the stochastic frontier production
function in Eq(5.1-8). The dynamic frontier model is different from the static
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frontier model (4.3-5) by specifying a time trend in the constant and in the
parameters of lnXi	 and lnX2j . Unlike the static model, the dynamic model
consists of a series of production frontiers corresponding to each time period.
Differentiating the deterministic kernel frontier production function in
logarithmic form with respect to t gives the rate of technical progress on the
frontier
dl nF
(5.2-2)	 oF1t	 - P0+PllflXlft+p2lflX2,t
dt
which varies with the level of production and factor proportions.
The marginal product of labour and capital are found by differentiating
Eq(5.2-1) with respect to Xi and X211
(5.2-3)	 MPL - (Y,t/X1It)(cr1+p1t+2c2lnX1ft-Fy1lnX2ft)
and
(5.2-4)	 MPC= (YJ/X2I)(f31+p2t+2f321nX2It-f1f1lnX1ft)
hence in a competitive market
P1	 X21t c1+p1t+2c2lnX1t+y1lnX21t
(5.2-5)	
- - {	 )
P	 X1t f31+p2t+2f32lnX2J+y1lnX11
where P1 and 
"c are factor prices for Xi and X2. Recall that Hicks neutrality is
associated with that kind of technical progress which leaves factor ratios unchanged
if factor prices remain constant. Thus the translog technology is Hicks neutral if
the term in the curly brackets of Eq(5.2-5) is constant. This is the case when
p 1 =O and p 2 0, and under constant returns to scale (CRTS), i.e.
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- 1, 2o 2 
- 
-y1 and 2 2 
- -1i
Thus
P1	 X21t	 l-131-i-yiIn(X21t/Xljt)
(5.2-6)	 - -
	 (	 )
1'	 Xi1	 i-'y11n(X2J/X1J)
which yields constant X21t/X11t when 11k is constant. Hence the CRTS translog
technology has Hicks neutral technological progress provided that the parameters for
lnXi and lnX2jf remain constant over time. The rate of Hicks neutral
technological change is given by p0
From Eq(5.2-3) and Eq(5.2-4) we have output elasticities of labour and
capital, i.e.
(5.2-7)	 flit -a1+p1t+2&21nXi1+y1lnX21
and
(5.2-8)	 *cjt - f31+p2t+2f321nX21-I--y1lnX11
respectively. Both vary with time as well as with the level of production and factor
proportions. With no change in Xi and X2jt the process of technical progress is
labour saving (or capital saving) if p 1 <O (or p2<O)
The returns to scale properties are given by the scale elasticity function,
(5.2-9) 's - (cxl+plt)+(l+p2t)+(2a2+-y1)lnX1I+(2132^y1)IflX2I
which varies with time as well as with the level of production and factor
proportions.
In order to calculate oTFP 1
 in Eq(5.l-13) for each observation, two time
series are needed: 5F11 and	 efficiency improvement. ö Fjt can be given by
Eq(5.2-2). A better estimate of this may be obtained by averaging the current
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period's value and the previous period's value. Thus
(5.2-10)	 ÔFIL - (2p0+p1lnX1t_1InXlt+p2lnX2t_1X2t)/2
Let U_ 1 and U denote the inefficiency level (the shortfall of output below
the stochastic frontier in percentage) for port i in period i-I and t. The rate of
efficiency change for the port in period t is given by the difference from period
t-1, i.e.
(5.2-11)	 U1t -	 -
Recall that Uu>0 implies a deterioration in efficiency and U,t<0 an
improvement in efficiency.
The growth rate of total factor productivity ÔTFPIt for port i in period t is
compounded from the rate of technical progress on the frontier 6F and the rate
of efficiency improvement 	 namely
(5.2-12)	 ôTFPt -	 -
(2p 0 -i-p 1 1n(X 1	 1Xi	 2 ln(X2 it 1 X2	 )/2
+ Uit_1-Uit
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5.3 Estimates of Dynamic Efficiency
The ML as well as the OLS estimates of the dynamic translog frontier function
from the cross-sectional and time-series data of inputs and output for 28 British
ports during the period 1983-1990 are set out in Table 5.3-1. Again both
half-normal and exponential distributions were specified for the inefficiency term.
Table 5.3-1 The Dynamic Translog Frontier of British Ports 1983-1990
Estimator	 OLS
Error
Specification
R2	 0.957
0.955
Residual-squared	 12.340
Log-likelihood	 -10.340
Constant	 -2.594
(1.162)
Trend	 0.051
(0.075)
IogXi	 0.640
(0.180)
Trend	 0.006
(0.018)
logX2	 1.040
(0.264)
Trend	 -0.009
2	 (0.019)
(logXi)	 0.115
2	 (0.021)
(logX2)	 0.043
(0.019)
logXllogX2	 -0.195
(0.048)
a.
0
ML
Half-Normal	 Exponential
-6.177	 0.276
	
0.080	 0.419
(1.133)	 (1.015)
	0.03 	 0.025
(0.075)	 (0.067)
	
0.538	 0.631
(0.173)	 (0.159)
	
0.007	 0.004
(0.015)	 (0.013)
	
0.641	 0.441
(0.251)	 (0.247)
-0.008	 -0.005
(0.016)	 (0.014)
	
0.091	 0.081
(0.019)	 (0.018)
	
0.046	 0.054
(0.017)	 (0.016)
-0.149	 -0.141
(0.043)	 (0.028)
	
1.918	 -
(0.585)	 -
0.361	 -
(0.029)	 -
-	 5.540
-	 (n '7R\
-
-	 (0.018)
Note: Standard errors of the estimator are in the parentheses below the parameter estimates.
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The structural change of the production frontier is indicated by the estimated
trends. The positive estimate of p 0 implies the shifts in the production frontier.
Since the estimate is positive for p 1 and negative for p 2 , the kernel output
elasticity of labour increased and the kernel output elasticity of capital decreased
over time. The observed technical change can in this sense be characterised as
capital saving. However, the time trends are weak in all cases. For an average
port, the characteristics of technical progress on the frontier are presented in Table
5.3-2. The output elasticity with respect to labour is about 2.5 times as high as
with respect to capital. The frontier technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
Although the scale elasticity declined gradually and there were changes in the
output elasticity in the direction of capital saving, the structure was fairly stable
throughout the whole period. As far as the average port is concerned, the rate of
technical progress on the frontier is 1.5% per year, which is rather low.
Table 5.3-2 The Best-Practice Technology of British Ports 1983-1990
Year	 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Output Elasticities
Labour	 0.613 0.620 0.627 0.634 0.641 0.648 0.655 0.662
Capital	 0.275 0.265 0.259 0.251 0.243 0.235 0.227 0.219
Scale Elasticity
0.888 0.887 0.886 0.885 0.884 0.883 0.882 0.881
Rate of Technical Progress on the Frontier
1.5%
Note: These figures refer to technical characteristics of an average port (an arbitary observation
with arithmetic average value of inputs and output in the industry.
Cutting the estimated dynamic frontier production function with a vertical
plane through the origin along the average factor ray (a ray corresponding to the
Output Y (mOO,000)
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where (X, 0 .X2 0 ) Is average usage of Inputs In the Industry.
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average factor ratio), one obtains the series of production frontiers corresponding to
each year during 1983-1990. The graph also gives the impression that the shifts in
production frontier are not pronounced during this period.
Fig 5.3-1 Shifts of the Production Frontier in the British Port Industry 1983-90
Note: The stochastic frontier model is based on exponential assumption.
A joint significance test of the trend parameters in the dynamic translog
model Eq(5.2-1) was performed. If p 0=p 1 p 2=0, then the dynamic (unrestrictive)
frontier model reduces to the static (restrictive) frontier model Eq(4.3-5) used in
chapter 4. The joint significance test is thus equivalent to the test of the adequacy
of the restrictions. For the half-normal distribution, the maximised value of
log-likelihood is increased from -8.064 for the static model to -6.177 for the
dynamic model. For the exponential distribution, the maximised value of
log-likelihood is increased from -1.758 to 0.276 accordingly. The value of the
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generalised likelihood-ratio is 3.8 in the half-normal case and 3.0 in the
exponential case. From the chi-square table with 3 degree of freedom we find that
the 5% point is 7.81. Thus we reject the joint significance of the trends. We also
reject the hypothesis that the static model is not an appropriate representation of
the production frontier for the whole period. Being consistent with this, none of
the ML parameter estimates of time trends are significantly different from zero.
However, all other estimated parameters in the dynamic model are highly
significant.
The testing procedure conducted above could be questioned. Since the data set
contains a large number of cross-sectional units but only a few periods,
cross-sectional variation could overweight time-series variation so that the time
trend is concealed. A testing procedure against this suspicion is not available. In
order to detect any disguised shift in the production frontier, we flit the static
model Eq(4.3-5) for 1983-1984, 1985-1986, 1987-1988, and 1989-1990. If there
were any significant time trend, the parameter estimates would be likely to vary
consistently from year to year. The results were messy. No consistent shifts in the
production frontier were found. Moreover, in these smaller samples the problem of
multicollinearity comes back, which makes the parameter estimates imprecise. Table
5.3-2 shows the parameter estimates of the production frontiers for 1983-1986,
1987-1990, and 1983-1990. There do not seem to have been significant changes in
the structure, although we cannot make this judgement on certain significance level
without a proper sample test.
Table 5.3-3 The Production Frontiers 1985-1990
	
Constant LogXi	 LogX2	 LogXi 2
 LogX2 2 LogXlLogX2
	1983-1986	 0.42	 0.72	 0.32	 0.06	 0.07	 -0.15
	
(2.04)	 (0.33)	 (0.15)	 (0.03)	 (0.04)	 (0.05)
	
1987-1990	 0.73	 0.62	 0.40	 0.10	 0.05	 -0.15
	
(1.39)	 (0.24)	 (0.31)	 (0.03)	 (0.03)	 (0.06)
	
1983-1990	 0.62	 0.69	 0.37	 0.08	 0.06	 -0.14
	
(1.01 ) (0.18)	 (0.26)	 (0.02)	 (0.02)	 (0.04)
Note: The one-sided term is assumed to be exponential.
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Estimated productive inefficiencies (purely productive inefficiencies) for each
port against each year's frontier in the exponential case are plotted against the
ports over time in Fig 5.3-2. The picture is very similar to time plot of estimated
efficiencies derived from the static model (not shown). In fact the efficiency
estimates derived from both models are close. Both suggest that average British
ports are about 25% inefficient under the half-normal distributional assumption and
18% inefficient under the exponential distributional assumption.
Fig 5.3-2 Pure Productive Efficiency of British Ports
Relative to a Dynamic Frontier (exponential) 1983-90
The rate of technical progress on the frontier which can possibly be achieved
given factor proportions and the level of production for individual ports were
computed in accordance with Eq(5.2-10). The results are presented in Table
A5.3-1 of Appendix 5.3 to this chapter and plotted against ports and years in Fig
5.3-3. What can be seen is a picture of a close-to-zero rate of technical progress
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on the frontier over time regardless of port size. The picture is consistent with the
results described above.
Given the estimates for inefficiency one can easily work out the rate of
change in efficiency for individual ports in accordance with Eq(5.2-11). The results
are presented in Table A5.3-1 and plotted in Fig 5.3-4. In contrast to the rate of
technical progress on the frontier, the rate of efficiency change is fairly dynamic.
The latter indicates frequent efficiency improvement or deterioration from port to
port and from time to thne. Since firms tend to raise technical efficiency over
time, these moves towards and off the production frontier are likely to reflect the
instability of X-efficiency over time.
Given Uu and ôFt, the estimates of 5TFP for individual ports can now be
computed in accordance with Eq(5.2-12). The results are also given in Table
A5.3-1 and plotted in Fig 5.3-5. Given that the rate of technical progress on the
frontier is low and stable, the growth rate of total factor productivity mainly
mirrors the rate of efficiency improvement, implying that efficiency gains over time
for British ports during this period were brought about mainly by the movement
towards the frontier rather than by a shift of the frontier.
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Fig 5.3-4 Efficiency Improvement of British Ports 1983-90
Note: The inefficiency component is assumed to be exponential
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Fig 5.3-5 Total Factor Productivity Growth of British Ports 1983-90
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Appendix 5.3 Estimates of Dynamic Efficiency
Table A5.3-1
Efficiency Improvement, Technical Progress and Total Factor Productivity
Port
	
Year
	
Technical
	
Efficiency	 Total Factor
Progress
	
Deterioration Productivity
EU
	
Growth bTFP
ABP
1.00000
1.00000
1.00000
1.00000
Bristol
2.00000
	
4
	
2. 00000
	
5
	
2. 00000
	
6
	2.00000
	
7
	
2. 00000
	
8
Clyde
	
3.00000
	
2
	
3.00000
	
3
	
.00000
	
4
	
3.00000
	
5
	
3.00000
	
6
3.00000
	
7
	
3.00000
	
8
Dover
	
4.00000
	
2
	
4.00000
	
3
	
4.00000
	
4
	
4.00000
	
5
	
4.00000
	
6
	
4.00000
	
7
	
4.00000
	
8
Fel ixst owe
	
5.00000
	
2
5.00000
	
3
	
5.00000
	
4
	
5.00000
	
5
	
5.00000
	
6
	
5.00000
	
7
	
5.00000
	
8
Forth
	
6.00000
	
2
6.00000
	
3
	
6.00000
	
4
	
6. 00000
	
5
	6.00000
	
6
	
6. 00000
	
7
0. 180046E-01
0. 181048E-01
0. 173952E-01
0. 158135E-01
0. 144262E-01
0. 145297E-01
0. 145371E-01
0. 143908E-01
0. 138586E-01
0. 186992E-01
0. 190343E-01
0. 205800E-01
0. 218198E-01
0.218580E-01
0. 218950E-01
0. 207386E-01
0. 118114E-01
0.110073E-01
0. 109960E-01
0. 109570E-01
0.982667E-02
0. 920589E-02
0. 939349E-02
0. 188267E-01
0. 164848E-01
0. 154454E-0l
0. 163890E-01
0. 167511E-01
0. 161671E-01
0. 156862E-01
0. 145532E-01
0. 146325E-0l
0. 153738E-01
0. 162509E-01
0. 163650E-01
0. 164129E-01
0. 859837E-01
-0. 123359
-0. 144778E-01
-0.2133 16E-01
-0.68340 1E-Ol
0.263633E-01
-0.317514E-03
0. 485657E-01
-0. 112610E-01
0. 360353E-02
0.569320E-02
0.701115E-03
0. 144580E-02
0. 278455E-01
-0. 280502E-02
-0. 875861E-01
0. 127314E-01
0. 5642 85E-02
-0. 238244E-01
0. 241378E-01
0. 412858E-01
-0.793121E-01
-0. 660188E-02
0. 216228E-01
0.676919E-01
-0. 130973E-01
-0. 731934E-01
-0. 148293E-01
0. 354271E-01
0. 214626E-01
-0. 340533E-01
-0.697 260E-02
0.710882E-02
0. 522820E-01
-0 .286714E-01
-0. 358206E-01
-0. 679790E-01
0.141464
0.318730E-01
0. 37 145 1E-Ol
0. 827663E-0 1
-0. 118336E-01
0. 148546E-01
-0. 341749E-01
0.251196E-01
0. 150957E-01
0. 133411E-01
0. 198788E-Ot
0. 203740E-01
-0.598752E-02
0 .247000E-01
0. 108325
-0.920005 E-03
O . 536450E-02
0. 348204E-01
-0. 131809E-01
-0. 314592E-01
0.885180E-01
0. 159954E-01
-0.2796 12E-02
-0. 512071E-01
0. 285426E-01
0. 895824E-01
0.315804E-01
-0. 192599E-01
-0. 577643E-02
0.486065E-01
0.216051E-01
0.8264 99E-02
-0.360311E-01
0. 450364E-01
0. 522335E-01
0. 208725E-01
0. 150675E-01
-0. 423707E-01
-0. 193680E-01
0.495 049E-02
0. 269992E-01
-0. 140339E-01
0. 250039E-01
0. 817287E-01
-0.117777
0.12265 IE-02
0. 845732E-01
0. 138596
-0. 896882E-01
-0. 389630E-01
0. 149758E-01
0. 687238E-01
-0.1067 1OE-02
-0. 719690E-02
0 . 280777E-02
-0. 390667E-01
-0.49445 2E-02
0.27623 9E-02
-0. 174219E-01
0. 407489E-01
-0. 539935E-01
-0.3611 19E-01
-0.105631
-0. 173443E-01
0. 772209E-02
-0. 317802E-01
-0.264528 E-02
0.102044
0. 160665E-01
-0. 114239E-01
-0. 858904E-02
0. 339611E-01
0. 221844E-01
-0. 449986E-01
-0. 124222E-01
-0.643698E-03
0.52665 4E-02
0.628510E-01
0.389379E-01
0. 133105E-01
-0.90673 4E-02
0. 320243E-0l
-0. 838064E-02
-0. 654673E-01
0. 132909
0. 129575E-01
-0. 726074E-01
-0.13 1642
0.931673E-01
0. 607572E-01
0.6493 28E-02
-0. 483329E-01
0 .212484E-01
0 .274201E-01
0. 165901E-01
0 .566108E-01
0. 220539E-01
0.14801 1E-Ol
0. 350039E-01
-0.232397E-01
0.717628E-01
0 .383866E-01
0. 108694
0.218691E-01
-0. 913344E-03
0.401586E-01
0. 154623E-01
-0. 857427E-01
0.74 1484E-03
0.286168E-01
0. 2717 13E-01
-0. 140930E-01
-0.26565 8E-02
0 .632572E-01
0.284117E-01
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Table A5.3-1 (Continued)
Efficiency Improvement, Technical Progress and Total Factor Productivity
Efficiency	 Total Factor
Deterioration	 Productivity
Growth ÔTFP
Port	 Year	 Technical
Progress
London
	
7.00000	 2	 0.202288E-01
	
7.00000	 3	 0.203341E-01
	
7.00000	 4	 0.204803E-01
	
7.00000	 5	 O.195699E-01
	
7.00000	 6	 0.182610E-01
	
7.00000	 7	 0.179318E-01
	
7.00000	 8	 0.179904E-01
Manchester
8.00000	 2	 0.166233E-01
8.00000	 3	 0.162615E-01
8.00000	 4	 0.151323E-01
8.00000	 5	 0.141841E-01
8.00000	 6	 0.119658E-01
8.00000	 7	 0.695397E-02
8.00000	 8	 0.347917E-02
Medway
9.00000	 2	 0.217941E-01
9.00000	 3	 0.214691E-01
9.00000	 4	 0.203908E-01
9.00000	 5	 0.201812E-01
9.00000	 6	 0.202232E-01
9.00000	 7	 0.193979E-01
9.00000	 8	 0.175441E-01
Mersey
10.0000	 4	 0.171093E-01
10.0000	 5	 0.175635E-01
10.0000	 6	 0.175821E-01
10.0000	 7	 0.175092E-01
10.0000	 8	 O.177692E-01
Milford Haven
11.0000	 2	 0.227470E-02
11.0000	 3	 0.306321E-02
11.0000	 4	 0.452481E-02
11.0000	 5	 0.680875E-02
11.0000	 6	 0.837839E-02
11.0000	 7	 0.128170E-01
11.0000	 8	 0.163016E-01
Tees & Hart lepool
12.0000	 2	 0.168080E-01
12.0000	 3	 0.171929E-01
12.0000	 4	 0.185823E-01
12.0000	 5	 0.198681E-01
12.0000	 6	 0.195278E-01
12.0000	 7	 0.182585E-01
12.0000	 8	 0.159894E-01
Tyne
	
13.0000	 5	 0.167405E-01	 -0.995319E-02	 0.266937E-01
	
13.0000	 6	 0.171096E-01	 0.572661E-02	 0.113830E-01
	
13.0000	 7	 0.171692E-01	 0.606583E-02	 0.111034E-01
	
13.0000	 8	 0.164047E-01	 0.105053E-01	 0.589949E-02
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Table A5.3-1 (Continued)
Efficiency Improvement, Technical Progress and Total Factor Productivity
Efficiency	 Total Factor
Deterioration	 Productivity
Growth 6TFP
Port	 Year
Aberdeen
	
14.0000	 2
	
14.0000	 3
	
14.0000	 4
	
14.0000	 5
	
14.0000	 6
	
14.0000	 7
Ardrossan
	
15.0000	 2
	
15.0000	 3
	
15.0000	 4
	
15.0000	 5
	
15.0000	 6
	
15.0000	 7
	
15.0000	 8
B I yt h
	
16.0000	 4
	
16.0000	 5
	
16.0000	 6
	
16.0000	 7
	
16.0000	 8
Boston
17.0000	 4
17.0000	 5
17.0000	 6
17.0000	 8
BWB
18.0000	 4
18.0000	 5
18.0000	 6
18.0000	 7
Cromarty Firth
19.0000	 4
19.0000	 5
19.0000	 6
19.0000	 7
19.0000	 8
Dundee Firth
20.0000	 2
20.0000	 5
20.0000	 6
20.0000	 7
20.0000	 8
Great Yarmouth
21.0000	 4
21.0000	 7
210000	 8
Technical
Progress
0.1 18273E-01
0. 110761E-01
0.110062E-01
0. 118460E-01
0. 124388E-01
0. 132037E-01
0. 185123E-01
0. 187194E-01
0.192516E-01
0. 196674E-01
0. 196826E-01
0. 197331E-01
0. 187193E-01
0. 185195E-01
0. 192352E-01
0. 188680E-01
0. 173737E-01
0. 159170E-01
0.215150E-01
0.23 1879E-01
0. 236414E-01
0. 207065E-01
0. 172583E-01
0. 149614E-01
0. 106962E-01
0. 921047E-02
0.355447E-02
0.381407E-02
0 .358331E-02
0.47 1618E-02
0.577295E-02
0. 151290E-01
0. 142588E-01
0. 136816E-01
0. 125684E-01
0. 123333E-01
0.161637E-01
0. 183378E-01
0. 187349E-01
0. 868075E-03
0.1 17367E-01
0. 128193E-01
-0. 104829E-02
0. 176653E-02
0. 187393E-02
-0. 355024E-01
0 .282918E-01
0. 155084E-01
0.708759E-02
0. 483519E-01
-0. 168602E-01
-0. 473430E-01
0. 322170E-01
0.180527
0.8645 16E-01
-0.4457 19E-01
-0 .912310E-01
-0 . 279325E-01
0. 168008
-0. 923287E-01
0. 117955E-02
-0. 163474E-01
0. 802368E-01
o . 684558E-01
-0. 688878E-01
0. 162539E-01
0.228367
-0.257258
0. 462527E-01
0. 286204E-01
-0. 228053E-01
-0. 106683E-01
0. 185231E-01
0. 388083E-02
0. 330432E-01
0. 109592E-01
-0. 660578E-03
-0. 181306E-02
0. 128943E-01
0. 106723E-01
0.113298E-01
0. 540147E-01
-0.957240E-02
0. 374324E-02
0. 125798E-01
-0. 286693E-01
0. 365933E-01
0. 660623E-01
-0. 136974E-01
-0.161292
-0. 675835E-01
0. 619456E-01
0. 107148
0. 494475E-01
-0.144821
0. 115970
0. 195269E-01
0. 336057E-01
-0. 652753E-01
-0. 577596E-01
0. 780983E-01
-0. 126994E-01
-0.224553
0. 260841
-0. 415366E-01
-0. 228474E-0 1
0.379343E-01
0.24927 1E-Ol
-0. 484142E-02
0. 868752E-02
-0. 207099E-01
0.214021E-01
0.112264E-01
0.763845E-02
0.657667E-01
-0. 131569E-01
-0.523841E-02
0.711144E-02
0.110965E-01
Harwich Harbour
	
22.0000	 4 -0.199720E-02	 -O.677639E-01
	
22.0000	 5	 -0.101883E-03	 0.121380E-02
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Table A5.3-1 (Continued)
Efficiency Improvement, Technical Progress and Total Factor Productivity
Efficiency	 Total Factor
Deterioration	 Productivity
Crowth 6TFP
Port
Harwlch
22.0000
22. 0000
22.0000
Ipswich
23.0000
23.0000
23.0000
23.0000
23.0000
23.0000
23.0000
Lerwi ck
24.0000
24. 0000
24.0000
24.0000
24. 0000
Poole
25.0000
25.0000
25.0000
25.0000
25.0000
25.0000
25. 0000
Shoreham
26.0000
26.0000
26.0000
26. 0000
26.0000
26.0000
26.0000
Harwich
27.0000
27.0000
27.0000
27.0000
Ramsgate
28. 0000
28. 0000
28. 0000
28. 0000
28. 0000
Year
Harbour
6
7
8
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
4
5
6
7
8
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Dock
4
5
6
7
4
5
6
7
8
Technical
Progress
0. 270151E-02
0. 961039E-02
0. 144698E-01
0. 236874E-01
0. 227252E-01
0. 224896E-01
0. 238498E-01
0. 244164E-01
0 .245046E-01
0. 242405E-01
-0.383738E-03
0. 510700E-03
0 . 8403 96E-03
0. 594671E-03
0.889054E-03
0. 150879E-01
0. 139840E-01
0.15 1140E-01
0. 159213E-01
0. 162050E-01
0. 163690E-01
0. 164437E-01
0. 914458E-02
0. 895141E-02
0. 825036E-02
0. 800418E-02
0. 845771E-02
0. 106848E-01
0. 114009E-01
0. 414662E-01
0. 425964E-01
0. 445895E-01
0. 483557E-01
0.617144E-02
0. 613728E-02
0.47 1131E-02
0. 410027E-02
0.504733E-02
-0.649609E-02
0. 160290E-02
-0. 220375E-02
0. 326528E-01
0. 617746E-01
-0. 500136E-01
0. 173488E-02
0. 236925E-01
0. 774264E-02
-0. 349754E-02
-0.106777
-0. 129539E-01
-0. 136814E-01
-0. 248542E-01
0.257073E-01
0.789325E-01
-0. 569935E-01
0. 148055E-02
0.162385E-01
0. 182673E-02
-0. 974506E-02
-0. 459928E-01
-0. 168628E-01
0. 243654E-01
0.207 898E-02
-0. 640548E-01
0.618486E-01
-0.163499
0. 39247 1E-Ol
0. 422682E-01
0.1 15905E-01
0. 561657E-01
0. 929630E-02
-0.244711E-01
-0. 462681E-01
0. 966053E-01
-0.272607E-01
-0. 197708E-01
0. 919760E-02
0.800749E-02
0. 166736E-01
-0. 896544E-02
-0. 390494E-01
0. 725032E-01
0.221149E-01
0. 723833E-03
0. 167620E-01
0. 277380E-01
0. 106394
0. 134646E-01
0. 145218E-01
0. 254488E-01
-0. 248182E-01
-0. 638446E-01
0. 709774E-01
0. 136335E-01
-0.317197E-03
0. 143783E-01
0.261140E-01
0. 624364E-01
0.260074E-01
-0. 154140E-01
0. 61713 8E-02
0. 720589E-01
-0. 533908E-01
0.174184
-0. 278462E-01
-0. 801943E-03
0.310059E-01
-0. 115761E-01
0. 390594E-01
0. 306425E-01
0. 524054E-01
-0. 918939E-01
0.313610E-01
0.248181E-01
Notes:
ÔTFPj
 = 6F t - LUu.
U is assumed to be exponential.
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Chapter 6
Efficiency and Port Ownership:
Empirical Evidence
The empirical analyses of the previous three chapters have revealed wide efficiency
differentials across British ports. This naturally turns our attention to the possible
factors that may be, either individually or in combination, the causes of inefficiency
and whether these therefore can be seen as focal points for action to bring
efficiency to higher levels. But we cannot pretend to trace in any detail the
influence and impact on efficiency differentials of the plethora of factors,
institutional, technical, economic and physical, which determined the comparative
efficiency ratios that have been measured. Such an exhaustive enquiry would require
a port—by—port investigation and should be a subject of another study. Our focus is
the influence of port ownership. Given the data available, and limited space, we
shall also attempt to test some hypotheses on the association between productive
efficiency on the one hand and the National Dock Labour Scheme, port size,
capital intensity and modes of operation/types of cargo on the other. These
hypotheses are important for both public and private policy reasons.
Price—independent efficiency in this study has been decomposed in a suggestive
way. We discovered that, among the sources of inefficiency in this industry, purely
productive inefficiency and scale inefficiency are the main ones. There has been
little evidence of congestive inefficiency. Furthermore productivity growth over time
was mainly identified with efficiency improvement while the best—practice technology
remained largely unchanged. We begin, in section 6.1, by investigating the
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influence on purely productive efficiency of port ownership and other factors of
interest, and then proceed to scale efficiency in section 6.2 and dynamic efficiency
in section 6.3. In the final section conclusions are drawn for the whole study.
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6.1 Determinants of Purely Productive Inefficiency
One of the most important ways that British port producers depart from the
efficiency frontier is purely productive inefficiency. British ports were about 83%
efficient in the exponential case and 78% efficient in the half-normal case relative
to the stochastic frontier of the industry during 1983-1990. The average value of
PTE is 71% relative to the deterministic frontier.
Non-price productive inefficiency results from failures to maximise output
obtainable from a certain input level given the factor ratio, or from failures to
minimise inputs in producing a certain output level given the output mix. PTE
refers to the kind of failure that can be attributed neither to non-optimal scale
nor to congestion in technology. Two hypothesized reasons for this are
X-inefficiency and technical inefficiency. The questions to be addressed in this
section are as follows: (i) how and to what extent can X-inefficiency and technical
inefficiency be explained by port ownership and the labour scheme? (ii) Can the
best-practice technology be correlated with port size, capital intensity and modes of
operation/cargo types? (iii) To what extent and how does the level of inefficiency
relate to demand conditions?
Ownership
Table 6.1-1 shows both parametric (exponential) and non-parametric
(input-based) measures of purely productive efficiency (PTE) for 13 major British
ports (a classification adopted by the British Ports Federation) during the period
from 1985 to 1990. For each port parametric estimates are given in the first row
and non-parametric estimates in the second row. Both measures are unified to
represent the percentage of efficiency. The last column is the 6-year geometric
average values of PTE measures. The 13 ports are ranked in terms of average
parametric measures. The ownership status of each port before 1990 is also
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indicated.
Table 6.1-1 PTE Scores of Major British Ports
	
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990	 Average[1]
ABP	 private	 -	 -	 0.93 0.93 0.95	
-	
0.9412]
-	
-	 1.00 0.61 1.00
	 -	 0.85[3]
Forth	 trust	 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.93
	 -	 0.91
1.00 1.00 0.88 0.85 0.90	 -	 0.92
Tees &
	
trust	 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.92 0.92
	 0.91
Hartlepool	 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.76 0.85 0.74
	 0.88
Dover	 trust	 0.88 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.92 0.92	 0.90
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.51
	 0.90
London
Tyne
Mi I ford
Haven
Medway
Clyde
trust	 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91
1.00 1.00 0.95 0.89 1.00 1.00
trust	 0.82 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
0.71 0.84 0.90 0.73 0.76 0.52
trust	 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.86
0.78 0.67 0.69 0.56 0.76 0.44
trust	 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89
1.00 0.82 0.83 0.65 0.72 0.69
trust	 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.91
0.85 0.81 0.87 0.51 0.65 0.67
0.90
0.97
0.88
0.76
0.88
0.65
0.88
0.78
0.87
0.71
Felixstowe	 private	 0.81 0.83 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.87
	 0.87
	
1.00 0.79 0.85 0.93 0.61 1.00
	 0.85
Liverpool	 private	 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.89
	 0.86
	
0.95 0.82 0.76 0.73 0.77 1.00 	 0.83
Bristol	 municipal 0.71 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.74 0.76
	 0.75
	
0.57 0.64 0.64 0.58 0.49 0.40
	 0.55
Manchester	 private	 0.72 0.81 0.82 0.74 0.60 0.68
	 0.72
	
0.61 0.71 0.73 0.68 1.00 0.20
	 0.59
Note:
[1] Geometric average.
[21 The figures in the first row are parametric measure of P'rE. i.e. EXP(-U) given the
inefficiency given estimates of inefficiency term U.
[3) The figures in the second row are non-parametric measure of output-based PTE.
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By parametric measure the five most efficient ports with the 6-year average
PTE > 90% are ABP, Forth, Tees & Hartlepool, Dover and London (apart from
ABP the remaining four are trust ports), and the two least efficient ports with the
6-year average PTE 80% in terms of the average PTE scores are Manchester
and Bristol, which are in turn private and municipal port. The ranking by
non-parametric measure is different. The three most efficient ports with average
PTE	 90% are London, Forth and Dover and the six least efficient ports with
average PTE	 80% are Bristol, Manchester, Milford Haven, Clyde, Tyne and
Medway.
In both cases the private ports Feixstowe and Liverpool are regarded as
second class and Manchester is counted as one of the least efficient ones. One
may argue that private ports on the whole perform better than the only municipal
port, Bristol, which is among the least efficient ones in both cases. But trust ports
are as efficient as private ports. There is no clear-cut pattern when one compares
the performance between private ports and trust ports.
To investigate the comparative efficiency of alternative forms of port
ownership on the basis of the whole sample evidence, the average values of PTE
for each ownership group in terms of alternative measures are computed and
presented in Table 6.1-1. Figures in parentheses are the standard errors of
estimated efficiency. By parametric measures trust ports seem to be the most
efficient ones, followed by private ports, municipal ports and a national port. By
non-parametric measures, private ports seem to perform better that trust ports,
municipal ports and a national port in turn. In all cases the national port (British
Waterays Board) appears to be the least efficient. However, the difference between
private and other public ports (especially trust ports) is small. Do these figures
produce a real difference between public and private ports or indicate merely a
matter of sample variations? In what follows the implications of port ownership
structures for efficiency is considered in an Newman-Pearson hypothesis testing
framework. We ignore the one national port since this sample is too small for
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inference. Thus trust ports and municipal ports are compared with private ports.
The hypotheses are set up as follows:
H 0 : PIE 1 - PTE2
H 1 : PIE 1 < PIE2
where PTE 1 is the average PTE of trust or municipal ports and PTE 2 is the
average PTE of private ports. Thus the null hypothesis that there is no significant
efficiency difference between trust (or municipal ports) is tested against the
alternative hypothesis that private ports are more efficient than trust ports (or
municipal ports).
Table 6.1-2 Average PTE of Alternative Forms of Port Ownership
Port Ownership	 Parametric Measure	 Non-Paramet nc Measure
Private Ports
Trust Ports
Municipal Ports
National Port
	
[1]	 [2]
	
0.799	 0.850
(0.073) (0.070)
	
0.805	 0.870
(0.083) (0.066)
	
0.731	 0.798
(0.057) (0.061)
	
0.581	 0.530
(0.030) (0.055)
[3]	 [4]
0.751	 0.720
(0.255)	 (0.231)
0.700	 0.695
(0.278)	 (0.268)
0.664	 0.620
(0.160)	 (0.156)
0.345	 0.299
(0.187)	 (0.169)
Notes:
11] under the hall-normal assumption.
[2] under the exponential assumption.
[3] input-based.
I] output-based.
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The test statistic is
(-	 2) - (PTE1-PTE2)(6.5 -1)	 Z - _________________________
( s 1 2/n 1 + s22/nl)hh'2
which is normally distributed with mean zero and variance one. Here s 1 and
are the corresponding standard errors. The values of this statistic for alternative
measures are presented in Table 6.1-3.
Table 6.1-3 The Values of Statistic for Testing the Efficiency Differentials
Trust vs. Private ports	 Municipal vs. Private Ports
[1]	 0.433	 -3.258
[2] 1.574	 -2.406
[3] -1.132	 -1.551
[4] -0.602	 -1.893
Notes:
[lJ in ternis of parametric measure under the half-normal assumption.
[2) in terms of parametric measure under the exponential distribution.
[3] input-based non-parametric measure.
[4) output-based non-parametric measure.
At the 5% significance level the critical value is -1.65. The test statistic is
well within the acceptance region for all measures when we compare trust ports
with private ports. Thus there does not appear to be a significant efficiency
difference between trust and private ports. When we compare municipal ports with
private ports, the test statistic falls into the rejection region for three out of four
efficiency measures. The sample evidence thus favours the alternative hypothesis,
namely, private ports are more efficient than municipal ports.
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Labour scheme
It has been argued that the productive efficiency of UK ports has been hampered
by the National Dock Labour Scheme, which has been the most important
restrictive practice in the industry and was abolished in the summer of 1989. The
Dock Labour Scheme was introduced in 1947 by the post-war Labour Government
as a direct response to the chaotic employment conditions which existed in the
docks prior to the war. The scheme was significantly strenthened by the then
Labour Government in 1967. Under the scheme casual employment was prohibited
and the National Dock Labour Board that was to be responsible for the number of
dock workers employed and for the definition of dock works. The Scheme covered
a large number of commercially important ports which shared 68% of the volume
of trade through UK ports. The Scheme was an alleged cause of overmanning and
of an ageing labour forces in scheme ports. According to the National Port
Employers Association, in 1986 the average surplus of labour in each Scheme port
was estimated to be 12% of the total work force; the average age of a registered
docker had risen to 47 because, with declining labour requirements, new
recruitment had been unusual. Moreover the Scheme was blamed for the
disproportionate power of the dockers' trade unions, as trade unions and employers
had 50-50 representation on 20 local boards. Thus the Scheme was said to impose
a substantial labour cost burden on port employers, besides hampering productivity
and encouraging inefficiency. Frequently cited evidence of this is the decline of
scheme ports on the east coast and the contrasting prosperity of non-scheme
Felixstowe. The demise of the labour scheme was expected to restore management's
freedom and incentive to manage by breaking the dockers' statutory monopoly on
dockwork; to bring about a remarkable change in the attitudes of the workforce
and industrial relations at the port; and to facilitate the adoption of new working
practice and handling techniques. The primary benefit of abolition was reckoned to
be massive cost reductions and productivity improvement. At least this is a view
widely shared in official circles and in the media.
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However, there has been very little concrete evidence of this to date
(Turnbull, 1991). According to a report in the Employment Gazette (1990) the
productivity improvement was as high as 100%. As Turnbull has pointed out, this
claim was based on examples of improved cargo handling performance taken from
just three ports in one day. And in these ports new working arrangements have
extended effective working hours both in respect of gross hours worked and
effective utilisation of labour during those hours. It is thus impossible to determine
whether ships are turned round more quickly because of improvement in
productivity or longer working hours.
We can draw inferences about the effects on productivity of the abolition of
the scheme by comparing the relative performance of non-scheme ports with
scheme ports. The influence of the Labour Scheme on efficiency is investigated by
testing the average efficiency differnce between scheme and non-scheme ports in a
smae way as we did for ownership. The average PTE and the corresponding
standard errors for both scheme and non-scheme ports are calculated and presented
in Table 6.1-4. The null hypothesis is that there is no efficiency difference
between scheme and non-scheme ports and the alternative hypothesis is that
non-scheme ports are more efficient than scheme ports. The values of the
test-statistic are given in the last column. Surprisingly these are all within the
acceptance region at the 5% level. Thus we would not reject the null hypothesis
of no efficiency difference between scheme and non-scheme ports. The sample
evidence does not seem to support the claim that the abolition of the scheme has
reshaped the attitudes of the workforce and industrial relations at the ports and
facilitated the introduction of new handling techniques.
In addition, as we discovered in chapters 3 and 4, the results of both
deterministic and stochastic analysis confirm that the structure of British port
production technology is free from congestion in labour as might be expected by
the Scheme.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
0.800
(0.080)
0.857
(0.069)
0.692
(0.249)
0.654
(0.232)
0.784
(0.099)
0.834
(0.110)
0.697
(0.296)
0.704
(0.301)
1. 129
I . 542
0.136
-1.379
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Table 6.1-4 Average PTE for Scheme and Non-Scheme Ports
Scheme Ports	 Non-Scheme Ports	 Difference[5]
Eli under the half-normal assumption.
[2] under the exponential assumption.
(31 input-based.
[4] output-based.
[51 The value for the sample mean difference tests. See Eq(6J-l).
Turnbull argued that the major institutional changes in British ports have done
little to transform the adversarial nature of labour relations. As he explained
'coerced compliance' rather than 'co-operative commitment' still characterises the
labour relations of many ports, as shown by the ability and willingness of dockers
to manipulate the new 'flexibility agreements' to their advantage. An example of
this- at one West Coast port cited by Turnbull is that dockers quickly adapted to a
new pay system in order to make it work for them. The old practice was that
trimmers were allocated to bulk vessels from the commencement of work. Under
the new pay system trimmers were now allocated only when an initial need arises,
and they remain until the hold completes. Once they are allocated the gang earns
a higher bonus rate to encourage more rapid completion of the cargo at the higher
manning level. The 'trick' now, however, is for the crane drivers to 'free grab' as
much cargo from the centre of the hold as quickly as possible to ensure the early
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allocation of the trimmers and the higher bonus pay. In consequence, although
labour productivity has increased, unit labour costs have increased as well.
We now turn to technological factors of interest. The co-existence of different
structures of production technology is the cause of technical inefficiency. Substantial
inter-port inefficiencies in the industry tell us the possible extent of improvement
from the average technologies to the best-practice technology. It should then be
useful for both public and private policy reasons if the best-practice technology can
be characterised. In this aspect three distinct hypotheses can be tested: that a large
port technology is more efficient than small port technology; that a technology of
high capital intensity is more efficient than technology of low capital intensity; that
ports concentrating on specific modes and commodities are more efficient than
ports providing comprehensive facilities to handle a variety of cargoes.
The coefficient of simple correlation between PTE (parametric measure based
on exponential distribution), turnover 0, net-book value of fixed assets C, staff
costs L, capital/labour ratio C/L, labour productivity and capital productivity are
shown in Table 6.1-3. We may use L as a proxy measure of port size and C/L as
a measure of capital intensity. Shown in parentheses are values of t-lest statistic of
the significance of correlation. This follows a t-distribution with n-2 degrees of
freedom. A two-tail test was chosen because correlation can be either positive or
negative. For n=188 (observations during 1983-1990), the critical value of the t
distribution for a two-tail test with 186 degrees of freedom at the 5% significance
level is 1.96.
Port size
Britain is endowed with an unusually large number of small ports. For instance,
apart from 8 mainstream UK container ports handing in excess of 100,000 TEU
per annum, there are 25 small ports, mostly located along the east coast and with
container throughput varying from just over a thousand TEU to 80,000 TEU.
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These small ports handle 20 % of UK container traffic. Despite the philosophy of
concentration of port traffic in fewer and bigger ports, many small ports in the
UK continue to survive and to show a modest increase in throughput in the face
of severe port competition.
One of the main reasons why small ports remain viable is that the customers
of these small ports tend to be relatively small scale short-sea operators deploying
small-sized vessels, for which the facilities available in small ports are ideally
suited. Also small operators in small ports are big fish in a small pond and are
offered personal and flexible services. Small ports can give quick decisions and can
give their personal attention to each customer. Furthermore the increasing trend for
deep sea carriers to call at fewer ports and to feeder cargo to/from other
destinations is a further boost to the small ports.
Table 6.1-5 Technological Factors and Purely Productive Efficiency
PTE[l]	 Q	 C	 L	 CL	 CP	 LP
Q	 0.196
	 1.000
(2.72) [2]
C	 -0.163	 0.836	 1.000
	
(-2.24)	 (20.72)
L	 0.044
	
0.959	 0.869	 1.000
	
(0.60)	 (46.02)	 (26.05)
	
CL -0.043	 -0.268	 -0.154	 -0.298	 1.000
	
(0.60)	 (-3.78)	 (-2.12)	 (-4.24)
CP	 0.115	 -0.047	 -0.124	 -0.047	 -0.187	 1.000
	
(1.57)	 (-0.63)	 (-1.70)	 (-0.63)	 (-2.59)
LP	 0.329	 -0.225	 -0.273	 -0.333	 0.880	 0.248	 1.000
	
(4.74)	 (-3.14)	 (-3.85)	 (-4.80)	 (25.20)	 (3.58)
Notes:
[1] FTE is a parametric measure based on the exponential distribution;
[2] The figures in parentheses are t-ratios of associated simple correlation coefficients;
t.rj((n-2)I(1-r2)), which follows a t-distribution with 1f (n-2).
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Small ports thus remain viable because of service differentiation. The question
is whether small port technology requires higher costs. Since modern port
technology is highly capital intensive, there is a belief that considerable efficiency
can be gained from economies of scale. If this is true, there will be a strong case
for mergers of small ports. The implication of this for public policy is a dilemma:
how to enjoy the cost benefits of large port production without suffering
monopolistic behaviour. But using L as a proxy measure of port size, we found
that the correlation between PTE and port size is close to zero and highly
insignificant. We thus discover no evidence to support the proposition that large
port technology is more efficient than small port technology. This result is
consistent with our descriptive evidence earlier that the level of concentration in
the industry has remained almost unchanged over the last 20 years or so. Both
seem to imply that the port technology does not exhibit the expected substantial
economies of scale.
While cost-reducing gains could be realised with an increase in port size,
there are also several reasons why at the same time efficiency may be expected to
decline. First, because of the small number of employees, better staff relations
usually obtain, with the result that any grievances are usually dealt with directly
without the need for posturing or escalation to a national level. Second, an
increase in port size may lead to a reduced speed and flexibility of
decision-making and increased difficulty of and cost of coordination. Third, the
superiority of a large-scale operation usually depends on full or nearly-full use of
port capacity. When throughput falls, the big port is left with costs, incurred in
order to handle larger cargo volume, which it cannot reduce at will. Small ports
may be less capitalised, having a higher variable/fixed cost ratio and can therefore
adjust their costs to current throughput more flexibly. This point is particularly
relevant since variation in demand is a typical feature of the port industry.
Economies of scale depend on maintenance of large ouptut. In the face of demand
fluctuations big ports cannot consistently achieve economies of scale. Therefore the
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effects of port size are multiple and complex. The net effect can go either way.
Capital intensity
Without doubt the dramatic increase in the productivity of cargo handling since
World War Two has been attributed to the mechanisation of port operation. In
1965 UK port labour handled 1.6 tons of cargo per man hour and this figure in
1988 had increased to 8.5 tons per man hour. In the port industry, which used to
be notoriously labour intensive, the manning level has been reduced so that most
workers are now equipment operators. Still commercial pressure to reduce manning
and improve efficiency remains high. As the present ageing UK dock labour force
retires the ports will take on younger port employees who have different attitudes
and better education, but who will expect high wages and good conditions. Under
commercial pressure a trend towards ports "without people" has started with port
automation. Important automation schemes include operation automation in container
terminals (e.g. the automation of stackyard operation, the automation of horizontal
movement to/from the stackyard) and in dry bulk terminals (e.g. self-discharging
vessels in the dredged aggregates trade combined with a modern conveyor system),
and computation and electronic data handling of port traffic. The question from
the efficiency point of view is whether the best-practice technology can be
identified with high capital intensity. The answer to this question is important for
policies of R&D and technical progress.
The coefficient of correlation between CL and PTE, as revealed in Table
6.1-3, rejects any significant association between the best-practice technology and
high capital intensity. The substitution of capital for labour at a given technical
level is not without limit. The introduction of additional mechanical equipment or
automation scheme may result in an increase in the labour productivity and a
decrease in labour cost on the one hand, but involves considerably more capital
cost. Moreover, as stated above, ports which are highly capitalised tend to be
inflexible in adapting to fluctuating demand and thus have lower capacity utilisation
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and higher unit costs. Thus it is not suprising that ports with higher capital
intensity are not necessarily more efficient than ports with lower capital intensity.
Modes of operation/Types of carao
We could not find any evidence, either, to support the hypothesis that specialised
ports are more efficient than ports providing comprehensive facilities and handling
a variety of cargoes. Table 6.1-4 indicates the PTE rankings of 28 British ports in
terms of their 6—year average PTE. The main types of cargo handled in each port
are also described. Large, traditional ports providing comprehensive facilities
developed over the years to handle most cargoes - container, bulk, ro —ro and
general cargo - are among the efficient ones, e.g. London, Tees & Hartlepool and
Forth, as well as among the inefficient ones such as Manchester and Bristol. This
is also the case for ports which specialise in specific modes or commodities -
container and ro—ro. There is no clear pattern as to which type of port is more
efficient than another.
Geographical pattern
However, we have discovered a geographical pattern for PTE. If one looks at both
the most and the least efficient ports in Table 6.1-4 on a map, it is immdiately
clear that, by and large, efficient ports such Harwich Dock, Aberdeen, Forth, Tees
& Hartlepool, London and Dover are concentrated on the East Coast, while the
inefficient ports such as Bristol, Manchester and Ardrossan are on the West Coast.
This probably reflects the changing pattern of the UK's international trade.
Amongst the larger ports in this country those situated in the Channel area handle
mainly EEC trade while those on the West Coast tend to handle a large volume of
deep sea trade. The major exception to this is Felixstowe which handles both short
sea and deep sea trade. Since the mid 1960s, the relative importance of short sea
trade with EEC countries has increased whereas the significance of links with the
UK's traditional trade partners has declined. Unlike other industries, ports are
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unable to relocate to meet the geographical change of markets. En consequence, the
port business has become prosperous on the South and East Coasts and diminished
on the West Coast. Another possible reason for the geographical pattern of
efficiency is the intense inter-port competition in this area (e.g. for container and
Ro-ro traffic) which can act as a spur to port efficiency.
Table 6.1-6 PTE Rankings of British Ports 1983-1990
Ports
1.Great Yarmouth
PTE-O.95
2.Harwich Harbour
PTE-0.94
3 .Aberdeen
PTE-O.93
4. ABP
PTE-O.91
4. Forth
PTE-O .91
Type of Cargo
Offshore supply, Ro-Ro, ferry, liquid, bulk
Navigation, conservancy, pilotage
Passenger, marine support for offshore oil,
bulk, Ro-Ro
Container, ro-ro, general, dry and liquid
bulk
Oil, petro-chemicals, unitised general and
dry bulk
4.Tees & Hartlepool Oil, chemical, steel, bulk, Ro-Ro, container,
PTE-O.91	 and general cargo
5. Dover
PTE-O.90
5. London
PTE-0.90
6.Dundee Firth
PTE-0.89
6.Harwich Dock
PTE-O.89
7. Tyne
PTE-O.88
Ferry port. Ro-Ro, hover-craft and Jetfoil
services
Container, Ro-Ro, general cargo, dry and liquid
bulk, passenger
Bulk and general cargo, container, Ro-Ro
Container, general, forest products, Ro-Ro
Timber, forest products, ferry services,
containers, general bulk
7 .Medway	 Container, Ro-Ro, forest products, fruit, meat
PTE-O.88
8 .Lerwick
	
General, Ro-Ro, ferries, cruise liners
PTE-O.87
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Table 6.1-6 (continued) PTE Rankings of British Ports 1983-90
Ports	 Type of Cargo
8. Clyde
PTE.-0.87
8.Fel ixstowe
PTE-0.87
8.Ramsgate
PTE-O.87
9.Liverpool
PTE-0.86
9.Milford Haven
PTE-O.86
10 .Boston
PTE-0.85
11 . B 1 yt h
PTE-0.83
11 .Poole
PTE-O.83
12.Ipswich
PTE-0.82
13.Shoreham
PTE-0.81
14.Bristol
PTE-0.75
15.Cromarty Firth
PTE-0 .74
15 .Manchester
PTE-0.74
16 .Ardrossan
PTE-O.71
17. BWB
PTE-0.56
Container, iron ore, coal, grain and other
dry and liquid bulk
Container port. Ro-Ro, general, bulk
General cargo, timber, car and oil port
Comprehensive cargo handling facilities for
containers, break bulk, dry and liquid bulk
Oil terminal. Ro-Ro, general cargo
Container, general, timber, steel bunkers
A general cargo, Ro-Ro-Sto-Ro port specialising
in forest products and bulk commodities
Recreational facilities, Ro-Ro, general,
passenger
Container terminals, general cargo, bulk liquids
grain and other bulk solid cargoes
General cargo, timber, conventional bulk
Wet and dry bulk, forest products, Ro-Ro,
general
General and bulk cargo, oil and oil field
support base
All bulk liquid, dry bulks, containers,
heavy individual loads, Lo-Lo and Ro-Ro
Ro-Ro, container, unit loads, break-bulk
River ports
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6.2 Determinants of Scale Efficiency
Scale inefficiency is another important way that British port producers depart from
overall productive inefficiency. During 1983-1990 British ports were about 82%
scale efficient in the half-normal case and 80% scale efficient in the exponential
case. Relative to the deterministic frontier the value was lower.
Scale inefficiency occurs because of the failure to operate at the most
productive scale size (i.e. the maximum productivity per unit of inputs) for a given
input and output mix. The notion of scale referred to here is related to returns to
scale rather than economies of scale. it is useful to distinguish between the
problem of determining the most productive scale size for a particular input and
output mix, and the problem of determining the minimum cost of inputs on the
basis of their relative prices (Banker, 1984). For each input and output mix there
is a corresponding most productive scale size, while the overall optimal scale size
depends on prevailing prices as well. Thus the optimal scale here is a local rather
than a global one. The most productive scale size corresponds to the long run
competitive equilibrium only when the factor ratio is optimal given factor prices.
Unlike purely productive inefficiency and congestive inefficiency, scale
inefficiency is not necessarily an error on the part of producers (Fare, et al.,
1985). As evidence of this, Table 6.2-1 shows that no correlation was found
between scale efficiency and purely productive efficiency, which is the form of
private inefficiency in the industry. Ports which are productive inefficient need not
be scale inefficient. The converse is true as well. Nevertheless, scale inefficiency is
undesirable from a social point of view.
Given that scale inefficiency is not an error from the private point of view,
organisational factors such as ownership and the labour scheme are not relevant
causes. Our attention will thus be focused on technological factors only. The
coefficients of correlation between the parametric measure of scale efficiency (SE)
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and the proxy measures of port size (L), capital intensity (CIL), capital productivity
(CP) and labour productivity (LP) are given in Table 6.2-1. For comparison the
corresponding coefficients of correlation between the parametric measure of PTE
and the proxy measures of technological factors are shown in the same table as
well. Again the figures in parentheses are t-ratios of corresponding simple
correlation coefficients. For a simple correlation to be significant at 5% significance
level, the test statistics must exceed 1.96 (a two-tail test).
Table 6.2-1 Technological Factors and Scale Efficiency
SE[1]
SE	 1.000
PTE
	 0.120
(1.64) [2]
Q	 -0.270
(-3.81)
C	 -0.501
(-7.87)
L	 -0.212
(-2.95)
CL	 -0.655
(-11 .79)
CP
	 0.320
(4.59)
LP
	 0.485
(7.00)
PIE
0.120
(1.64)
1.000
0.196
(2.72)
-0.163
(-2.24)
0.044
(0.60)
-0.043
(-0.60)
0.115
(1.57)
0.329
(4.74)
Notes:
[1] SE is a parametric measure under the exponential assumption;
[2] The numbers in parentheses are test statistics of the significance of correlation, which follows
a t distribution with (n-2) degrees of freedom.
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As suggested in Table 6.2-1, SE is negatively related to the level of
production, the usage of labour input and capital input in particular, but the
correlation is not very strong. While there is a lack of correlation between capital
intensity and purely productive efficiency, the correlation between capital intensity
and scale efficiency is negative and significant.
Our parametric estimates in chapter 4 suggested a strong association between
scale efficiency and scale elasticity. It can be seen in Fig 4.4-3 that the closer the
value of scale elasticity is to unity, the higher the scale efficiency. The estimates
of scale elasticity for each port revealed in Table A4.4-3 and A4.4-4 make it
clear whether scale inefficiency for each observation was due to increasing returns
to scale or decreasing returns to scale. For most ports, especially large ports, scale
inefficiency was attributed to decreasing returns to scale. In other words most
British ports operate on a scale larger than the most productive scale size given
their factor ratios. We can also identify the sources of scale inefficiency for each
port in non-parametric models by comparing the value for weakly productive
efficiency WTE and the value for weakly productive efficiency on the star-input
correspondence WTE* (FCL, 1988). If there is input scale inefficiency, i.e. ISE^1,
then it is caused by increasing returns to scale if and only if IW1'E < IWTE*,
and it is caused by decreasing returns to scale, if and only if JWTE = JWTE*.
The values for IWTE and IWTE* for British ports during 1985-1990 can be
found in the tables of Appendix 3.3. They are summarised in Table 6.2-1 and the
source of scale inefficiencies for each observation is identified in the same table.
One striking result is that the cause of scale inefficiency tends to be decreasing
returns to scale for large ports and increasing returns to scale for small ports. In
other words large ports tend to operate above their most productive scale sizes
while small ports tend to operate below their most productive scale sizes.
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Table 6.2-2 Source of Scale Inefficiency for UK Ports 1985-90
Ports	 Scale Efficiency/Sources
1985	 1988	 1989	 1990
ABP	 0.132 ORS 0.418 DRS
Bristol	 0.589 DRS 0.156 DRS 0.390 DRS 0.481 DRS
Clyde	 0.519 DRS 0.172 DRS 0.589 DRS 0.572 DRS
Dover	 0.542 DRS 0.135 DRS 0.243 DRS 0.449 DRS
Felixstowe	 0.430 DRS 0.137 DRS 0.423 DRS 0.259 DRS
Forth	 0.574 DRS 0.158 DRS 0.429 DRS
London	 0.446 DRS 0.137 DRS 0.385 DRS 1.000 CRS
Manchester	 0.546 DRS 0.150 DRS 0.216 DRS 0.863 DRS
Medway	 1.000 CRS 0.162 DRS 0.444 DRS 0.423 DRS
Mersey	 0.139 DRS 0.415 DRS 1.000 CRS
Milford Haven	 0.976 DRS 0.381 DRS 0.473 DRS 0.593 DRS
Tees & Hart lepool	 0.532 DRS 0.148 DRS 0.435 DRS 0.418 DRS
Tyne	 0.636 DRS 0.178 DRS 0.445 DRS 0.556 DRS
Aberdeen	 0.827 DRS 0.225 DRS
Ardrossan	 0.865 DRS 0.988 DRS 0.387 DRS 0.993 IRS
Blyth	 0.608 DRS 0.232 DRS 0.501 DRS 0.617 DRS
Boston	 0.771 DRS 0.272 DRS 0.738 DRS
Cromarty Firth	 0.766 DRS 0.741 IRS 0.899 DRS 0.934 IRS
Dundee Firth	 0.370 DRS 0.436 DRS 0.590 DRS
Great Yarmouth	 1.000 CRS 0.672 DRS
Harwich Harbour	 1.000 CRS 0.342 DRS 0.360 DRS 0.563 DRS
Ipswich	 0.527 DRS 0.177 DRS 0.413 DRS 0.451 DRS
Lerwick	 1.000 CRS 0.384 DRS 0.423 DRS 0.919 IRS
Poole	 0.797 DRS 0.245 DRS 0.469 DRS 0.601 DRS
Shoreham	 0.996 IRS 0.700 DRS 0.548 DRS 0.743 DRS
Cowes	 0.147 DRS 0.665 IRS 0.559 IRS
Dart	 0.217 DRS 0.601 IRS
Falmouth Habour	 0.901 IRS 0.863 IRS
Fraserburgh	 0.651 IRS 0.518 IRS
Harwich Dock	 1.000 CRS 1.000 CRS
King's Lynn	 0.340 IRS 0.992 IRS 0.795 IRS
Lancaster	 0.983 IRS
Montrose	 0.780 IRS 0.976 IRS 0.795 IRS
Milford Dock	 0.987
Newlyn	 0.243 IRS
Padstow	 0.233 DRS 1.000 CRS
Peterhead Bay	 0.503 IRS 1.000 CRS 1.000 CRS
Peterhead Harbour	 0.987 IRS 0.848 IRS
Ramsgate	 1.000 CRS 0.362 DRS 0.329 DRS 0.891 DRS
Stornoway	 0.362 IRS 0.795 IRS 0.586 IRS
Sutton	 1.000 CRS 0.471 IRS 0.553 IRS 0.497 IRS
Ullapool	 0.336 IRS 0.373 IRS
Whitehaven	 0.436 IRS 0.967 IRS 0.791 IRS
Yarmouth(IOW)	 0.316 IRS
Notes:
DRS decreasing returns to scale; IRS increasing returns to scale; CRS constant returns to
scale; SE is non-parametric and input-based.
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6.3 Determinants of Dynamic Efficiency
Technical progress offers both an opportunity and a challenge to individual ports. It
is an opportunity because the shifting production frontier expands the production
possibility set, in which more output is obtainable with a given set of inputs if the
best-practice technology is applied. It is a challenge because the failure to adopt
the best-practice technology may place the port and terminal operators at a
disadvantageous position in competitive situations. In what follows we examine the
influences of port ownership, labour scheme and technological factors on dynamic
efficiency.
As in their static productive performance, the dynamic performance of British
ports also differs widely. This can be seen in Fig 5.3-5 which shows 6TFP of
British ports during 1983-1990 excluding exogenous influences: the annual growth
rate of total factor productivity for individual observations varied from -22.5% to
27.5%. The distribution of bTFP is symmetric. Because the growth rate of total
factor productivity can be either positive or negative, we translate ÔTFP into the
rate of technical progress on the frontier and the rate of efficiency improvement.
Given that the structure of port production technology in Britain remained
unchanged during the period 1983-1990, efficiency gains (positive or negative) over
time were thus mainly attributed to changes in productive efficiency relative to
efficiency frontiers of the industry.
Port ownership and labour scheme
Ports which are conducive to technological development must possess two factors.
One is innovation incentive. The other is financial capacity. As far as innovation
incentive is concerned, once more, market structure is more important than
ownership per se. Ports in a monopoly position, whether private or public, tend to
be lax and inefficient and fail to grasp opportunities of technical progress as
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compared with ports in a more competitive environment. In Britain port markets
are mixed where public ports are in competition with private ports. There is no
reason to believe that public ports are less keen than private ports on technological
development. One may even argue that publicly owned ports which often take
throughput maximisation as one of their management objectives tend to show more
willingness to invest for port expansion and upgrading, whereas private port
management may be reluctant to sacrifice short term profits for long term
development under the pressure to make profits for the benefit of their
shareholders. As far as financial capacity is concerned, private ports are in a better
position to finance technical progress, as company status facilitates wide access to
external capital than currently available to public ports. Municipal ports are
especially at a disadvantage because of 'under-funding of local authorities. Actually
one of the objectives of the second stage of port privatisation relates to port
development. But the difficult situation of public ports in Britain is attributed more
to the free market policy of government than to their ownership status. In
continental Europe, by contrast, the municipal ownership status of ports, such as
Rotterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg, Bremen, has not become an obstacle to port
development. Rather it has been a legitimate reason for financial assistance from
government in major infrastructure, which has been important to enable these ports
to attain a high level of technical sophistication. While port subsidy is not justified
on allocative efficiency grounds, this example seems to indicate that there is no
necessary defect in the mechanism of public control as far as technological advance
is concerned.
Again we use dummy variables to investigate the influence of port ownership
and the labour scheme as in Eq(6.1-I) on the growth rate of total factor
productivity ÔTFP and the rate of productive efficiency improvement PTE. Recall
that the estimates for p 1 represent the sample mean of the relevant dependent
variable (ÔTFP, PTE and oF as appropriate) for private and non-scheme ports,
and the estimates for p 2 . p 3. p 4 and p 5 represent the differential effects of trust
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ports, municipal ports, national ports and scheme ports on the dependent variable
as compared with private and non-scheme ports.
Table 6.3-1 reports the results of the dummy variable analysis. We found that
the estimated p 1 associated with ÔF, U and ÔTFP are all close to zero and
insignificant. This reveals that there was little total factor productivity growth
achieved by private and non-scheme ports on average because neither did the
best-practice technology shift nor did they improve productive efficiency
significantly. We also found that estimated p 2 . p 3 and p 4 associated with bTFP,
U and ÔF are also insignificant. This implies that there was no significant
difference in dynamic efficiency between public ports of all forms and private ports
whether in terms of ÔF or zWTE or in consequence of ÔTFP. The conclusion is
the same when comparing scheme and non-scheme ports. Therefore British ports
on average achieved little productivity growth during this period regardless of
ownership, though improvement or deterioration in total factor productivity was
significant for individual ports. In other words differences in dynamic efficiency can
hardly be explained by differences in ownership or by the labour scheme.
The second part of Table 6.3-1 shows the influence of port ownership and
labour scheme on purely productive efficiency PTE as measured in terms of the
stochastic frontier of each year during 1983-1990 (the dynamic translog model
estimated in chapter 5) instead of the unique stochastic frontier of this period (the
static translog model estimated in chapter 4). The result of this dummy variable
analysis is almost identical to that shown in Table 6.1-2. Private ports performed
slightly better than municipal ports and much better than the national port. But
there was no significant difference in productive performance between private and
trust ports, nor between scheme and non-scheme ports.
As a final note, the values of the F-test statistic for the joint significance
suggest that, while ownership explains static efficiency differentials to some extent,
it does not explain dynamic efficiency differentials at all.
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Table 6.3-1 The Influence of Port Ownership on Dynamic Efficiency
p 1 	p2	 p3	 p4	 p5
öTFP	 0.018	 0.008	 0.005 -0.021 -0.013
(0.011) (0.012 ) (0.022) (0.030) (0.010) [1]
F(5,155)-0.603 [21
sPTE	 0.003	 0.012	 0.006 -0.019 -0.018
(0.011 ) ( 0.012 )
 (0.022) (0.030 (0.010) [1]
F(5,183)-1 .013
0.016 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
	 0.004
(0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) [1)
F(5,183)-4.616
PTE(half-normal)	 0.794	 0.002 -0.080 -0.221	 0.011
(0.014) (0.015) (0.028) (0.039) (0.013) [1]
F(5,183)-132.68
PTE(exponential)	 0.848	 0.012 -0.060 -0.319 	 0.006
(0.012) (0.013) (0.023) (0.032) (0.010) [1]
F(5 , 183)-136 .56
Notes:
[1] Standard errors are in the parentheses below the parameters.
[2] F-test statistic is for the joint significance of all variables in the equation concerned.
TechnolojcaI Factors
Table 6.3-2 reports the results of correlation analysis on dynamic efficiency and
technological factors. The figures in the table are the coefficients of correlation and
the figures in the parentheses are the values of t-statistic.
ÔTFP has a positive correlation with LWTE as high as 99.1% while it has no
correlation with oF. This confirms that the main component of OTFP is PTE.
But it is difficult to characterise the improvement in productive efficiency, since the
coefficients of correlation between LsPTE and variables such as 0, C, L and CL are
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insignificant. Nevertheless, there is some degree of positive correlation between PTE
and ÔPTE. This means that ports which are efficient in the static sense tend to be
efficient in the dynamic sense. But the correlation is very weak.
Table 6.3-2 TechnologIcal Factors and Dynamic Efficiency
ÔF	 PTE
1.000
6 TFP
PTE	 0.991
(93.90)
6F	 -0.021
(-0.264)
PIE	 0.234
(3.025)
Q	 0.080
(1.009)
C	 -0.023
(-0.289)
L	 0.026
(0.327)
CL	 0.006
(0.075)
cP	 0.015
(0.189)
LP	 0.111
(1.404)
LPTE
1.000
0.156
(1.985)
0.227
(2.93)
0.061
(0.768)
-0.014
(-0.176)
0.003
(0.038)
0.113
(-1.411)
-0.073
(0.915)
0.200
(2.566)
0.037
(0.465)
0.135
(1.71)
-0.06 1
(-0.768)
0.169
(2.129)
-0.790
(-16.20)
0.648
(10.69)
-0.674
(-11.469)
1.000
0.211
(2.713)
0.179
(2.287)
0035
(0.440)
-0.0182
(-0.229)
0.083
(-1.047)
0.353
(4.743)
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the test statistic of the significance of conelation, which
follows a t distribution with (n-2) degrees of freedom.
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6.4 Concluding Remarks
6.4.1 Summary Of The Study
Purposes and Methodologies
This study concerns the productive efficiency impact of ownership in the British
port transport industry. Unlike previous studies on whether public ownership leads
to better or worse performance, which relied on observable and possibly biased
variables in measuring productive efficiency (for survey on the literature of
performance studies see Vickers and Yarrow (1989, pp.39-43)), we have taken
efficiency measures defmed and constructed within the rigorous framework of
frontier function theory. The notion of a frontier is consistent with the underlying
economic theory of optimising behaviour. Deviations from a frontier have a natural
interpretation as a measure of the efficiency with which firms pursue their technical
or behavioural goals. Information about the relative efficiency of firms and about
the structure of the frontier has many public and private policy implications.
The frontier models adopted and developed in this study allow us to delineate
the various ways in which a firm might fail to achieve its technical or behavioural
goals. Relative to a production frontier in a given period of time, deterministic or
stochastic, the possible reasons for inefficiency are classified into purely productive
inefficiency (in the form of X-inefficiency and/or technical inefficiency), congestive
inefficiency and scale inefficiency. But the efficiency defined in the frontier models
need not be restricted to a static concept. Measures of the dynamic efficiency or
progressiveness of a firm can also be defined and constructed relative to an
ever-shifting production frontier. Efficiency gains over time can be interpreted in
terms of shifts of the frontier and movements towards/off the frontier.
Two competing paradigms for constructing frontiers have been adopted. One
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uses mathematical programming techniques, the other employs econometric
techniques. Both techniques reveal that efficiency levels differ from port to port,
but the efficiency differential suggested by the mathematical programming techniques
is wider than by the econometric techniques. While the stochastic models distinguish
between exogenous influences and efficiency errors, the deterministic models make
no allowance for this. The variance of statistical noise was estimated to be as high
as 52% to 55% of the total disturbance. Given a well-specified structure for the
parametric technology, we believe that the stochastic measures were closer than the
deterministic measures to the true extent of efficiency or inefficiency.
Estimated Efficiencies and the Best-practice Technology
Although efficiency estimates resulting from the use of these two techniques do
not suggest identical rankings, both revealed the same compositions of inefficiency.
The main ways that British ports departed from the production frontier in the
period 1983-90 were purely productive inefficiency and scale inefficiency while
congestive inefficiency was negligible.
If we use stochastic measures under the exponential assumption, which has a
plausible estimated efficiency distribution on Farrell's criterion, there was an 18%
potential for improvements in purely productive performance for average ports in
the industry. Purely productive inefficiency is partly explained by X-inefficiency
because of motivational deficiency at both worker and management level. In part it
is due to difference in technical levels of ports. For an industry like ports, with
long-lived facilities and highly specialised capital assets, the co-existence of
different vintages of technologies at any time is unavoidable.
The scale inefficiency of average British ports was 20% because of departures
from the most productive scale size. Scale inefficiency seems related to excessive
use of the capital input relative to labour input. Both parametric and
non-parametric measures have indicated the direction of improvements in scale
efficiency by the values of scale elasticity or the nature of returns to scale. Most
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sample ports were found to operate on scale sizes where decreasing returns to scale
prevailed (the value of scale elasticity was less than unity). The most productive
scale size (a purely technological characteristics) is not necessarily the minimum
cost mix of inputs and outputs (based on their relative prices). However, because
of the volatility of factor prices, the purely technological characteristics may be
useful for managerial decisions and policies for a longer period.
We found little evidence on congestive inefficiency as a possible result of the
labour scheme. The structure of production technology in the industry is basically
free from congestion.
Dynamic efficiency of British ports also exhibits variations. It appears that the
development of the best-practice technology in the industry has reached a plateau
and remained static over the second half of 1980s following dramatic
containerisation and specialisation in the previous decades. Efficiency gains over
time in the industry were thus brought about by shifts of the average technology
towards the frontier technology and improvements in X-efficiency. But for most
sample ports the rate of efficiency change kept altering its sign, indicating frequent
movements towards as well as off the frontier. This probably reflects instability of
X-efficiency.
We have attempted to characterise the best-practice technology in terms of
port size, capital intensity and modes of operation. But we cannot find evidence to
suggest that efficient ports are necessarily large, capital intensive and associated
with one particular mode of operation.
At first sight demand would definitely be a significant factor behind efficiency,
especially for ports which are vulnerable to market conditions. But in stochastic
frontier models random shocks in demand are captured by the symmetric error
component and hence should not affect efficiency estimates in theory. Neither
should long-term changes in demand provided that the changes are evenly spread
over the industry, since demand conditions affect the best-practice technology as
well as the average technology. But changes in the trading patterns of the UK
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have been characterised by increases in short sea traffic with the Continent and a
decline in deep-sea traffic with the traditional markets across the globe. In
consequence efficient ports tend to be concentrated on the East Coast. The
geographical pattern of efficiency is an indication of the impact of asymmetric
demand on efficiency. In other words, to some extent, some ports are inefficient
because they are on the wrong side of the country.
Efficiency and Ownership
Port privatisation in the last 10 years has brought three-quarters of the port
industry into the private sector. There still remain 108 trust ports and a number of
small municipal ports. Under the Conservative Government, which has been
unsympathetic towards public ownership, it seems just a matter of time that the
residual public sector of the industry will be entirely replaced by the private sector.
The port privatisation programme is supposed to promote economic efficiency
(mainly productive efficiency), but is there any empirical basis for believing the
superior productive performance of private ports?
The finding of this study, summarised in Table 6.1-2, is not strongly
supportive of this belief. As far as static efficiency is concerned, private ports do
not outperform the most important form of public ports in the country: trust ports.
As compared with municipal ports, private ports are only marginally more efficient.
The national port, British Waterways Board (BWB), was the least efficient one.
However, one should be cautious before jumping to the conclusion that the national
port is the least efficient type of ownership, since BWB is the only observation of
such a national port. Besides it is different because it consists of small river ports
while all the other observations in the sample are seaports. The result is not very
persuasive, as like is not compared with like. By the dynamic measure private
ports are less efficient than trust and municipal ports, and more efficient than the
national port. But the differences are statistically insignificant. Therefore the
evidence does not establish the clear-cut superiority of private ownership in respect
257
of productive efficiency. At least it can safely be concluded that public ports can
be as efficient as private ports. Although efficiency estimates derived from different
models arrive at different orders of maganitude, the conclusion remains unchanged
regardless of efficiency measures used.
Rarely is one piece of statistical work 'decisive'; rather it is added to the
body of evidence which researchers use to evaluate the worth of different economic
theories. But the hypothesis that public ownership is inherently less productively
efficient than private ownership has been subject to many empirical tests that have,
on balance, provided no firm support to the hypothesis. Many agree that this is a
weak conclusion which is based on at least one presumption that the relevant firm
faces strong competition, and other forms of product and factor market failure are
relatively unimportant. Since many of the comparative studies involved cases with
product and factor market inefficiencies, it is hardly surprising the evidence is
much less clear cut. The lack of a clear—cut pattern is explained by the lack of
competition. It is believed that private enterprises outperform public enterprises in
competitive conditions. The evidence provided in this study, however, presents an
example that public enterprises can be as efficient as private enterprises even in
competitive situations.
The result of our empirical analysis is consistent with the view touched on at
the end of the theoretical analysis in chapter 2, where we offered two
explanations. One is that public ownership is compatible with competition in the
port sector and competition provides a spur to the efficiency of public ports as
well as private ports. The other is that the possible deficiency of public monitoring
as compared with private monitoring system has been largely reduced because of
the decentralised and autonomous nature of public port administration.
The empirical results have cast serious doubt on whether any significant
transformation in the productive efficiency of Britain's ports has been brought about
by the privatisation programme. Since the act of port privatisation is unlikely to
enhance competition and to improve managerial incentive structure significantly, we
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see few attractions of the programme in improving efficiency. It should be noted
that we refer mainly to the second wave of port privatisation, i.e. the programme
to privatise trust ports and municipal ports. We have no evidence about the
relative performance of ABP ports as compared with BTDB ports. In theory the
transfer of ownership from the national-government sector to the private sector
could lead to significant changes in managerial incentive structures. Thus we do not
believe that the privatisation of BTDB ports was a bad thing. However, we do not
favour the second wave of port privatisation, especially the privatisation of the
trust ports. The privatisation of trust ports was perceived as a means of increasing
their ability to diversify activities and to invest in port-related transport operations.
But under the Transport and Works Act (1992), restrictions on the right of trust
ports to diversify have been removed. It is then hard to see what advantages
privatisation has. As far as the future is concerned, we believe that port
privatisation will be more advantageous in the long term if some ports remain in
the public sector. The mixed-ownership will allow yardstick competition and a
direct comparison of public and private port performance. In addition, the existence
of public ports in the industry will prevent unfavourable market concentration and
keep a competitive port industry.
Given that merger and acquisition is a major route of firm growth in the
private sector, in the longer term port pnvatisation may well alter the nature of
port markets by industrial concentration. Many small ports are distinctly
unenthusiastic about plivatisation as they tend to rely on specialist trades or a few
major customers, and would be vulnerable to the market and to predatory takeover
bids in the private sector. As more trust ports and municipal ports are privatised,
the conditions for a merger and acquisition boom are being matured. This could
create a marked effect of port privatisation on efficiency. The optimistic view is
that the reduction in port numbers will improve efficiency as a result of exploiting
economies of scale. The pessimistic view is that it will deteriorate both allocative
and productive efficiency because of increased market power. It should be noted
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that the argument is only relevant when the acquiring port takes over the target
port and puts the latter to other more profitable use (non-port activities). If the
acquiring port does not close down the acquired port, it will increase its market
dominance without reducing port numbers. In this case the economies-of-scale
argument will not be persuasive. While the reduction in port numbers will
definitely narrow the scope of competition and hence affect port efficiency in a
negative direction, the magnitude of its positive effect will depend much upon the
extent of economies of scale exhibited in both shipping and port technology. This
could be a controversial issue of competition policy in the aftermath of port
privatisation. (By the way, sooner or later the ABP ports could be referred to the
Monopoly and Mergers Commission for investigation as their market share exceeds
25%).
Two pieces of evidence revealed in this study have cast doubt on substantial
e onomies of scale which were expected. The first is that traffic concentration has
remained fairly stable over last 20 years or so. One may argue that public
ownership status has prevented market forces from realising potential economies of
scale. But ship operators are free to choose ports and they have more say in
deciding the pattern of traffic distribution. Although port operators can lower port
charges to influence ship operators' decision, the role of port costs is limited and
often unimportant. Actually the prices charged by some small ports involving
short-sea container traffic were higher than by large ports. The second piece of
evidence is that port size does not explain wider efficiency differentials in the
industry. In other words small ports are as efficient as big ports and there has
been no indication of efficiency gains from economies of scale.
So far we have only discussed costs from the port producers' and the
customers' side. There is one more dimension of costs associated with traffic
concentration. The Government intends to increase the use of water transport as
compared with road for environmental reasons. Thus if we include in the total cost
the "green cost" of traffic concentration, the case for economies of scale could be
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further weakened. Therefore unless there is effective competition policy intervention
in the port sector, privatisation may even affect efficiency in a negative direction.
The issue on the extent of economies of scale is worth further investigation.
A new line of research might be to draw inferences about scale economies in ports
by using the survivor technique (Stigler, 1958). Despite the fact that the technique
has been subject to criticisms, we have some reasons for believing that its
application in the British port industry is appropriate.
Although productive efficiency is the focus of our empirical investigation, we
have also considered efficiency related to port pricing and investment behaviour
under alternative forms of ownership in a simplified model. Port privatisation may
lead to an increase in port prices. But we argued that this need not imply a
deterioration in allocative efficiency. Given inelastic aggregate demand for port
facilities and services, the welfare loss of monopoly pricing tends to be negligible
as far as resource allocation between the industry and other sectors is concerned. It
is shown that the welfare loss of monopoly pricing is also likely to be small as far
as resource allocation (traffic distribution) between ports is concerned, provided that
ports have uniform pricing objectives. Thus traffic distribution may be closer to the
optimal pattern in a single-ownership port system than in a mixed-ownership port
system. If this is accepted there is a case for believing privatisation may even
improve allocative efficiency in the port sector. An adverse welfare implication of
port privatisation relates to port development. it is maintained that private
ownership is inherently less efficient than public ownership in terms of investment
performance. in other words the pursuit of monopoply profit combined with the
oligopolistic structure of port markets results in either over- or under-investment as
compared with the social optimum. We have stressed that the investment
performance of port oligopolies should be the focus of applied welfare analysis in
port economics. There are a number of things that can be done on this aspect,
drawing on spatial economics.
No doubt efficiency gain has been a misplaced priority of privatisation in the
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port industry as well as in other industries, although in public debate it has been
claimed to be one of the utmost important objectives.
What can we learn from the UK 'experiment' of mixed port ownership and
port privatisation? British experience stresses that privatisation could be misplaced
or wasted effort if the policy objective is truly to improve efficiency. It could be
misplaced effort because ownership may not be very relevant for efficiency. It
could be unnecessary because public ownership is robust and can be made as
efficient as private ports. Possible measures to improve the efficiency of public
ports include decentralising port administration, setting up autonomous port
authorities, tightening financial constraints, stimulating market competition, etc.
There are even some situations in which privatisation not only does not guarantee
improvements in efficiency it may adversely affect efficiency as well.
What we have learnt from the UK 'experiment' is important. While public
ownership is currently an unpopular public policy option, there are a number of
reasons why it may be desirable that ports should be partly or wholly retained in
the public sector. These include the problem of property rights, the need for
planning, the necessity of dealing with externalities and the need to promote
efficiency by a public port authority (Goss, 1990, 3). It is often believed that there
is a painful trade—off between efficiency and public interests. However, if the
position is accepted that ownership is not always relevant for efficiency or that
public ownership is robust for efficiency, a trade—off will not be necessary.
Furthermore, while in this country the market ideology is so strong that people no
longer worry about wholesale privatisation (including prisons and the civil services,
let alone ports), in many other countries the notion of a purely private port is
often not in accord with the political system or with people' beliefs. Under these
circumstances, even when in theory private ownership is conducive to efficiency,
any push to transfer port ownership from the public sector to the private sector
would be unwise.
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Efficiency and Dock Labour Scheme
The abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme was another big event that the
port industry experienced in the 1980s. The result that emerges from the
comparison of productive efficiency between scheme and non-scheme ports during
1983-90 is a surprising one: the scheme had little impact on efficiency. It is only
three years since the scheme has been abolished; the full effect of the deregulation
in employment remains to be seen. But based on the relative performance of
non-scheme ports as compared with scheme ports, it is doubtful that the demise of
the scheme is likely to have a significant effect on efficiency. Although this demise
has led to an enormous change in conditions of employment, it does not
necessarily imply a remarkable change in the attitudes of working forces and
industrial relations at the ports.
Research Work on Frontier Estimation
Half of the research work of this thesis has involved developing and estimating
frontier models. Although both mathematical programming and econometric
approaches have each their own advantages and disadvantages, we tend to prefer
the econometric approach. The problem with the econometric approach is that an
unwarranted structure may be imposed for the true frontier technology. But with
the econometric approach one can test the structure specified and do something to
improve or re-specify the structure. By contrast the mathematical model is rigid.
When one finds the resultant efficiency estimates are not sensible (for example we
found that non-parametric measures overstated the true extent of inefficiency)
because of its deterministic nature, there is nothing that can be done given the
data.
The work involved included Monte Carlo analysis to compare the performance
of estimators and choose algorithms of non-linear optimisation, programming the
maximum likelihood (ML) procedure and modelling frontiers. The corrected
ordinary least square (COLS) technique performs better in small-sized samples but
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it is asymptotically inefficient as compared with the ML method. It seems that the
likelihood	 function	 is ill-behaved.	 Our	 experience	 shows	 that	 the
David-Fletcher-Powell algorithm is a powerful one.
Thus given the estimators available one should use larger samples whenever
possible. One problem with small-sized samples (say, less than 50) is the
occurrence of the wrong sign of the third moment of residuals. There are three
possible explanations for this. The first is that the model is not well-specified. The
second is that there is no inefficiency. The third is due to sample variation. To
avoid incorrect explanations the strategy we suggest is that one should first try
larger samples whenever possible before concluding that the model is inconsistent
with the data or that the data reveals no efficiency.
The econometric modelling of the production frontier has been enhanced in
two ways in this study. Firstly, the specification of the less restrictive reference
technologies enables us to restore notions of efficiency, which are normally missing
in the econometric models but can be measured in the mathematical programming
models. While the modelling strategy of 'general to specific' is well accepted in
other fields of applied econometrics, it has long been ignored by researchers of
frontier studies. But unless the structures that we impose on stochastic frontier
models are well justified we are not sure whether our efficiency estimates are
sensible ones. Unlike previous studies which specified a particular structure without
justification, we began with a less restrictive structure and proceeded by testing to
discover whether any appropriate restrictions can be imposed to obtain a specific
structure based on large-sample tests. We found that the data from our samples
rejects the widely-used Cobb-Douglas model in favour of the translog specification.
But we could not reject Kmenta's approximation of CES model as a restrictive
version of the translog model. Efficiency estimates were thus derived from a
better-specified frontier function. Secondly, the production frontier was given a
dynamic interpretation and hence we are able to translate productivity growth in
terms of the movement towards the frontier and the movement of the frontier
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itself over time.
6.4.2 Umitations Of The Study
Farrell's (1957) original intention was to measure managerial efficiency relative to
the frontier production function. This is also the main concern of our investigation
to compare relative efficiency of alternative forms of ownership. To estimate a
frontier which can be used to measure the quality of management truly, one needs
to measure factor inputs (except managerial input) correctly and exhaustively.
In view of this requirement the most serious problem of this study arises from
the measurement of input and output variables. In describing the data set in
Section 3.4 we have already discussed the deficiency of the data set (namely the
use of a gross measure rather than the use of a net measure of output, the
likelihood that port prices fail to reflect real costs, and the measurement of capital
at depreciated book value). The consequence of these measurement problems may
be that computed efficiency measures reflect different output mixes, different port
charging policies, and different capital structures as much as or more than genuine
efficiency differences. In non-parametric models these measurement errors will
under- or overstate the true extent of efficiency. In parametric models, while the
measurement errors may be partly captured by the symmetric error component, the
systematic measurement errors (e.g. lower book-value of capital assets for ports
developed a long ago) will contaminated efficiency measures. So for instance, one
may have a reason to suspect the lower-than-expected efficiency score of
Felixstowe (a relatively new port) and the high efficiency score of Liverpool (a
relatively old port). These measurement problems may undermine the credibility of
our efficiency estimates, especially when we compare ports individually. For instance
we may not have sufficient faith in our efficient estimates if we compare
Felixstowe with Liverpool.
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These measurement problems can also obscure the implications of efficiency
estimates for alternative ownership structures. Thus, for instance, a private port
turns out to be less efficient than a public port, but the relative efficiency may
merely reflect difference in output mix, or capital structure, or charging policy.
Nevertheless our concern is the efficiency of public ports relative to private
ports. We are interested in average efficiency of each ownership group rather
individual efficiency. It might be reasonable to expect that the effect of
measurement problems can be reduced by averaging. Thus, for example, the lower
efficiency score of Uverpool might be compensated by the higher efficiency score
of Felixstowe as they both belong to the group of private ports.
A further problem arises from the fact that there are only two inputs
available to us. Our frontier production models may omit some relevant variables
because of lack of measurement. Location of port site is likely to be such an
omitted factor. Some ports may claim their cost efficiency simply because of their
superior locational advantage. For example, ports with natural deep water depth
require less dredging costs, and ports in proximate to urban and industrial centres
or better connected with multiple inland transport systems (e.g. railway, road,
waterways, airways) need less inland transport costs. In these instances the resulting
efficiency measures indicate relative locational advantage of port sites rather than
relative efficiency of port management. Since the locational factor is not taken into
account in our efficiency models, our deterministic frontier may well be biased in
favour of ports with locational advantage or other unobserved factors. The
estimated parameters of parametric models may be inconsistent because of omitted
variables, and the estimates of the efficiency error distribution may be poorly
determined, which is obscured by the more dominant measurement error
distribution.
When information is available it would be appropriate to include a measure of
location in our frontier models, both parametric and non-parametric. Given
insufficient information, one way out of this problem is perphaps to use a
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fixed-effect frontier model by using the panel data we have. The omission of the
locational effect may cause inconsistency of our estimates based on pooled data,
since the efficiencies and regressors may not be independent. For locationally
efficient ports tend to have higher levels of inputs through the marginal
productivity conditions. But the time-constant locational effect can be eliminated in
a fixed-effect model which effectively takes means over time for each port. In
Section 4.5 both fixed-effects and random effects frontier models are estimated.
Under the null hypothesis that there is no correlation of the inefficiencies and the
regressors the general least squares (GLS) estimator is as consistent as the
least-squares dummy variable (LSDV), while under the alternative hypothesis of
correlation of regressors and inefficiencies the OLS as well as the ML is not.
However, a Hausman test fails to reject the null. Thus sample evidence does not
seem to be supportive of the possible effect of omitted fixed effects such as
location. This correlates with the fact that the our estimated model by the OLS
has a value of R-square as high as 96%, meaning that our capital and labour
input variables are nearly exhaustive in explaining the total variation in the output
variable. A 'goodness of fit measure' suggested by Farrell in estimation frontier
models is uesd to check the plausibility of estimated efficiency distribution. A
plausible efficiency distribution that Farrell favoured is the half-normal with mode
at maximum efficiency. On Farrell's criterion, the efficiency distributions derived
from the stochastic models under the exponential specification (Fig 4.4-3) is
well-shaped with mode at maximum efficiency (0.90-1.00).
This does not mean, of course, one must conclude that location has no
influence on port production. A more likely explanation for this might be that the
locational effect is partly captured by the aggregate capital variable. For example,
the value of land is based on market price, which may reflect locational advantage
of port sites to some extent.
267
6.4.3 Recommendations For Further Studies
Much could be improved if more time were given. First of all it would be
necessary and desirable to re—define and re—value the output and capital variable.
The gross measure of output should be replaced by a net measure. Given the
information available in annual reports and financial accounts this could be done.
Some physical measure (i.e. a function of the length and the depth of quays)
might be used for the capital input to replace net—book value of fixed capital
assets based on historical cost. But this would involve a port—by—port study to
identify quays belonging to the port authority under investigation. Furthermore,
instead of using the aggregate capital measure it might be better to adopt measures
of different sorts of capital (land, dock structure, machinery, buildings, ect). This
may partially solve the problems arising from heterogeneity of capital inputs.
Having revalued the output and input variables properly, we should have a better
representation of the production frontiers for the British port industry, against
which better efficiency estimates can be derived.
In estimating the deterministic frontier models we fail to take the qualitative
advantage of the panel data we have. Under the assumption of constant efficiency
over time, one may estimate the the frontiers from a data set of averaged input
and output variables for each port over time. The most serious problem the
deterministic approach suffers is its inability to tackle random shocks and
measurement errors. Time—averaging should substantially eliminate random shocks
and random measurement errors and hence allow a more accurate estimation of a
deterministic frontier.
The panel data models we used have to assume constancy of efficiency over
time. Over a long span of time periods or in dynamic circumstances this would not
be a reasonable assumption. Alternative specifications allowing both cross—sectional
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and time-series variations of efficiency would be appropriate. For instance, a two
ways fixed-effects or a two-ways random-effects models permitting both
time-specific and firm-specific effects. Furthermore an unsolved problem with the
dynamic frontier model is that the time trends might be overwhelmed by
cross-section variation when the cross-sectional and time-series data is "fat". In
addition, other specifications of time trends than the linear form might be
warranted.
Constrained by the data available we have been unable to illustrate another
piece of frontier modelling work, which involves decomposing the departure from
the frontier into X-inefficiency and technical inefficiency. This has been done by
introducing the concept of vintage capital into the frontier model. We insist that
these two notions have different policy implications and that it is inappropriate to
ignore the distinction between them.
Our experience shows that the measure of scale efficiency suggests an
unattainable most productive scale size and hence overstates the potential for
productivity improvement. An unfinished line of work is to develop more pertinent
size efficiency measures based on attainable productivity. An effort has been made
in Data Envelope Analysis Models (Maindiratta, 1990). Parallel work can be done
in parametric models. One more line is the development of testing procedures for
the appropriateness of the distributional assumption. Bauer (1990) suggested that
Lee's approach (1983) and the Kappa criterion used by Molina and Slottje (1987)
to test distributional assumptions about income distributions could be adopted.
Furthermore, it is very likely that autocorrelation will be present when panel data
is used. A dynamic specification of the frontier function that involves distributed
lags may then be necessary and the appropriate estimators would need to be
considered.
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